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This study contributes to the discussion around the value of a college degree and 
associated career advantages by considering how postsecondary education contributes to 
the attainment of the most powerful and prestigious positions in the American corporate 
world.  Guided by a conceptual framework informed by status attainment, power elite, 
and upper echelon theories, I examined the backgrounds of almost 4,000 top-level 
Fortune 500 business executives in 2010.  The data, including socio-demographics, 
postsecondary degrees, various undergraduate accomplishments, and company 
characteristics, were collected from a variety of secondary sources.  A series of analyses, 
inspired by the work of Useem and Karabel (1986), compared executives who were 
senior managers or outside directors of one company to even more powerful executives. 
This latter group, referred to as the “corporate elite,” were operationalized as CEOs, 





I found a bachelor’s degree to be almost universally held and few significant 
differences emerged distinguishing the most powerful executives from others in terms of 
their bachelor’s degree source.  Focusing more closely on undergraduate academic and 
extracurricular accomplishments, however, indicated that the corporate elite were more 
likely to be involved in certain activities.  Also, I observed differences in the levels of 
graduate degree attainment and graduate degree sources. Possessing an MBA degree 
from a top business school or, to a lesser extent from a lower ranked business school, 
were each positively associated with membership in the business elite. For law school 
graduates, the likelihood of holding a top position of corporate power was less consistent 
than that of MBAs.  
Ultimately, this paper adds to our understanding of how postsecondary education 
might shape a small and understudied population that is a high status occupational class, 
the top management team responsible for major corporate decisions, and a powerful inner 








Does a college degree really give someone an advantage in his or her career?  
Most professors, university administrators, and policy experts – not to mention students 
and parents – would like to believe that this is the case.  With the average annual tuition 
for a four-year degree in the range of $20,000 per year, it is reasonable to assume that 
such a major investment will pay off in the form of a good job after graduating as well as 
continued occupational success. As is it reasonable to assume that the “better” or more 
elite the degree, the greater the advantage.   
Examples of highly successful college graduates abound. Yet for every Yale B.A., 
Harvard MBA-holding Chief Executive Officer of a huge corporation like Boeing’s 
James McNerney, there is a Bill Gates counterexample. Literally one of the first facts 
mentioned by many news articles and biographies of the Microsoft founder is his choice 
to drop out of Harvard as an undergraduate in 1976 (e.g., BBC, 2004; Grossman, 2004).  
Gates is certainly not alone; anecdotes about wildly successful college dropouts are 
everywhere1 and contribute to an undercurrent of doubt that runs through popular opinion 
on the true necessity and value of a degree (Altucher, 2010; Baldwin, 2003; Murray, 
2007; Steinberg, 2010).  One of the latest examples is Pay-Pal co-founder and Facebook 
investor Peter Thiel’s “20 Under 20” program (Lacy, 2011). Thiel is a graduate of 
Stanford University and Stanford Law School but is convinced that higher education is 
the latest “bubble” industry. In 2011, Thiel announced his intentions to pay twenty 
                                                 





talented young adults $100,000 each over the course of two years to drop out of college 
and start a company instead.  
Purpose of the Study 
 This study confronts these competing narratives by considering the influences on 
who achieves the most powerful, most lucrative positions in the business world.  In 
today’s competitive and global economy, how important is postsecondary education, 
specifically whether and where someone goes to college, in determining whether 
someone attains a corporate leadership role?  How likely is it that someone will run a 
major business enterprise if he chooses to attend a top university compared to a lesser-
regarded school?  Will earning a graduate degree such as an MBA improve one’s 
chances?    
More specifically, this study builds on the scholarship of Michael Useem and 
colleagues in considering the role that higher education plays in determining who will be 
part of the senior-most managers and directors of the world’s largest public companies 
(Useem, 1978; Useem, 1979; Useem, 1980; Useem, 1982; Useem, 1984; Useem, 1989). 
Useem studied top American business executives in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and 
his research with Jerome Karabel during this time period informs the design and 
methodology here.  Useem and Karabel (1986) examined a sample of upper level 
corporate managers and found that postsecondary education influenced the chances that a 
top executive would be a Chief Executive Officer, serve on multiple corporate boards of 
directors, or be appointed to a leadership position in an influential business organization. 




achievement, even among those who already reached the upper levels of corporate 
management. 
In this study, I replicated, refined and extended that of Useem and Karabel with a 
sample of 3,798 top executives from 250 companies that were part of the 2010 Fortune 
500 list. My analyses compared executives who were senior managers or outside 
directors of one company only to even more powerful executives who were part of what 
scholars label the “corporate elite.”  To be clear, the entire population is high-level 
American executives, all holding relatively high status and well paid positions.  This 
study, like the one that I replicate, was “concerned not with whether an aspiring middle 
manager with top university credentials will reach the senior level of a firm, but rather 
with those factors that increase the probability that senior managers already there will 
reach even higher levels of power and responsibility [and status] within the corporate 
world” (Useem & Karabel, 1986, p. 190).  
I began by analyzing whether the sample’s social background and postsecondary 
degree patterns were associated with membership in the corporate elite, and I contrasted 
my findings with those of the prior study.   I then refined these analyses by incorporating 
more variables and more comparisons among the different executive groups. Finally, I 
focused on a subsample of executives and explored patterns of their undergraduate 
experiences and achievements. 
Corporate Elite Defined 
The focus here is on a small group of business leaders known as the corporate 
elite. I discuss the theoretical underpinnings of this term in Chapter Two and empirical 




offer a brief definition here as well. By corporate elite, I mean individuals who hold top 
positions in major American corporations, according them the highest status, prestige, 
and power in American business.  Their positions enable them to define the political 
interests of business at a national level and mobilize to exert corporate influence over the 
political process, serving the interests of all large companies (Domhoff, 1974a; Domhoff, 
2006a; Domhoff, 2010; Dye, 1995; Useem, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1984).  
There are three ways the corporate elite are operationally represented in this 
study: 1) Top corporate management, or those who have oversight of a company’s major 
strategic decisions and responsibility for its outcomes (i.e., CEOs), 2) Corporate 
governance, or involvement in the governance of two or more major corporations, and 3) 
Business association leaders, or those who are key members and leaders of organizations 
that represent the national political interests of business.   
Unfortunately, “elite” often is considered to be pejorative when used to describe 
individuals (Klitgaard, 1985) and that is especially true in the mainstream media (e.g., 
Murray, 2010). As used here, elite refers to those at the apex of the corporate power 
structure in legitimate leadership positions. Political scientist Thomas Dye (1995) asserts, 
“the elitist character of American society is not a product of political conspiracy, 
capitalist exploitation, or any specific malfunction of democracy. All societies are elitist. 
There cannot be large institutions without great power being concentrated within the 
hands of the few at the top of these institutions” (p. 3). 
Foundation of the Study: Useem and Karabel (1986) 
 Given the importance of Useem and Karabel’s (1986) research to this study, a 




Published in the American Sociological Review, their study was theoretically grounded in 
Pierre Bourdieu’s work on what (and how) an individual’s background– especially family 
social class and education – facilitate social and economic success.  Useem and Karabel 
assumed a family background rich with social connections and opportunities (i.e., high 
status) was a type of “social capital” and a postsecondary degree from a top university 
was a type of “scholastic capital.” These forms of capital, along with cultural and 
economic capital (neither measured in this study, however), were hypothesized to be 
important influences on a business executive’s chances of entrance into the corporate 
elite.  
 To test this hypothesis, Useem and Karabel selected 3,105 executives with the 
rank of vice president or above from 208 companies included in Fortune magazine’s 
1977 list.  They used a variety of secondary sources to construct a biographical dataset 
with their major measures being high status family background (i.e., graduate from an 
elite secondary school and/or family listed in the Social Register) and university 
credentials (i.e., a BA from a top ranked university, an MBA from a top ranked program, 
a JD from a top ranked program).  Using the three representations of the corporate elite 
described in the prior section, Useem and Karabel compared these executives to other top 
leaders (e.g, single outside directors, executive vice presidents) using quantitative 
analytic techniques, primarily crosstabulation and linear regression.  
 The main conclusion from this study was that social capital and scholastic capital 
were associated with membership in the corporate elite, even when this group was 
compared to others who had also reached upper management levels of major firms. For 




families, and this was directly related to being in one of the extra-firm leadership 
positions (i.e., being a multiple outside director and a business association leader), though 
not significant for CEOs.  Postsecondary education was associated with each of the three 
outcomes.  The odds that senior managers without bachelor’s degrees would be in a CEO 
position were 26.5 percent, for example, while the odds increased to 36.4 percent for 
those with a “lesser” bachelor’s degree and 51.5 percent for those with a “top” bachelor’s 
degree. Earning an MBA or a law degree from a top program also improved the 
likelihood that executives would be a CEO but not as much compared to holding a top 
bachelor’s degree.   However, a law degree from a top program relative to any other type 
of degree provided the largest career advantage for multiple outside directors and 
business association leaders.   
Significance of the Study 
The study by Useem and Karabel is considered seminal in the sociology and 
higher education literatures as evidence for the continued importance both of family 
background and of attending a top college on an individual’s social and economic 
attainment.  Their findings are especially remarkable given that their entire sample was 
comprised of high-achieving executives, yet significant differences still existed in the 
social and scholastic backgrounds of those in the topmost positions to those just below.   
Nonetheless, there are a number of reasons that make revisiting the topic a worthwhile 
endeavor.  
The data are over thirty years old, and whether the findings continue to apply to 
contemporary social and economic context is unclear. In his review of educational and 




reading signals and establishing screens differently from the way they did those things 30 
years ago” (p. 459). Patterns of educational attainment were clearly different in 2010 than 
1977 – in 1980, 10.7 percent of Americans age 25 years and over held a college degree, 
compared to 28.7 percent in 2007 – so it follows that patterns of executive degree 
attainment have changed as well (U.S. Census, 2008).   
Also, Useem and Karabel did not explore the distinctions among postsecondary 
degrees in much detail.  They simply used Coleman’s university rankings in 1940 to 
identify eleven “top” undergraduate programs.  The relationship between holding a top 
degree was contrasted to holding a “lesser” degree (i.e., any other bachelor’s degree) as 
well no degree.  A similar method was used to identify the top eleven MBA programs 
and the top nine law programs.  No further investigation was made of the college 
groupings or of any other organizational characteristics that might be salient explanations 
for the differences in occupational attainment, nor did they consider the role that 
individual aspects of the executives’ postsecondary experience might play (e.g., 
undergraduate major, academic performance, campus involvement). This limitation 
reflects an ongoing challenge in higher education research, namely understanding what it 
is about specific colleges that may confer distinctive advantages on degree holders and in 
turn translate into different outcomes.  Using contemporary data, I investigate these 
dimensions more closely.  
The outcomes of Useem and Karabel’s research, which were the same outcomes I 
used in this study (i.e., whether an executive was a CEO, served on multiple corporate 
boards of directors, or held a leadership position in a major business organization), can be 




study represents a contribution to at least three separate bodies of scholarship across 
several disciplines – status attainment (sociology), power elite theory (sociology/political 
science), and upper echelon theory (business management/organizational behavior) – as 
well as research in higher education that addresses college outcomes and college impact. 
I discuss the literature in more detail in Chapter Two but consider here the significance of 
this study to each of these areas.   
From a career-oriented perspective, my focus is on the attainment of top-level 
occupational outcomes. A CEO position is above a CFO, COO, or Executive Vice 
President in an organizational chart; it is a relatively higher occupational category.  Also, 
these positions are among the best compensated today. Piketty and Saez’s (2006) income 
trends research demonstrates “the very large increases in top wages (especially top 
executive compensation). As a consequence, top executives (the “working rich”) replaced 
top capital owners (the “rentiers”) at the top of the income hierarchy during the twentieth 
century” (p. 204).  
Surveys of prospective college students indicate that improving career 
opportunities is a common reason cited for pursuing postsecondary education (King, 
1996; Knox, Lindsay & Kolb, 2003; Mullen, 2010). Business is a popular field that 
students enter. According to UCLA’s 2008 College Senior Survey, 17.4 percent of 
seniors nationally reported business was their probable career/occupation after 
graduation, the most frequent response on the survey after the 20 percent of seniors who 
responded “other” (Liu, Ruiz, DeAngelo & Pryor, 2009).  While students may hope that 
their investment in a degree will translate into occupational advantages, Pascarella and 




focused on the impact of postsecondary educational attainment on occupational status” 
(p. 449). My review of the status attainment literature published in the twenty-first 
century did not produce many additional resources (exceptions include Roksa, 2005; 
Stock & Alston, 2000; Warren, Sheridan & Hauser, 2002).  Also, most of the studies in 
this area focus on early career; less is known about how postsecondary education relates 
to later-in-life occupational outcomes.  
Another way to view the study outcomes is that they represent positions held by 
individuals who direct and manage major organizational decisions; “more than any other 
single set of people, their decisions have decisive bearing on the contemporary contours 
of the nation’s career hierarchies, wage distributions, and plant locations” (Useem & 
Karabel, 1986, p. 184). Therefore, I also use the upper echelon theory in business 
management to frame my research.  While the research in this tradition suggests that 
CEOs and directors influence firm outcomes (Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders, 2004; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984), little is known about specific characteristics of these 
individuals, including their education.  After reviewing the literature, Keiser (2004) 
concluded, “for all the field knows about CEOs, there are regrettably few examples of 
systematic research about executive traits, and whether the demographic traits of 
individuals in this top position have changed over time” (p. 55).   
Executives who are CEOs, networked across several organizations as multiple 
outside directors, or part of leading business organizations represent a small group of 
leaders who are able to exert considerable power over the decisions made not only in 
their own companies but across corporations as well.  This is part of power elite theory, 




“inner circle” – are a unified class that exerts corporate influence over the political 
process based upon its shared interests (Domhoff, 2010; Useem, 1984). Do those who 
achieve powerful positions share common postsecondary backgrounds? Beyond Useem 
and Karabel’s study, this question has been given scant attention by power elite 
researchers and no attention at all by higher education researchers.  However, Baker (in 
press) argues that a college degree is more important than ever before in positioning 
someone to move into power:   
power (often now in formal organizations with large professional staffs) in society 
is legitimately distributed by education credentials…the schooled society not only 
makes educational credentials ever more prominent for individuals’ status 
attainment, educational credentialing anchors the society-wide status system by 
which the volume of resources and power of a richly technological world are 
legitimately controlled and distributed (p. 14). 
 
Also encouraging me to pursue this line of inquiry is the recent resurgence of 
interest across all disciplines in studying and understanding elites (Sullivan, 2010).  Early 
in the twentieth century, scholars such as C. Wright Mills, Digby Baltzell, and Thorstein 
Veblen produced a strong foundation of work on social, cultural, economic, and political 
elites. In the early 1980s, however, social scientists interested in inequality focused their 
attention on the other end of the socioeconomic spectrum, at impoverished, unemployed, 
and disenfranchised members of society.  These studies rarely made distinctions among 
the middle classes or the elites, so the place of elites in contemporary society and how 
they reach this position is under researched (with a few exceptions like Domhoff).   
Though the idea that elites exist is uncomfortable to many in the United States (Dye, 
1995), this group directs and manages major decisions that have far-reaching effects on 
the contours of American socioeconomic life and therefore is an important focus for 




concentration of wealth in the hands of a small group, attention to elite formation and 
associated consequences has increased and in October 2010 the first “Elites Research 
Network” conference was convened at Columbia University (Sullivan, 2010).  These 
researchers are mostly sociologists and political scientists, however, and my focus on 
education uniquely positions me to make a distinctive contribution to the field.  
 
Research Questions  
 
This study addresses the primary overarching question, how is postsecondary 
education associated with membership in the American corporate elite?  I begin by 
establishing the patterns of executives’ postsecondary attainment and the specific types of 
institutions from which they earned their bachelor’s and graduate degrees.  This 
descriptive analysis addresses the following sub-question: 
1).  What are the higher education backgrounds of top corporate executives?  Are 
there differences in the backgrounds of Chief Executive Officers, multiple 
directors, and business association leaders compared to other senior executives?   
 
 
I then replicate the work done by Useem and Karabel (1986) in their 1977 study of 
corporate executives.  The study replication addresses the following sub-question:  
2).  How has the relationship between postsecondary attainment and membership 
in the corporate elite changed between 1977 and 2010?   
 




3).  Is postsecondary attainment related to the chances that an executive will be 






Finally, I extend the prior study to better understand the executives’ undergraduate 
accomplishments beyond the college or university from which they earned their degrees. 
The study extension addresses the following sub-questions: 
4).  Do the undergraduate academic achievements of the corporate elite differ 
from other top executives?  
 
5).  Does the undergraduate campus involvement of the corporate elite differ from 
other top executives?  
 
 
Organization of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is organized into five chapters. In this chapter, I gave an 
overview of the study’s purpose, including the significance of understanding the 
relationship between postsecondary education and membership in the corporate elite 
today, and I identified the research questions guiding my analysis.  
My review of the literature is in Chapter Two and organized around two 
overarching questions. First, how are top corporate executives studied? I discuss three 
main conceptual frameworks that inform this line of inquiry – status attainment, power 
elite, and upper echelon theory – and highlight main assumptions and 
strengths/weaknesses of each. Second, what predicts executive career achievement? 
Drawing from the empirical evidence pertaining to each conceptual framework, I 
summarize the demographics, social-psychological characteristics, postsecondary 
education, career experiences, and firm characteristics that have been shown to affect 
someone’s chances of ascending to the corporate elite. 
Chapter Three outlines the study methodology. I discuss the companies and 




constructed as well as the analytic strategy I employed to understand ways in which the 
corporate elite differed from other top executives.   
The study results are presented in Chapter Four. I begin by analyzing the 
descriptive characteristics of postsecondary degree attainment for the full sample. I then 
replicate and refine Useem and Karabel’s (1986) study of top business executives with 
contemporary data. Next, I extend their analysis to focus on the role of postsecondary 
education – academic achievements, status-conferring experiences, involvement, etc. – 
on membership in the corporate elite.  The chapter concludes with a summary of the 
study limitations. 
The final chapter summarizes the key findings, considers their implications for 
policy and practice as well as for each of the three contributing conceptual frameworks, 







Review of the Literature 
 
 
I begin this chapter by considering how executive careers are studied, 
summarizing the three main theoretical frameworks that inform the study design.  I then 
examine the evidence around what predicts executive career achievement, especially why 
and how postsecondary education affects executive careers.  
 
How are Top Corporate Executives Studied? 
Much of the contemporary research on the careers of high level business 
executives approaches the topic using one of three frameworks: status attainment, power 
elite, or the upper echelon. I discuss each of these orientations to the study of business 
executives, their limitations, and their conceptual contributions to framing my 




Table 2.1  




General Purpose Contribution to this Study 
Status 
attainment 




a. Emphasizes the social value & 
importance of occupation. 
b. Groups occupations according to 
relative desirability and status. 
c. Identifies education as an important 
factor in individual status attainment. 
Power elite Sociology / 
Political 
Science 
To explain the 
American power 
structure  
a. Defines the corporate elite as CEOs, 
members of multiple boards, and 
business policy group leaders. 
b. Asserts corporate elite are more 
powerful than other top executives 
because they participate in cross-
corporate decision making processes.  
c. Is the framework for Useem and 








a. Asserts top corporate executives – 





The status attainment perspective assumes occupation is a central element of 
social organization as well as the basis on which modern forms of social stratification 
arise (Hall, 1983; Sorensen, 2001). The attribute of occupation represents something 
beyond financial standing. It is one of the fundamental economic and social roles of most 
adults, a basic piece of one’s identity and activities (Haller & Portes, 1973; Sewell & 
Hauser, 1975). It also gives information about skills and abilities that are valuable in the 




No approach to measuring occupation for research purposes is universally 
accepted among status attainment researchers, though most typically consider all 
occupations together based upon ratings of status, desirability, or prestige associated with 
any given occupation (Blau & Duncan, 1967; Nakao & Treas, 1989; Siegel, 1971).  
Business executives are not typically the sole focus of the research in this tradition and 
are considered along with other types of workers, with the goal of understanding how and 
why different individuals follow different career paths.   
Status attainment offers insight into how individuals attain positions in the 
hierarchies of social, economic, and/or political power. In this framework, the term 
“status” is taken to mean “inequalities among social units, such as persons or families, 
which are more or less institutionalized within the larger social system” (Haller & Portes, 
1973, p. 51). Thus, status attainment offers insight not only where individual social 
mobility is concerned but also the degree to which individual achievement is connected 
to broader social stratification.  
In The American Occupational Structure (1967), Peter Blau and Otis Duncan 
outlined the basic status attainment framework. Using data collected by the U.S. Census 
Bureau in 1962, they employed path analysis to test how two exogenous variables – 
father’s education and father’s occupation – influenced an individual’s educational 
attainment and occupational status and found strong support for the hypothesized 
relationships.  Blau and Duncan’s work is foundational in asserting the importance of 
education in the overall status attainment process (Haller & Portes, 1973). The zero-order 
correlation between educational attainment (measured in years) and occupational status 




of 0.440 and a direct effect on occupation in 1962 of 0.394. In fact, the effect of 
education on occupational status in 1962 (r=0.394) was comparably larger than the effect 
of first job on occupational status in 1962 (r=0.281).  
 The basic Blau-Duncan framework is one of the most cited works in sociology 
and has been modified, extended, and updated extensively (Sewell & Hauser, 1992).  One 
of its early modifications is often referred to as the Wisconsin model and in its own right 
is similarly foundational for the status attainment tradition. Researchers from the 
University of Wisconsin incorporated psychological variables (e.g., IQ) and social 
psychological variables (e.g., aspirations, self-concept, motivation) into the status 
attainment path model (Sewell, Haller & Portes, 1969; Sewell, Haller & Ohlendorf, 
1970).  Tested using data collected from Wisconsin males who were high school seniors 
in 1957, variables for occupational aspirations, educational aspirations, influence of 
parents’, friends, and teachers, academic performance, and “mental ability” were added. 
The influence of education (again measured in years) on occupational status continued to 
be strong despite the inclusion of these additional independent variables.  Specifically, 
the direct path coefficient was 0.553, and educational attainment explained 38 percent of 
the variance in occupational attainment in 1964 (Sewell, Haller & Ohlendorf, 1970).   
The Blau-Duncan and Wisconsin models both gave support to the causal order of 
status variables, and the classic framework derived from them is reproduced in Figure A1 
(Appendix A).  Ascribed characteristics present at birth (e.g., family socioeconomic 
success), achieved characteristics (e.g., training), and the social-pyschological 
characteristics discussed above directly influence occupational status as well as earnings.  




through educational attainment. Education in turn exerts a unique effect on earnings and 
occupational status throughout the life course, although the direct effect declines over 
time.  Many studies report results consistent with Blau-Duncan and Wisconsin using 
different data sets, including additional variables, and applying more sophisticated 
methods to adjust for unobservables, response errors and incomplete data, but there is 
strong continued support for the fundamental assumption that educational attainment 
directly contributes to occupational attainment (Corcoran, 1992; Griffin & Alexander, 
1978; Hout, 1988; Kerckhoff, Raudenbush & Glennie, 2001; Sewell & Hauser, 1992; 
Warren, Hauser & Sheridan, 2002).   
By the same token, scholars in this tradition have been criticized for not exploring 
this relationship in more detail beyond parsing out its significance and effect size.  Baker 
(in press) recently observed,  
Not only has formal educational credentialing become widely interjected into the 
occupational process, the nature of educational credentialing itself continues to 
intensify (p. 3) … [but] oddly, with only a few notable exceptions this distinctive 
and expanding feature of education in postindustrial society is generally 
underappreciated, under-analyzed and under-theorized in the sociologies of 
education, occupations and social stratification. If appreciated, educational 
credentialing is seen as playing a supporting role in inter-occupational conflict; if 
analyzed, educational credentials are considered as a mere technical adjustment to 
the status attainment models; and if theorized about, educational credentialing is 
considered a minor phenomenon, or as an indicator of the assumed problem of 
over-education (p. 4). 
 
 Several other criticisms of the classic status attainment framework are relevant to 
my research.  First, the dependent variable is typically a continuous measure of prestige 
or socio-economic status.  Determining where differences exist between specific groups – 
such as CEOs compared to other executives – is unclear with continuous outcomes.   




characteristics of schools and labor force variations according to sector and firm (Baron 
& Bielby, 1980; Braxton, Brier, Herzog & Pascarella, 1990; Kerckhoff, 1995; Petersen, 
1992; Scott, 1996; Smart, 1986; Tinto, 1980).  More recent status attainment research – 
referred to as “fourth generation” (Kerckhoff, 1995, 1999) or “new structuralism” (Baron 
& Bielby, 1980) – ameliorates some of these limitations and considers how a cohort of 
individuals is sorted into positions in the stratification hierarchy, given their structured 
social contexts. Petersen (1992) asserts that “the macro-sociological orientation of Blau 
and Duncan, to characterize the stratification structure of an entire society, has been 
replaced by a more micro- or meso-sociological approach, where specific career 
mechanisms, as found for example in organizations, are studied in detail, uncovering 
much more heterogeneity in positions and conditions than a standard status attainment 
approach allows” (p. 638).  The classic status attainment framework is silent about the 
actual mechanisms that produce occupational attainment.  For instance, what is it about a 
college degree that causes an individual to find a high quality job? How does this 
relationship work? Also, the occupational attainment process is not as simplistic or linear 
for everyone as the model assumes (Haller & Portes, 1973; Rosenfeld, 1992).   
Despite its limitations, the status attainment tradition is relevant to my study for 
two reasons.  First, it offers a conceptual reason to study business executives; namely, 
they are a high status and desirable occupation. Second, despite criticisms about under 
attentiveness to education, it is the foundational framework on which much of the 
research on the relationship between education and career outcomes is based.  




especially findings on the importance of education and the literature that has applied 
status attainment, which will be discussed later in this chapter.  
Power Elite Theory 
Status attainment ranks occupations based on relative social prestige. A top 
executive of a major corporation is a position of high status, and a CEO is an even more 
prestigious occupation. Social status is one dimension along which a society may stratify; 
another dimension is power. Power is a core concept in the social sciences, and scholars 
dating back to Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Hobbes have extensively debated what 
power is, how to measure it, and how to determine who possesses it (Scott, 1991). Max 
Weber’s definition is classic and a common starting point (Emerson, 1962). Weber 
(1946) described power as “the chance of a number of men to realize their own will in a 
communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action” 
(p. 132). Though an extensive discussion of the power literature is beyond the scope 
here,2 especially germane is the assumption that high level corporate executives are able 
to wield a great deal of power based on their positions as heads of major institutions, 
what French and Raven (1960) labeled “legitimate” power. Also important is the 
assumption that this power is separate from the income or the status associated with their 
positions (Weber, 1946).  
Top executives’ power can be thought of as extending in two dimensions, 
vertically and horizontally.  By virtue of their positions at the top of a company’s 
organizational structure, executives have vertical power over the organization’s key 
resources, operations, and employees (Pfeffer, 1981; Perrow, 1981). Their decision-
making capacities affect the company’s employees, stockholders, customers, and other 
                                                 




stakeholders. The higher an executive is in an organization chart, the closer he will be to 
the biggest decisions with potentially the greatest impact (e.g., plant closings, layoffs, 
product launches, investment decisions).  
According to the power elite theory,3 a subset of these top executives are in even 
more powerful positions.  The corporate elite – also referred to as the “inner circle” – not 
only have vertical influence over a single company’s decisions but also have horizontal 
influence extending across all major corporations. They are a unified class that defines 
the political interests of business at a national level, mobilizes to exert corporate 
influence over the political process, and ensures that political actions produce benefits 
that serve the interests of all large companies (Domhoff, 1974a; Domhoff, 2006a; 
Domhoff, 2010; Dye, 1995; Mills, 1956; Moore, 1979; Useem, 1984).   
Scholars in the power elite tradition, including Useem and Karabel (1986), assert 
that the corporate elite is a relatively cohesive group; they collaborate to define the 
political interests of business at a national level.  These shared interests or extracorporate 
logic are characterized as a “classwide principle,” and allow the corporate elite to exert 
institutionalized power (Useem, 1984, pp. 14-15). The group mobilizes based upon its 
shared logic to exert corporate influence over the political process. This does not, 
however, imply corporations are coordinating every decision.  According to Useem 
(1984),    
Most corporate business decisions are viewed, correctly, as a product of the 
internal logic of the firm. Yet when decisions are made on the allocation of 
company monies to political candidates, the direction of its philanthropic 
activities, and other forms of political outreach, an external logic is important as 
                                                 
3 Also commonly considered to be part of the power elite are top leaders in other dimensions of the 
institutional structure of American society beyond major corporations – including media, law, education, 
civic and cultural organizations, the government, and the military – but detailed attention to these is outside 




well.  This is the logic of classwide benefits, involving considerations that lead to 
company decisions beneficial to all large companies, even when there is no 
discernible direct gain for the individual firm. The inner circle is the carrier of this 
extracorporate logic; the strategic presence of its members in the executive suites 
of major companies allows it to shape corporate actions to serve the entire 
corporate community (p. 5). 
 
Who is part of the corporate power elite? 
 
In modern societies that favor bureaucratic structures such as the United States, 
the acquisition and maintenance of large-scale bases of power occurs through institutions 
(Mills, 1956). Someone may exert great power outside of an institutional context (e.g., an 
assassin who kills a President), but this is fleeting and situation-specific. Through their 
control of economic resources on a national and even global scale, corporations and large 
banks are the main economic institutions that are the basis for the corporate elite in the 
United States. Executives leading local or family-owned companies, therefore, are not 
part of this group. The form of power associated with institutional positions is not merely 
an attribute of an individual but rather an attribute of the role held by that individual in 
the broader social structure (Dye, 1995). 
Determining who specifically is part of the power elite is a function of identifying 
the positions that translate to the cross-company horizontal influence described above.  
Members are commonly distinguished by the formal roles that they occupy (Pettigrew, 
1992; Useem, 1979; Useem, 1984).  The Chief Executive Officer of a company is 
generally assumed to have the most vertical influence over his company’s operations of 
any other single employee, although research on exactly what they do is surprisingly 
limited (Mintzberg, 1973; Mintzberg, 1990).  In addition, CEOs are recognized as “the 




modern economies” (Bertrand, 2009).  Corporate elite scholars, therefore, commonly 
include CEOs of major corporations as part of the power elite.  
Interlocking directorships are another key mechanism through which the power 
elite operates.  Individuals who sit on the boards of directors for at least two major 
corporations are part of an interlocking directorship.  According to Domhoff (2009), 
interlocking directorships are “valuable for the dissemination of organizational 
innovations among corporations; they give the people who are members of several boards 
a very useful overview of the corporate community as a whole; they contribute to 
political cohesion; and they have modest effects on some of the financial practices of the 
interlocked corporations” (pp. 24-25).  While power elite theory recognizes that outside 
directors have responsibility for approving major internal decisions such as the selection 
of top executives, they are also critical in helping the organization monitor the external 
environment and ensure its policies and strategies are consistent with those of the larger 
business community. Useem (1979, 1984) asserts that interlocking directors have a 
unique opportunity to define and communicate extracorporate logic through their 
relationships with multiple firms that are often in different environments.   
An additional means by which corporate leaders shape this extracorporate logic 
and influence policy is through certain overarching business policy organizations (Useem 
& Karabel, 1986), also referred to as “policy discussion groups” (Domhoff, 2010) or 
“elite policy-planning networks” (Burris, 1992). Examples include the Business 
Roundtable, the Business Council, the Committee for Economic Development (CED), 
and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), and all are comprised of and funded by 




that narrowly focus on policies pertinent specifically to their membership (e.g., the 
National Association of Home Builders, the American Petroleum Institute) and instead 
take positions on larger scale issues that affect all major businesses such as free trade or 
international tax laws (Domhoff, 2010). Business policy organizations are forums for 
corporate leaders to hear about policy issues from experts, to work though disagreements 
with other members and formulate collective positions, to identify peers who might be 
good representatives for government appointments or organizational spokespeople, and to 
influence public opinion and policy outcomes (Burris, 1992; Domhoff, 2010; Useem, 
1984).  An important note is that business policy organizations have full-time staff 
members and hundreds of members, but “only those who come to have major roles 
within the policy-planning network are part of the leadership group, the power elite” 
(Domhoff, 2010, p. 100).  Each organization has a board of directors or trustees 
comprised of a subset of the membership, and these positions are commonly used to 
proxy those who have sustained involvement in and oversight of the organization’s 
activities (Colwell, 1993; Useem & Karabel, 1986). 
Evidence on the existence of a corporate power elite. 
 
Most studies4 of the corporate power elite focus on defining the prevalence and 
density of interlocking corporate directorships (Scott, 1991). In 1969, about half of 
outside directors in the largest 800 American firms were also a top executive (president, 
chairman, or CEO) of another company in that group (Useem, 1979).   Also, compared to 
individuals holding a single corporate directorship, multiple directors were at least twice 
                                                 
4 Network analysis is the main technique used to study power and by extension the inner circle of the power 
elite.  This is a process of mapping out different connections between people and organizations, including 
the size and direction of financial transactions, information transactions, social relationships, and kinship 




as likely to be on boards of nonprofit private organizations, to be members of major 
business policy organizations, or to be government policy advisors. In a more recent 
study, Davis, Yoo and Baker (2003) examined the Fortune 500 interlocks in 1982, 1990, 
and 1999 and found a consistent “small world property,” in that “corporate America is 
overseen by a network of individuals who to a great extent know each other or have 
acquaintances in common” (p. 321).  In 1999, for instance, the average board member 
had 4.3 ties to other members in other firms.  The trustees and directors of major business 
policy organizations also overlap considerably with major corporations (Burris, 1992), 
and their leadership is interlocked to major foundations and think tanks as well (Burris, 
2008; Colwell, 1993).  
Yet the mere existence of interlocking relationships does not necessarily imply 
that a cohesive power elite is at work.  While boards of directors meet face-to-face 
several times per year, it cannot be assumed these interlocks imply that some type of 
coordination is occurring through them.  Interlocks likely offer other advantages to firms 
acting solely in their self-interest – directors with ties to other well-known institutions 
may convey a sense of legitimacy to investors, banks, and other firms, or they may give 
information that better enables the firm to monitor their environment and co-opt 
uncertainty (Mizruchi, 1996). However, in a review of the corporate network literature, 
Scott (1991) notes that even “at its weakest, an interlock involves a potential for 
communication and for the exercise of influence and power” (p. 182). Also, studies of 
these groups’ political ideology and political contributions are mixed in terms of whether 
they appear to be more cohesive than other businesspeople (Mizruchi, 1989; Mizruchi, 




direct or indirect corporate board tie were more likely to make contributions to similar 
political candidates, but a similar study by Mizruchi (1992) indicated that only indirect 
ties were statistically significant.  
Mizruchi (2007) suggests that the corporate power elite may be an artifact that 
peaked in the first few decades after World War II.  In a reaction to the Cold War, the 
corporate elite needed to coordinate the national business interests and affect social 
policy. Then in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the disappearance of an active state, 
decline in union power, a change in commercial banks, and the takeovers in the 1980s 
contributed to the dissolution of a classwide principle and ultimate fragmentation of the 
corporate elite, according to Mizruchi. However, Domhoff (2009) argues that these same 
events in fact strengthened the corporate elite: “in the same time period between 1965 
and 2000 when individual rights and freedoms expanded, corporate power also became 
greater because unions were decimated, the Civil Rights movement dissipated, and the 
liberal-labor coalition splintered” (p. 212).  
Therefore, the degree to which the corporate elite today directly or indirectly 
drives policy-making is uncertain. One of the leading contemporary advocates for the 
existence of a power elite is William Domhoff, and he readily acknowledges that 
executives regularly complain about their lack of power in the policy arena (2006a, 
2010).  However, he also maps out the process by which the corporate elite serves on 
federal executive branch policy advising committees, participates in presidential and 
congressional commissions, and is appointed (or their close colleagues are appointed) to 





Power elite theory offers several key contributions to this research. It underlies 
Useem and Karabel’s (1986) research and I am replicating their study. In addition, it 
emphasizes the importance of studying the corporate elite because they have power in 
cross-corporate decisions and business policy-making at the federal level.  Power elite 
research also offers solid grounding in how to empirically represent the positions 
associated with membership in the corporate elite; namely, CEOs and multiple directors 
for major corporations as well as business policy group leaders. 
Upper Echelon Theory 
Even if the relative collective power has declined there is another important 
reason to focus on the individuals who hold these positions. They are leaders who exert 
enormous influence over the directions individual corporations take and matter for firm 
performance (Bertrand, 2009). Management and organizational scholars, as well as some 
economists, use upper echelon (UE) theory to study firm performance.  First proposed by 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) and updated by Carpenter, Geletkanycz and Sanders (2004), 
it considers interrelationships among firm and environment characteristics, the attributes 
of top executives, and organizational outcomes.  The Carpenter et al framework, which is 
more detailed than Hambrick and Mason’s and draws from more recent research, is 
reproduced in Figure B2 (Appendix B).   
Top executives, also referred to as the firm’s top management team (TMT), are 
central to the UE perspective.  Conceptually, the TMT is defined as those individuals 
who “provide an interface between the firm and its environment, and are relatively 
powerful, and therefore their choices and actions are likely to have an impact on the 




operationalized varies, with most researchers relying on organizational charts or 10-K 
filings to select high-level executives by title, by compensation, or those who report 
directly to the CEO.  A few researchers instead ask the CEO to identify the top managers 
who are involved in strategic decisions, while others include only those who hold 
management positions and are members of the board.5  In their summary of the UE 
literature Carpenter et al (2004) observed that no matter how the TMT is defined 
empirically, almost all of the research demonstrates a significant relationship between 
executives and firm outcomes.   
UE theory suggests executives directly affect a firm’s performance outcomes such 
as survival, profitability, and growth.  Executives affect the firm’s strategic choices and 
direction, including acquisitions, diversification, technology and other investment 
decisions (e.g., buildings, equipment), product innovations or launches, administrative 
complexity, internal reorganizations, and responsiveness (Hickson, 1987). These strategic 
decisions, in turn, influence firm performance.  Each of these relationships may be 
mediated by contextual differences, including variations in discretion, incentives, 
integration, or team processes (Carpenter et al, 2004).     
In terms of precise executive characteristics, the original UE framework proposed 
by Hambrick and Mason (1984) includes both psychological attributes, including their 
cognitive base and values, as well as more observable career background and 
demographics, including age, functional tracks, education, social origins, financial 
position, and other group characteristics.  However, Hambrick and Mason downplayed 
                                                 
5 These definitions are consistent with at least some of those used by power elite scholars, but UE research 
has developed as a mostly parallel tradition. In his review, Pettigrew (1992) observed the UE literature “has 
neither sought nor made any connections with the sociological research on elites and interlocking 





the importance of psychological attributes, arguing they are difficult to measure, and 
asserted that not only are career background and demographics influential in their own 
right, they are affected by and can serve as proxies for psychological attributes.  
Applications of the UE model since have operated from this assumption and most rely 
upon demographic measures alone, although scholars consistently call for a better 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms of how and why executives affect strategic 
decisions and organizational outcomes (Carpenter et al, 2004).   
Several studies substantiate the relationship between CEO education and different 
dimensions of organizational strategy, such as openness to innovation or change, choices 
about the deployment of resources, and the comprehensiveness of decision-making 
strategies (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Barker & Mueller, 2002; Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; 
Papadakis & Barwise, 2002; Wally & Baum, 1994; Weirsma & Bantel, 1992). Tihanyi, 
Ellstrand, Daily and Dalton (2000) found that top managers with degrees from elite 
postsecondary institutions are more likely to pursue an international diversification 
strategy or implement strategic change.  Education may also be directly related to firm 
performance and related outcomes.  Some evidence suggests that companies whose top 
executives have more years of education are more likely to see growth in profits, sales 
and market share (Hambrick, Cho & Chen, 1996; Smith et al, 1994), and D’Aveni (1990) 
determined that companies whose CEOs held an elite degree were less likely to declare 
bankruptcy. Also, Srivastava and Lee’s (2008) meta-analysis indicates a statistically 
significant relationship between the TMT’s education and their firm’s return on assets. 
A number of possibilities exist as to why executives’ schooling might affect 




intelligent people may be more likely to follow these sorts of strategies.  Alternatively, 
CEOs might gain skills in college that improve their ability to understand sophisticated 
financial strategies (Graham & Harvey, 2002), formulate high-level tactics, and make 
important executive decisions (Frydman, 2007).  CEOs with degrees in technical fields 
are more likely to invest in research and development activities than CEOs with degrees 
in business or law (Barker & Muller, 2002; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).   Rather than 
schooling future executives on content, another possible explanation for the connection 
between education and firm outcomes is college experience may create opportunities for 
CEOs to establish individual relationships with other executives that ultimately translate 
to strategic firm-to-firm relationships (Keiser, 2004).  What actually goes on in this 
“black box” relationship between CEO education and firm outcomes, however, is not 
well understood.   
In contrast to status attainment and the power elite framework, UE theory does 
not focus on individuals’ career paths to the executive suite.  This is consistent with the 
functionalist tradition in sociology, in which individuals are thought of in terms of the 
role(s) that they play to keep society functioning seamlessly (Parsons, 1961).  In the UE 
theory, executives’ attributes are antecedents of organizational outcomes (e.g., profits) 
rather than individual outcomes (e.g., promotion). Also, no distinctions are made among 
members of the TMT; for instance, the attributes of the CEO are not considered to have 
different effects on the firm than those of other top executives (Peterson, Smith, 
Martorana, & Owens, 2003).   
However, as the far left box in Figure A2 (Appendix A) indicates, UE theory 




is selected for the TMT. Most studies of board composition compare the proportion of 
executive/inside directors to the proportion of nonexecutive/outside directors (Pettigrew, 
1992). Studies of board educational backgrounds are uncommon.  An exception is 
Westphal and Zajac (1995) who found when a firm’s CEO is perceived to be powerful 
the boards (and any incumbent members) have similar levels of educational attainment as 
the CEO.  When the boards are perceived to be more powerful than the CEO, incumbent 
members are more likely to share educational backgrounds with the existing board rather 
than the CEO.  
A strength of UE theory is it includes labor market demand forces in the executive 
selection process, while both status attainment and the power elite are supply-side 
focused.  The relationship between executives and the organization is assumed to be 
recursive, as indicated by the bi-directional arrow from Organizational Outcomes to 
Antecedents in Figure A2. In other words, a firm and its environment are affected by its 
executives, then these affect subsequent executive selection.  Antecedents associated with 
the broader environment include external stakeholders, external managerial labor 
markets, and environmental characteristics, while organizational antecedents include firm 
characteristics, board characteristics, and the internal labor market (Carpenter et al, 
2004).  
Research by Palia (2000) supports the likelihood that CEO educational patterns 
vary across firms.  He found CEOs in regulated firms (e.g., utilities) attended less 
prestigious universities, according to student SAT scores, than CEOs at unregulated 




restrict the ability of a CEO to affect change.  If degree prestige equates to “quality,” then 
regulated firms have less incentive to seek a CEO of the highest quality.   
UE theory offers an additional rationale for the importance of studying executive 
careers.  Not only does this study give insight into the process of individual occupational 
attainment and social mobility (as status attainment would argue) and into the process of 
power acquisition (as power elite theory would argue), but it also may have implications 
for organizational performance.    
What Predicts Executive Career Achievement? 
The perspectives discussed in the prior section inform my choice to focus on 
high-level corporate executive outcomes – namely, becoming a chief executive officer, 
holding multiple directorships, or involvement in business policy organizations.  Also, 
research using each framework contributes to our knowledge about potential influences 
on these outcomes, and my review of the literature now turns to these findings.  I 
organize my discussion according to five main categories of likely influences – 
demographics, social-psychological characteristics, postsecondary education, career 
experiences, and firm characteristics – which together construct my conceptual 
framework for this study (see Appendix A, Figure A3).  
Demographics 
An extensive body of research considers the influence of demographics such as 
gender, race, age, and social class origins on executive career outcomes and why, despite 
inroads by traditionally underrepresented groups in other occupational sectors, white 






Although it is the highest paying job that a woman can hold according to Forbes 
magazine, very few women actually attain a Chief Executive position (Bertrand, 2009; 
Daily, Certo & Dalton, 1999; Goudreau, 2010).  In 2009, thirteen of the Fortune 500 
CEOs were female, the highest total ever. Women fare comparatively better in 
directorships; 17 percent of Fortune 100 corporate directors in 2006 were female, 
according to the Executive Leadership Council (2008).   
While women have made gains over time in access to managerial jobs and other 
higher status occupations generally (Capelli & Hamori, 2004), explanations for the 
gender imbalance in corporate leadership vary. There is little evidence that differences in 
ability or motivation are the cause (Stroh, Brett & Reilly, 1992), but other possibilities 
include human capital differences, family power, industry choices, and discrimination 
(Bertrand, 2009). Human capital would say women do not invest as much as men in their 
careers, with “investments” variably defined as formal education or company training, 
ongoing career opportunities (e.g., transfers that require relocation), or by choosing to 
take time off for family reasons (Judiesch & Lyness, 1999). Family power theory 
suggests that whichever member of a couple generates more resources will hold more 
power in the family – and historically, males have held this role (McDonald, 1980). On 
average, therefore, women make disproportionate sacrifices in their careers for their 
partners (Eby, 2001; Eby, Allen, & Douthitt, 1999).  In terms of industry differences, 
historically women have been concentrated lower paying and lower prestige positions, 
such as clerical jobs. Using workforce data from 1966 to 2000, Stainback and 




especially in traditionally female sectors where the majority of the employees remain 
female, white men consistently maintained access to managerial jobs in older and more 
desirable sectors of the economy.  Finally, discrimination or bias against women may 
exist on the part of boards, shareholders, or outgoing CEOs who pre-ordain a 
replacement. 
Race and ethnicity. 
 
Compared to white women, racial and ethnic minorities have made less progress 
in achieving proportional representation in higher status occupations, including corporate 
managers  (Miech, Eaton, & Liang, 2003; Morrison & von Glinow, 1990; Stainback & 
Tomaskovic-Devey, 2009; Wilson, Sakura-Lemessy & West, 1999).  The first African 
American was appointed to a Fortune 500 board in 1964, though ten years later blacks 
still represented less than one percent of all Fortune 500 directors (Zweigenhaft & 
Domhoff, 2006). According to the Executive Leadership Council (2008), minorities held 
15.4 percent of Fortune 100 directorships in 2006 (9.8 percent were African-American, 
1.6 percent were Asian-American and 4.0 percent were Hispanic).6  Considerably fewer 
become Chief Executives; a total of fifteen CEOs on the 2009 Fortune 500 were racial or 
ethnic minorities.   In July 2009, Xerox became the first Fortune 500 company to have an 
African American female as its CEO.   
 Similar to those pertaining to the gender gap, hypotheses about the ongoing 
executive racial gap include discrimination and racism, structural barriers, and/or human 
capital differences (see summary in Morrison & von Glinow, 1990).  There is likely some 
degree of bias based upon physical appearance, as lighter skinned minorities have better 
                                                 
6 Certain racial and ethnic minorities are relatively advantaged compared to others (e.g., Cuban Americans, 
Japanese Americans), but the research of business executives’ backgrounds does not typically make finer 




chances of achieving corporate leadership positions compared to those who are darker 
(Zweigenhaft & Domhoff, 2006).  Also, discrimination may play a role in more subtle 
stereotypes that associate characteristics of “good managers” with those of white males 
(Morrison & von Glinow, 1990).  A commonly cited structural barrier for 
underrepresented minorities is a lack of same-race mentors to assist in navigating white-
dominated corporate cultures (Irons & Moore, 1985). Finally, researchers operating from 
a human capital framework often reference the “pipeline” idea that minorities lack the 
educational credentials and/or career experiences necessary to qualify for corporate elite 
membership.  Although educational attainment of underrepresented minorities – and 
especially access to elite postsecondary schools – has improved over time, it is not yet at 
parity with that of whites.   
Social class origins. 
 
Social class background receives a great deal of attention from scholars who study 
career attainment. There is no universally accepted approach in how to define and 
measure class, but in studies of corporate executives, there are two main approaches. 
Both consider class in a Weberian sense, assuming social status and economic class to be 
separate constructs. Those operating from a status attainment framework model father’s 
occupation as a direct influence and father’s education as an indirect influence.  In 
contrast, those who use a power elite framework assume there is a single national upper 
class that offers distinctive advantages to those who are born into it.  
According to the classic status attainment framework, the fundamental process 
underlying how parent education and occupation affect the next generation is 




the parent’s values and assumptions that are communicated to the child vary according to 
his own educational attainment and occupational position.  So a parent from a high status 
occupation who manages employees himself may role model to his child that this is a 
desirable career path to pursue.  The parent may also facilitate this process as the child 
reaches working age by creating an internship or entry level position at his company, by 
setting up interviews at colleagues’ companies, etcetera.  A socialization-based status 
attainment view is primarily agentic in nature; other applications of status attainment 
suggest structural mechanisms at work that are proxied by a parent’s SES.  For instance, 
the educational system may reward students differently according to their social class 
origins (Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Bowles & Gintis, 2002; Kerckhoff, 1976).  
In my review of the literature, I did not find any researchers who used status 
attainment-type variables alone to predict whether someone specifically reaches a top 
executive position.  A few researchers use status attainment to assess management 
careers generally, and Xie (1989) and Yamguchi (1983) both found father’s occupational 
status measured by the Duncan SEI score was a direct influence on the likelihood that 
someone will become managers in first job and current job, even after controlling for 
father’s and son’s educational attainment.  For other occupational groups, father’s 
occupation was only an indirect influence on current occupation, through education. This 
suggests there is some aspect of family background that is important in business 
occupations beyond just promoting education – “high status families have economic 
resources and social networks that can directly assist in their offspring toward successful 




Several published studies examine descriptive characteristics of CEOs and 
include status attainment measures of social class origins.    Friedman and Tedlow (2003) 
reviewed ten profiles of business executives in the nineteenth and first half of the 
twentieth century that included data about social mobility.   Despite the popularity of 
“Horatio Alger” anecdotes from this time period, they concluded that most executives 
came from white Protestant families that were financially well off. Sarachek (1978) 
echoed these findings and presented data indicating that while corporate executives do 
not fit a rags-to-riches path, highly successful business entrepreneurs may be more likely 
to come from disadvantaged background.  In a more recent descriptive analysis of the 
chief executives from the Forbes top 50 companies in 1988, however, Bassiry and 
Dekmejian (1990) claimed that 74 percent come from middle or lower middle-class 
backgrounds, as indicated by measures of family wealth, father’s occupation, and type of 
schooling. The sample is small and the authors did not disaggregate their measures of 
class or explain them beyond this, so whether it reflects broader patterns of 
intergenerational mobility among executives is unclear.  
In their initial formulation of the upper echelon framework, Hambrick and Mason 
(1984) noted that given the homogenous social class backgrounds of top executives, there 
is virtually no research by organizational scholars of the connection between class 
background and organizational outcomes.  However, drawing from studies of 
entrepreneurs’ social origins, Hambrick and Mason hypothesized that executives from 
lower class backgrounds will be more likely follow aggressive strategies like acquisition 
and unrelated diversification and their firms will therefore have more growth and more 




behaviors, but there has not been any UE research since to support or refute this 
hypothesis.  
Social class origins fit explicitly into the power elite model of executive careers. 
The corporate power elite is assumed to be part of a national “patrician” upper class that 
developed in conjunction with the industrialization of the American economy in the late 
1800s and early 1900s (Baltzell, 1964; Mills, 1956).  Membership is not merely a 
function of someone’s wealth, educational attainment, or occupational prestige, so these 
status attainment measures are insufficient representations of intergenerational 
transmission among the corporate elite.  Useem (1984) defined this upper class as 
consisting of “the social network of established wealthy families whose status is 
preeminent, whose culture and identity are distinct, and whose membership is closed to 
nearly all but those of proper descent” (p. 66).  
Where this final feature of the upper class (i.e., social closure) is concerned, the 
ongoing success of the corporate elite depends on strong group cohesion, as “the most 
socially cohesive groups are the ones that do best in arriving at consensus when dealing 
with a problem” (Domhoff, 2006a, p. 50). Cohesion is reinforced by personal friendships 
that individuals share with one another as well as social institutions such as clubs, 
intermarriage, and certain schools (Domhoff, 2006a; Rothkopf, 2008; Useem, 1979; 
Useem, 1982; Useem, 1984).  These relationships and institutions also transmit the 
common values, expectations and ideology that characterize the class.  They establish 
ease with the rhetoric of privilege and comfort interacting with others from the same class 
position (Khan, 2008).  Also, there might be a desire on the part of powerful parents to 




the drive that brings people to the top is typically matched by a desire to hold on 
to the position, power and possessions that they have acquired and to pass them 
on to chosen successors-typically family members…children raised in an 
atmosphere of power are educated in its uses in ways that those who are distant 
from it cannot be…those who come from power acquire important advantages in 
maintaining or gaining it. The access that comes with being a family member 
provides a range of benefits, whether within an organization run by the family or 
through the network of other elites established by the family over time (p. 78).   
 
Translating class location to empirical measures is challenging because most 
people feel uncomfortable identifying as anywhere but in the middle (Domhoff, 2006a). 
Useem and Karabel (1986) created a measure of “upper class origin,” using information 
as to whether the individual’s family was listed in the Social Register7 or whether the 
individual attended one of 14 elite preparatory schools.8 Equivalent representations of 
class origins are discussed in Baltzell (1964), Domhoff (1967, 2006a), Levine (1980) and 
Saveth (1988) and are used by similar studies (Allen, 1978; Dye, 1995; Persell & 
Cookson, 1985; Soref, 1976; Youn, Arnold, & Salkever, 1999).   
The association between these measures and executive career attainment persist.  
Useem and Karabel found that 442 of 2,709 top managers were from upper class origins.   
Of these, 134 attended one of the preparatory schools, 175 were from families listed in 
the Social Register, and 133 had both qualities.  The upper class executives were 
significantly more likely to become CEOs, hold multiple directorships, or be a member of 
a business association. Armstrong (1974) studied graduates of Hotchkiss prep school 
between 1940 and 1950 and determined that by 1970, 56 percent were business 
executives and an additional ten percent were lawyers.  More recently, Domhoff (2006a) 
                                                 
7 Published by Forbes magazine, the Social Register is a reputational compilation of families that are 
considered by their peers to be among the most socially prominent in 12 major U.S. cities. 
8 Useem & Karabel (1986) identified these top preparatory schools as Choate Rosemary Hall, Deerfield, 
Groton, Hill, Hotchkiss, Kent, Lawrenceville, Middlesex, Milton, Portsmouth Priory, St. George's, St. 




tracked St. Paul’s prep school graduates over the age of 45 and found that 303 of them 
are officers or directors of corporations, and 102 are directors in the Fortune 800.  St. 
Paul’s alumni were especially overrepresented in the financial sector, and 21 were either 
officers or directors at JP Morgan alone.   
Age. 
 
There are two competing schools of thought on the role of age in an individual’s 
occupational life course.  On one hand, an older worker could be thought of as highly 
experienced and a valuable corporate asset (Judge et al, 1994).  Alternatively, negative 
stereotypes of older people in the workplace are common, and age might hinder 
promotion during later years of the career. Older workers are thought to be less stable, 
less creative, less open to change or adaptable, and unable to handle stressful or high-
paced challenges (Rosen & Jerdee, 1976; Salthouse & Maurer, 1996).   
Applied to corporate leadership, age might not be important in terms of a 
company’s outcomes.  Srivastava and Lee (2008)’s meta-analysis of the UE research 
suggested that executives’ age was not statistically related to a firm’s return on assets. 
How age is perceived in top management circles is a different matter, and studies of 
executive promotion are mixed as to whether it is a positive or negative factor. Judge et al 
(1994) studied records of high-level executives from an executive search firm, and they 
found older workers had higher levels of compensation, more promotions over the course 
of their careers, and higher reported levels of satisfaction with their careers generally. 
However, Goldberg, Finkelstein, Perry and Konrad (2004) determined that age was 




Social Psychological Characteristics   
An early modification to the Blau-Duncan status attainment model by researchers 
from the University of Wisconsin expanded the basic father’s occupation/education-son’s 
education/occupation path model to incorporate social psychological variables (e.g., IQ, 
aspirations, self-concept, motivation) in the status attainment process (Sewell & Shah, 
1967; Sewell, Haller & Portes, 1969; Sewell, Haller & Ohlendorf, 1970). In doing so, the 
Wisconsin model attempted to decompose the causal relationship between socioeconomic 
background and educational attainment into a set of social psychological and behavioral 
mechanisms.  Research using a variety of datasets from different time periods supports a 
significant relationship between occupational status attainment and cognitive ability 
(Kerckhoff, Raudenbush & Glennie, 2001; Warren, 1998), self-concept (Chang, 2003; 
Wang et al, 1999), locus of control (Wang et al, 1999), and aspirations (Schoon & 
Parsons, 2002).  
The upper echelon theory incorporates social psychological variables into models 
focused on top executives, asserting that managers’ underlying values, personality, and 
cognitions affect a firm’s strategic direction and performance (Carpenter et al, 2004).  UE 
assumes that these social psychological characteristics may be proxied for research 
purposes by observable career, education, and demographic experiences, so most studies 
follow this approach (Pettigrew, 1992).  Among those that directly integrate them, 
Peterson et al (2003) is the best example, examining how five dimensions of CEO 
personality affect strategies of their TMTs.  Each of the dimensions - conscientiousness, 
emotional stability, agreeableness, extraversion, and openness - were correlated with at 




This research offers support to the idea that CEO personalities differ, and these 
differences may translate into different firm outcomes. As this suggests, UE considers 
executive selection from the perspective of the firm’s needs and demand rather than the 
individual’s career trajectory, which is the lens that status attainment takes. 
Given the recursive property of UE theory, it follows that different organizations 
pick the top management team based upon personality as well as other social 
psychological characteristics.  Measures of motivation, ambition, and dimensions of 
personality are associated with the odds of executive promotions generally (Boudreau, 
Boswell & Judge, 2001; Judge et al, 1994; Kilduff & Day, 1994; Ng, Eby, Sorensen, & 
Feldman, 2005; O’Reilly & Chatman, 1994; Rothkopf, 2008; Seibert & Kraimer, 2001; 
Whitely et al, 1991). Risk-taking and tolerance of ambiguity are also common traits 
among those who are inclined to seek power (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Galinsky, 
Magee, Inesi & Gruenfeld, 2006). Pfeffer (2010) argues that ambition, energy and a 
strong work ethic, the ability to focus, a commitment to learning and personal 
development, confidence, empathy, and the capacity to tolerate conflict are personal 
qualities especially important to reaching a position of corporate power. Consciously 
aspiring to a position of power appears to be important as well; McClelland and Burnham 
(2003) found that managers whose primary motivation was to acquire power were in fact 
more likely to achieve positions of power compared to managers most motivated by a 
need for likeability or most motivated by personal goal attainment.  The only study that I 
uncovered in my literature review that speaks directly to CEO selection is Norburn 
(1989), who surveyed CEOs and other top managers in the UK to compare whether they 




that CEOs were more satisfied with their careers and perceived their management style 
differently (i.e., interventionist style) than other top managers (i.e., participative style).  
No significant differences were found in motivation (e.g., career aspirations, retirement 
age wish) or personal beliefs and habits (e.g., importance of family, religion, politics, age, 
drinking, smoking, stress, sleep, exercise).   
Postsecondary Education  
 
In this section, I summarize the research pertaining to college effects on 
occupation as well as the evidence specific to college prestige, then I discuss in more 
detail why postsecondary education might be related to executive career outcomes. The 
research around education and the corporate elite is limited, mostly descriptive profiles 
and the Useem and Karabel study, so I draw from status attainment research and studies 
of early/mid-career executives as well. 
General postsecondary effects on occupation. 
 
Status attainment conclusively demonstrates that education is associated with 
achieving higher status occupations. In their synthesis of the college effects literature 
from the 1970s and 1980s, Pascarella and Terenzini (1991) suggested that bachelor’s 
degree recipients have occupational status or prestige ratings that average approximately 
34 percentage points higher than high school graduates. In their subsequent review of the 
college effects literature published in the 1990s, Pascarella and Terenzini (2005) 
identified only four studies that examine how postsecondary education affects 
occupational status – and each of these used data from the 1980s – but the results were 
consistent with prior patterns.  Among the few studies published since is Kerckhoff, 




and showed an increase in educational attainment from one degree level to another is 
associated with a 39 point increase in SEI.  These findings are perhaps to be expected, in 
that entry into several high status occupations, such as law and medicine, requires 
advanced degree completion.   
Although educational attainment exerts significant effects on occupation, the 
magnitude of this relationship differs according to where an individual is in the life 
course. Status attainment researchers report that the direct influence of educational 
attainment on occupational status declines over a person’s life, although it remains 
statistically significant (Alon & Tienda, 2000; Blau & Duncan, 1967; Elder, 1992; 
Featherman & Hauser, 1978; Hauser et al, 1996; Sorensen, 1974; Warren, 1998; Warren, 
2001; Warren, Sheridan, & Hauser, 2002).  For instance, Warren (1998, 2001) estimated 
that for individuals who entered high school in 1957, the effect of college on current/last 
occupation (i.e., in 1992-93) was 30 to 50 percent lower than on first occupation.  He 
hypothesized that the declining effect size may indicate credentials are an imprecise 
measure of an individual’s ability, talents, and experience.  Therefore, the further an 
individual is into his career, an employer is able to draw on alternative signals or 
measures of experience, such as performance reviews, recommendations from colleagues, 
etc (see also Bills, 1988). 
A complementary area of research examines whether education influences 
corporate employees’ career trajectory, i.e., their chances of promotion to positions of 
higher rank. Most studies are analyses of firm internal labor markets and generally 
confirm that education (represented in several different ways) is a statistically significant 




education on occupational entry (Bills, 2005). Using records from employees at a large 
insurance company between 1971 and 1978, Spilerman and Lunde (1991) found the 
association between years of schooling and promotion chances was statistically 
significant at all points in time, although it was curvilinear such that years of schooling 
mattered most on promotion in the middle ranks of employment. Belzil and Bognanno 
(2004) used a panel of 30,000 middle and upper level American executives followed 
between 1981 and 1988 and also reported that those with higher years of schooling 
completed started at higher levels in the company and were promoted at faster rates.  
Working from a human capital framework, they found schooling was the only 
consistently significant influence on promotion (the other two human capital variables 
used here were age and tenure at the company). Hurley-Hanson et al (2005) examined 
two cohorts of managers at a service sector company and reported that holding a 
bachelor’s degree was not significantly associated with moving up management ranks for 
those who entered the firm in 1972 but was positively related with attainment for 
managers who entered in 1982.  
The majority of the occupation/schooling literature uses either occupational status 
or promotion chances in early or middle career.  Much of what is known about the 
education of CEOs and other top executives at major corporations comes from a small 
body of descriptive studies (see also Friedman and Tedlow, 2003, for a more in-depth 
discussion of this literature).  As my summary of this work in Table 2.2 indicates, the 
educational attainment of top executives has increased over time.   
Among the earliest is Joslyn and Taussig (1932) who published the results of a 




7,371 replied.  Thirty-two percent of the men were college graduates, approximately 13 
percent more attended some college, 28 percent held high school or equivalent degrees, 
26 percent elementary school only, and one percent reported no formal education.  
The most recent statistical profile, comparing Fortune 100 executives in 1980 and 
2001, is a descriptive working paper released through NBER in 2004 by Peter Cappelli 
and Monika Hamori. Where education is concerned, degree information was converted 
into years of education (i.e., high school degree to 12 years of education, bachelor’s to 16 
years, master’s to 18 years, and PhD to 20 years).  In 1980, according to this conversion, 
the average executive attained 17.02 years of schooling, compared to 17.26 years in 
2001.  Except for Useem and Karabel, none of the executive educational profiles 
compared senior managers to CEOs or board members to determine whether educational 





Table 2.2   
Summary of Past Corporate Elite Educational Profiles 
 
Citation Sample size Sample selection Findings pertaining to 
postsecondary education 
Joslyn & Taussig 
(1932) 
7,371 businessmen Businessmen listed 
in the 1928 Poor’s 
Register of 
Directors 
32% had bachelor’s or more 
Mills (1945) 1,464 businessmen All businessmen 
who appear in the 
Dictionary of 
American 
Biographies – born 
between 1570 and 
1879 
Those who held a college degree: 
27.8% born between 1570-1699  
28.6% born between 1700-1729 
12.0% born between 1730-1759 
10.9% born between 1760-1789 
13.8% born between 1790-1819 
20.0% born between 1820-1849 
27.4% born between 1850-1879 
Miller (1949) and 
(1950) 
190 “career men” Presidents, board 
chairmen, and some 
partners from major 
manufacturing, 




22% had grammar school or less 
37% had high school diploma 
12% had some college 
29% were college graduates 
Warner & 
Abbeglen (1955) 
8,300 business leaders Executives in 1952 57% had bachelor’s or more 
Sub-sample of 505 graduates to 
closely examine where they 
attended and the top 3 were 
Harvard, Yale, Princeton 
Newcomer (1955) 284 executives (1900) 
319 executives (1925) 









1900, 1925, and 
1950  
28.3% had bachelor’s or more in 
1900 
40.2% had bachelor’s or more in 
1925 
62.1% had bachelor’s or more in 
1950 
Allen (1978) 83 executives (1935) 
70 executives (1970) 
Executives who 
were directors of 




1935 or in 1970 
63.9% had bachelor’s or more in 
1935 
80.0% had bachelor’s or more in 
1970 
49.4% had degree from “elite 
private college” in 1935a 
44.3% had degree from “elite 
private college” in 1970 
Useem & Karabel 
(1986) 
2,729 senior managers Vice presidents or 
higher from 208 
corporations 
Odds of becoming CEO or of 
holding multiple directorships 




sampled from the 
1977 Fortune 500 
based on industry 
with BA from lesser college, top 
college, MBA from top program, 
or JD from top program compared 
to no postsecondary degree.  
Also, odds of joining leading 
business association significantly 
increase for MBA or JD from top 
program compared to no 
postsecondary degree.  
Boone, Kurtz & 
Fleenor (1988) 
243 CEOs CEOs from the 800 
largest industrial 
corporations and 
service firms (year 
not given) 
91% had bachelor’s degree 
47% had advanced degree 
Bassiry & 
Dekmejian (1990) 
50 CEOs All CEOs from top 
50 companies on 
the 1988 Forbes list 
of 500 major 
companies 
6% had less than a college degree 
56% had bachelor’s only 
26% had master’s degree 
8% had law degree 
4% had doctoral degree 
Most attended state universities 
18% had Ivy League degrees 
Temin (1997)b  
and (1999) 
500 CEOs All CEOs from 
Fortune 500 in 
1996 
Found college attendance 
information on 454 CEOs (did not 
confirm whether the remaining 46 
had degrees or not) 
17% attended an Ivy League 
41% attended other private 
42% attended public  
Cappelli & 
Hamori (2004) 
802 executives (1980) 
1,160 executives (2001) 
Top 10 executives 
from Fortune 100 
companies in 1980 
and in 2001 
Mean of 17.02 years of school in 
1980 
Mean of 17.26 years of school in 
2001 
14% had bachelor’s from Ivy 
League, 54% from other private, 
32% from public in 1980 
10% had bachelor’s from Ivy 
League, 42% from other private, 
48% from public in 2001 
Frydman (2007) 1,545 executives Panel consisting of 
the three highest-
paid executives in 
the 50 largest 
publicly-owned 
corporations from 
1936 to 2003. 
No exact descriptives reported for 
education, but graphs the trends in 
degree attainment which show 
increases in bachelor’s and 
graduate degrees and decreases in 
high school and some college 
between 1936 and 2003. 
 
aAllen said that his definition of an elite private college is based on Baltzell (1958) and Domhoff (1967) but 
he did not specify exactly which these are. 





College prestige effects on occupation. 
 
The American system of higher education is distinguished by and celebrated for 
its heterogeneity.  Of the more than 3,600 postsecondary colleges and universities, no two 
are alike. This diversity has given rise to an intricate system of institutional stratification, 
complexified by the diffuse nature of American higher education, marked institutional 
resource differences, and comparatively minimal levels of federal control.  As with any 
system of stratification, there are certain cases that fall in the top tier of the hierarchy, 
such that some are considered to be more prestigious (and sometimes also labeled as 
“higher quality”) than others (Lawrence & Green, 1980; Stuart, 1995).  
The findings are mixed as to whether college prestige is associated with 
occupational status measured as a continuous outcome. Brand and Halaby (2003) studied 
the relationship between top ranked undergraduate degrees according to Barron’s college 
profiles and longitudinal career outcomes using a sample of 1957 Wisconsin high school 
graduates.  While statistically significant at all points in time, the effect size associated 
with a BA from one of Barron’s top two tiers diminished from 15.1 occupational status 
points at the first job, to 9.5 in 1974, to 7.9 in 1992. Pascarella, Smart and Smylie (1992) 
determined that a different measure of prestige, college tuition, was directly associated 
with higher occupational status for black women and white men, as well as indirectly 
associated with that of white men and women through academic achievement and degree 
completion. Karabel and McClelland (1987) found college selectivity predicted 
occupational status for individuals whose fathers held a professional occupation. Other 




occupational status with a selectivity measure, however, report little to no relationship 
(Alwin, 1974; Dey et al, 1999; Mueller, 1988; Smart, 1986; Trusheim & Crouse, 1981).  
When the outcome measure of occupation is disaggregated from a continuous 
scale into more nuanced destinations, clearer relationships emerge between specific types 
of colleges and specific occupation classes. A number of studies suggest a small but 
significant positive relationship between undergraduate selectivity and professional 
occupational attainment generally (Braxton et al, 1991; Cole & Barber, 2003; Kamens, 
1974; Pascarella et al, 1987; Smart, 1986; Tinto, 1980; Tinto, 1981). For executives 
specifically, Ishida et al (2002) found some evidence that selectivity predicts promotion 
at middle levels but Hurley Hanson et al (2005) and Judge et al (1994) did not find a 
relationship between Gourman ranking and odds of executive promotion. Useem and 
Karabel (1986) found Coleman’s ranking of the top eleven undergraduate institutions was 
associated with the chances of becoming a CEO, holding multiple directorships, and 
being a leader in a business association. 
Given the popular assumption that graduating from an Ivy League school is a 
guarantee of future career success, there are surprisingly few comparisons of how 
occupational outcomes are influenced by Ivy League degrees in contrast to those from 
other schools. Cole and Barber (2003) found Ivy League students were more likely than 
those from all other four-year colleges to enter professional occupations, although Judge 
et al (1994) did not observe a relationship between Ivy League degree and odds of 
executive promotion. Cappelli and Hamori  (2004) determined that 14 percent of Fortune 
100 top executives held an Ivy League BA in 1980, but the proportion declined to 10 




past and present Fortune 500 CEOs found just over eight percent earned their bachelor’s 
degrees from an Ivy (Caminiti, 1990). To put these numbers in context, the Ivy League 
colleges are estimated to have less than 0.5 percent of the total baccalaureate enrollment 
(Kingston & Lewis, 1990).   
Only eight schools are in the Ivy League, but even this might be too generous a 
representation of prestige in some corporate settings where competition for positions is 
fierce and the stakes are high. In a large multi-method qualitative study of the hiring 
practices of elite investment banks, law firms and management consulting firms, Rivera 
(in press) found company recruiters placed the most weight on the prestige of applicant 
postsecondary credential(s). These exclusive firms had a very narrow view of prestigious 
top-tier schools; those Rivera labels the “super-elite.”  
Evaluators drew strong distinctions between top four universities, schools that I 
term the super-elite, and other types of selective colleges and universities. So-
called ‘public Ivies’ such as University of Michigan and Berkeley were not 
considered elite or even prestigious in the minds of evaluators (in contrast, these 
‘state schools’ were frequently described pejoratively as ‘safety schools’ that were 
‘just okay’). Even Ivy League designation was insufficient for inclusion in the 
super-elite. For undergraduate institutions, ‘top-tier’ typically included only 
Harvard, Princeton, Yale, Stanford, and potentially Wharton (University of 
Pennsylvania’s Business School). By contrast, Brown, Cornell, Dartmouth, and 
University of Pennsylvania (general studies) were frequently described as ‘second 
tier’ schools that were filled primarily with candidates who ‘didn’t get in’ to a 
super-elite school.  Definitions of ‘top-tier’ were even narrower for professional 
schools, primarily referring to Yale, Harvard, Stanford and to a lesser extent 
Columbia law schools, and Harvard, Wharton (University of Pennsylvania), and 
Stanford business schools. (p. 8) 
 
As Rivera’s findings suggest, identifying exactly which specific schools are the most 
prestigious and how/where to demarcate those that are “top” is an ambiguous task., 
Useem and Karabel (1986) determined just over 40 percent of those holding a BA only 




besides Rivera’s I found that reported executive career outcomes associated with such a 
narrowly defined set of prestigious schools. 
Graduate degrees. 
The Master in Business Administration (MBA) is the best-known advanced 
degree for business education (Gottesman & Morey, 2006) and has become more 
prevalent among top-level executives over time (Bertrand, 2009; Frydman, 2007).  For 
example, Keiser (2004) observed that 6.9 percent of Fortune 500 CEOs in 1960 had an 
MBA, which increased to 34.2 percent in 1985. There is some evidence that executives 
who hold MBA degrees have increased odds of promotion (Belzil & Bognanno, 2004; 
Ishida et al, 2002).  Also, Baruch, Bell and Gray (2005) found that MBA graduates 
achieved higher positions in their organization’s hierarchy relative to those who held 
another business-related master’s degree (e.g., an MA in Accounting). Forbes and Piercy 
(1991) surveyed top executives about desired attributes in candidates for promotion to a 
top management position. While all preferred candidates with a wide breath of 
experience, all else being equal, they also prioritized someone with an MBA degree over 
in-house training. 
As with undergraduate degrees, the perceived prestige of the MBA program is 
likely an important influence on career outcomes. Several studies find earning a top law 
or business degree is associated with entering a prestigious firm upon completion 
(Granfield & Koenig, 1992; Kingston & Clawson, 1990; Schleef, 1997; Van Maanen, 
1983).  Useem and Karabel are among the only researchers who study top corporate 




corporate elite were more likely to have earned an MBA from a top ranked business 
programs than other top managers.  
Why does postsecondary education affect executive careers? 
 
Many competing explanations exist as to why a college degree might create career 
advantages for a corporate executive (Bills, 2003; Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005).  It is 
possible educational attainment merely proxies intelligence and does not represent any 
specific benefits derived from the actual college-going process.  Perhaps smarter people 
are more likely to become business leaders, regardless of whether they actually finish 
college. A major challenge for researchers is to isolate the causal effects attributable to 
college itself rather than pre-college effects and/or general maturation.  Several studies in 
the status attainment tradition report cognitive ability is a separate influence on 
occupational status from educational attainment (Warren, 1998). Kerckhoff, Raudenbush 
and Glennie (2001) use National Adult Literacy Survey (1992) data and, controlling for 
commonly used background variables (i.e., gender, race/ethnicity, age, language, parents’ 
education), an increase in educational attainment from one degree level to another is 
associated with a 39 point increase in SEI.  After adding a control for cognitive skill 
using a literacy test, educational attainment remains significantly associated with SEI, 
though the effect decreases to 33.9 points.  Comparing the coefficients, they conclude 
“educational attainment is a much more effective source of the explanation of 
occupational status than is cognitive skill” (p. 8).    
So it appears college may create occupational benefits for students above and 
beyond the individual’s incoming cognitive ability.  In this section, I summarize three 




Signaling and screening. 
 
Signaling and screening theories suggest it is difficult for an employer to discern 
the quality and productivity of a potential employee.  Employers therefore screen for 
indications of productivity to reduce this uncertainty, and a college degree is a reliable 
credential that signals someone has desirable labor market skills (Arrow, 1973; Spence, 
1973; Spence, 1974; Stiglitz, 1975). Screening and signaling are complementary schools 
of thought, and the key difference is that employers screen and potential employees 
signal (Bills, 2003). There is not consensus as to exactly what is screened for or what the 
degree signals – and whether schooling produces actual learning or is just a sorting 
device based on entering characteristics (Arkes, 1999).   
The selection of top-level executives is a high stakes competitive process.  The 
choice of a CEO today does not merely take into account the preferences and opinions of 
the outgoing CEO or the board (Khurana & Pikorski, 2004; Pfeffer, 2010).  Many 
external constituencies – shareholders, Wall Street, business journalists – must be 
satisfied as well, and how an executive is collectively perceived is important.  Applying 
signaling and screening to this selection process, degrees from high status schools may 
signal to these groups that a candidate is high achieving, able to succeed in elite 
environments, and a legitimate selection (Baker, in press; Collins, 1979).   
Acquisition of knowledge and skills. 
 
Human capital theory asserts formal education develops knowledge, skills, and 
problem-solving abilities in demand by the labor market (Becker, 1993). This includes 
technical or subject matter content, often specific to an academic major or an occupation, 




thinking. Pascarella and Terenzini (2005) suggest on average, students who earn a 
bachelor’s degree improve their verbal skills by about 10 percent, math skills by about 12 
percent, oral communication by 23 percent, written communication by 19 percent, and 
abstract reasoning by 13 percent.  Business employers identify these types of skills as 
important characteristics of potential employees (Karakaya & Karakaya, 1996), and it 
follows they may also be attributes that create advantages in an executive’s career path.  
Researchers commonly use two proxies of an individual’s knowledge acquisition 
during college, undergraduate major and undergraduate grade point average,9 to test 
associations with career outcomes. 10  A number of studies demonstrate a significant 
positive relationship between undergraduate GPA and occupational status generally 
(Knox, Lindsay & Kolb, 1993; Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005).  Also, there is evidence 
that corporate recruiters heavily weight GPA when hiring for entry-level positions (Cole, 
Rubin, Feild, & Giles, 2007). Two separate meta-analyses by Cohen (1984) and Bretz 
(1989) indicate a small but significant positive relationship between undergraduate GPA 
and different measures of job success for those in business careers, although the data 
examined in both studies are over twenty years old.  Rivera’s (in press) study of elite 
firms’ hiring practices suggested that grades are secondary to credential source, specific 
grade performance cut-offs are not applied by hiring managers, and the interpretation of 
grades is very dependent on school attended, major, and extracurricular involvement.   
The evidence is also mixed as to whether major has a significant impact on 
general occupational status or on career progression, due at least in part to the variation in 
                                                 
9 Although MBA programs assign grades, I did not find any research testing these relationships with career 
outcomes.  One explanation may that there is little variation in grades assigned to MBA students; most 
receive A’s or B’s, especially at elite schools.  Also, there is little evidence that many recruiters value 





how major is measured, the source of the data, and the time period under consideration.   
Smart and Pascarella (1986) examined CIRP data from 1971 to 1980 and did not find any 
differences in the status attainment of liberal arts and sciences majors compared to 
professional majors.  Dey et al (1999) used Wisconsin Longitudinal Study data 
representing those who were high school seniors in 1957 and found no relationship 
between majoring in business and occupational status in 1992.  However, those who 
majored in education, health, science/math, or humanities all had higher occupational 
status than the reference group, “other.” Where career progression is concerned, 
Spilerman and Lunde (1991) found business majors and mathematics, science, or 
engineering majors were more likely to be promoted in middle-management type 
positions than were humanities or social science majors.  Using data from a service-sector 
corporation in 1972 and 1982, Hurley-Hanson et al (2005) reported majoring in business 
increased the likelihood of promotion in both years.  In contrast, Judge et al’s (1994) 
analysis of executive search firm data did not find any differences in the promotion odds 
of those who held degrees in business, law or engineering compared to other majors, nor 
did Ishida, Spilerman and Su (1997) observe any significant differences in promotion 
probabilities at a large financial company for those who majored in business versus other 
majors.  There is evidence to suggest many CEOs today have an educational background 
in business. A survey of 243 CEOs from the top 800 American industrial corporations 
found 44 percent majored in business, 24 percent in engineering, 12 percent in liberal 
arts, 7 percent in science, 3 percent in law and 2 percent in journalism (Boone, Kurtz, & 
Fleenor, 1988). Whether this pattern is shared among other top executives or the 




An MBA might also create value for degree holders by transmitting the skills that 
UE theory would suggest are important for top executives to possess. Useem and 
Karabel, for instance, characterize a Harvard MBA as “the best technical training for a 
management career” (p. 192).  Some scholars disagree and argue MBA programs are too 
narrowly focused on technical business skills rather than those a top manager might need, 
such as the ability to handle a crisis (Pfeffer & Fong, 2002).  However, Schleef’s (1997)’s 
study of an elite MBA program indicates that while gaining competency in areas like cost 
accounting and financial statement evaluation were part of the curriculum, graduating 
students reported improved communication skills, decision-making abilities, and the 
ability to “think like an executive” were among the most valuable learning outcomes of 
the business school. 
This echoes the assumption of many scholars that in addition to content-based 
knowledge and skills learned in the classroom, the workplace values what is commonly 
referred to as cultural capital.  Cultural capital is the idea that certain attitudes, 
dispositions and behaviors are a type of currency in social or economic situations  
(Bourdieu, 1984; Lamont & Lareau, 1988; Musoba & Baez, 2009). Dimensions of 
demeanor and appearance – confidence, polish, ease, conversational 
ability/dialect/vocabulary – are forms of cultural capital as are aesthetic and cultural 
awareness.  Classic examples of the latter are appreciation for music and art, although 
contemporary scholars often include sports, books, magazines, and restaurants or types of 
food in their analyses of cultural forms (Erickson, 1996; Warde, Martens & Olsen, 1999).  
Most scholars assume cultural capital is transmitted through social interactions 




(Alderson et al, 2007; Bourdieu, 1984; Mark, 2003; Musoba & Baez, 2009; Van Maanen, 
1983).  The majority of studies examining education and cultural capital focus on the 
private preparatory schools that serve a disproportionate number of affluent and powerful 
families (Armstrong, 1990; Persell & Cookson, 1985).  One disposition cultivated in 
these educational settings and mentioned by many of the studies is a common sense of 
confidence that the students are all extraordinary and belong in the upper reaches of 
society (and by extension, the corporate world). In his study of St. Paul’s preparatory 
school Khan (2008) concluded, 
for elites, the world is a place that one can feel at ease within. Through the near 
constant public recognition of their achievements and the parade of important 
visitors to the school students developed an everyday orientation to the 
extraordinary. In believing that they were surrounded by international-level talent, 
students developed a sense both their own capacity and of the potential of the 
world around them. (p. 247) 
 
That elite postsecondary institutions transmit collective privilege to students is echoed by 
a study of Harvard Law School by Granfield and Koenig (1992).  Gaining entry to the 
law school is a highly competitive process and vestiges of the pressure to succeed 
lingered in the first year, but a sense of cooperation quickly set in as students noticed 
nonchalance about course grades.  They ultimately internalized the message that being 
average at Harvard Law was completely acceptable, since the entire group was so highly 
superior. Another related elite disposition developed in these schools is “social polish,” 
poise, and sophistication as students become accustomed to interacting with alumni, 
company representatives, and other campus visitors who are already part of the upper 
class (Granfield & Koenig, 1992; Rivera, in press; Schleef, 1997). The ability to use, 




interactions is another form of cultural capital associated with elite educational 
environments (Khan, 2008).  By the same token, a wide base of cultural knowledge is 
especially valuable in the workforce for managers who have authority over many 
employees from various cultural backgrounds (Erickson, 1996; Schleef, 1997; Warde, et 
al, 1999). 
Formation of networks and relationships. 
 
The college-going process enables students to make connections with others 
through personal networks, either individual relationships or membership in a group 
(Coleman, 1988; Lin, 1999).  These networks accord the parties involved with 
opportunities for social capital –in other words, material or symbolic exchanges with one 
another that may subsequently produce economic, social, or cultural value. In a college 
setting, a student may form relationships with other students, faculty, administrators, and 
alumni.  Networks with those who can provide access to opportunities like internships or 
full-time employment are especially valuable (Lee & Brinton, 1996).  These do not need 
to be close relationships; in fact, Granovetter’s (1995) research suggests weak ties – 
casual acquaintances or “friends of friends” – are often more valuable in the job search 
process.  His seminal study of professional, technical and managerial workers 
demonstrated the importance of personal contacts, compared to direct application and 
other formal means of searching, in finding employment.  
The use of networks developed during college (and beyond) may extend over the 
course of someone’s career. Studies of networks developed among MBA students suggest 




market information (Cohen et al, 2008). Lin (1999) noted social capital is especially 
valuable for leaders: 
Thus, we may anticipate that certain positions require more social capital than 
other positions in a firm. First, top-level executives are expected to possess rich 
social capital, as they need to deal and manage people both within and outside the 
firm. In fact, we may postulate that at the highest level of management, social 
capital far outweighs human capital for occupants. Thus, it can be hypothesized 
that firms such as IBM and Microsoft may be more likely to recruit experienced 
managers with social skills than with computer expertise for their CEOs, and that 
top universities need presidents who have the social skills to negotiate with 
faculty, students, parents, and alumni and to raise funds rather than to produce 
distinguished scholarship. (Lin, p. 484).  
 
It also follows that networks would pay off in the form of gaining positions on boards of 
directors.  While the value of social capital to top executives makes conceptual sense, 
there is a lack of evidence as to whether relationships formed in college affect long-term 
career outcomes.    One source of these relationships lending itself well to study is 
membership in social organizations.   
Fraternities and sororities are among the most well known collegiate social 
organizations; in the United States and Canada, there are over 650 campuses sponsoring 
nationally affiliated sorority chapters and over 800 campuses sponsoring nationally 
affiliated fraternity chapters (National Panhellenic Council, 2009).   Involvement in 
Greek organizations may translate into social networks that are especially useful for 
students entering business.  A study of Dartmouth College seniors indicated 19 percent of 
students seeking consulting positions used sorority or fraternity members or alumni in 
career networking, which was the second-most commonly used network behind relatives 




had similar patterns of reliance on Greek members, but students interested in education 
were more likely to seek help from professors.  
A few universities have exclusive social organizations that are campus-specific, 
among these the Hasty Pudding Club and Porcellian Club at Harvard, the Order of Angell 
(formerly known as Michiguma) at the University of Michigan, Columbia’s Axe and 
Coffin, Sphynx at Dartmouth, Georgetown’s Second Society of Stewards, and 
Princeton’s eating clubs (Robbins, 2002). Yale’s highly selective “secret societies,” 
which date back to the mid-1800s, are among the most notorious undergraduate social 
organizations, especially Skull and Bones, which admits 15 seniors each year.  
Anecdotally, at least, the networking associated with these organizations is invaluable.  
One Skull and Bones alumni told Robbins (2002), “the biggest benefit to Skull and 
Bones…is the networking. In the rest of the world you get to know people through 
accident or through choice. In Bones you meet people whom you otherwise wouldn’t get 
to meet. It’s a forced setup among a group of high achievers, even the legacies” (p. 163). 
It follows that ties developed through secret societies might be especially useful in 
corporate career advantages, because there is some evidence members are more likely to 
pursue business occupations.  Zweigenhaft (1992) studied Yale’s secret societies and 
found graduates had higher odds of pursing careers in finance or banking, as well as 
earning MBAs.  Yale graduates who were not in the secret societies were more likely to 
earn doctoral degrees, medical degrees, or law degrees.  
Other forms of extra-curricular engagement may also facilitate the development 
of networks useful in advancing to top corporate positions, though evidence is limited. 




He found most developed relationships with those with similar gender, nationality, age or 
race, a pattern labeled “homophily.”  However, participation in MBA clubs and 
organizations promoted the development of diverse and less redundant networks – 
heterogenous ties thought to have more career benefits than homophilous ties. 
A survey of 243 CEOs from the 800 largest American industrial corporations by 
Boone, Kurtz and Fleenor (1988) found 70 percent were officers in at least one club or 
student organization during their undergraduate years. Also, while only two to three 
percent of all college students participate in NCAA intercollegiate programs, 38 percent 
of these CEOs were members of an intercollegiate athletics team – although it is unclear 
if these patterns are significantly different from other top executives.  In contrast, 
students who are active in political organizations are not likely to pursue business 
occupations generally but instead are more likely to enter government jobs or other 
human services-type organizations (Hoge & Ankney, 1982).  
People with access to privileged opportunities are more highly concentrated in 
certain universities (Gerber & Cheung, 2008; Rothkopf, 2008). Granovetter (1995) noted, 
“I would also suggest that contacts acquired at higher prestige colleges are generally 
better placed in the occupational structure and will ultimately be of more help to their 
protégés – more likely to be in a position from which they can seek them out to offer or 
inform them of a job” (p. 32).   
Individual Career Experiences 
As the original Blau-Duncan status attainment model demonstrated, the 
occupational status of someone’s first job is correlated strongly with late career 




Also, early career mobility and “fast tracked” promotions are associated with promotion 
probability in late career (Belzil & Bognanno, 2004; Rosenbaum, 1979).  Internship and 
fellowship programs are associated with early career advantages and may have lingering 
effects over time (Gault, Redington & Schlager, 2000; Lindsay, 2009).  
Most of the research pertaining to top business executives’ career experiences is 
for CEOs; outside of Useem and Karabel’s (1986) study, there is little evidence on the 
backgrounds of corporate directors and more specifically, multiple directors compared to 
single directors.  The specific firm(s) where someone has worked is important in 
predicting whether he will achieve a CEO position. A substantial portion of the CEO 
selection literature debates the choice of an insider versus outsider (Bertrand, 2009).  
Firm Internal Labor Market theory studies how executives rise through the ranks of a 
single organization, gaining promotions due to seniority or their achievements.  
Occupational Internal Labor Market theory spans organizational boundaries, assuming 
the existence of a transferrable occupationally-based skill set, and someone motivated to 
a position of power may need to switch organizations to get promoted more quickly 
(Althauser, 1989; Althauser & Kalleberg, 1981). 
Historically, CEOs were more likely to be organizational insiders (Piercy & 
Forbes, 1991, and research by Frydman (2007) and Murphy and Zabojnik (2006) 
demonstrates just over 70 percent of CEOs today are internally recruited. Rationales for 
promoting from within include familiarity with the specific company’s products; less 
need for socialization to firm norms and practices; the selection of an insider is often an 
institutionalized process that contributes to overall organizational stability; firms cultivate 




knowledge and personal networks/relationships already established; there is less 
uncertainty about skills and personalities of internal compared to external candidates; and 
outgoing CEOs often prefer to identify and groom an internal “heir apparent” with 
similar qualities to themselves (Datta & Guthrie, 1994; Zajac & Westphal, 1996; Zhang 
& Rajagopalan, 2003).   
Selecting an external CEO often signals a desire for change or to focus on 
external growth, although Khurana and Piskorski (2004) found CEOs selected from an 
external pool are more likely to have been successful CEOs at another well-established 
firm beforehand because perceived competency is critical; “in an external CEO search, 
agreement on which social criteria are most important is evidenced by an overwhelming 
consensus in favor of three observable standards: the candidate’s current position; the 
performance of the candidate’s current firm; and the status of the candidate’s current 
firm” (p. 172).  Another observable indicator of competency is educational credentials, 
and though Khurana and Piskorski did not study this, it follows that an external CEO may 
have more prestigious educational credentials than an internal candidate.  
Tenure of employment at a firm is a related characteristic, and executives have 
more inter-firm mobility today than in the past.  Frydman (2007) found between 1940 
and 1967, over 70 percent of top executives had worked for only one company their 
entire career, but this was the case for less than half by 2003.  Mobility is most likely to 
occur early in the career, however (Piercy & Forbes, 1991). More than half of Frydman’s 
(2007) sample of 50 CEOs in 1988 had worked at their company since their first job (58 
percent), while most of the remainder joined the company in mid-career (38 percent). The 




Finally, an individual’s functional background is associated with the likelihood of 
becoming CEO.  Piercy and Forbes (1991) found experience in general administration 
was most common among Forbes highest paid CEOs between 1971 and 1982, followed 
by marketing, finance, and production/operations. The least common backgrounds were 
technical and legal areas, although these patterns likely depend upon the given industry 
and/or firm needs (Bassiry & Dekmejian, 1990).  For instance, in regulated industries 
such as insurance, utilities and transportation, legal backgrounds were more common.  
Bertrand (2009) suggests a CEO with general management skills is desirable, as the 
organizational structure of firms has flattened at the top resulting in more division heads 
reporting directly to the CEO. 
Firm Differences  
Organizational theory would suggest different firms look for different things in 
their CEOs (Pfeffer & Salacik , 1978).  As I noted in my discussion of status attainment, 
scholars from this tradition have acknowledged the importance of integrating structural 
and organizational differences into their analyses of occupational outcomes generally 
(Baron & Bielby, 1980).  There is some evidence the effects of educational attainment on 
occupational status are stronger as firm size increases  (Baron, 1984; Baron, Davis-Blake 
& Bielby, 1986).  Whether industry or labor market sector mediates education’s impact is 
unclear, though there is some evidence schooling matters more in nonmanufacturing 
firms compared to manufacturing-based (Baron, 1984; Baron, Davis-Blake & Bielby, 
1986; Pfeffer & Cohen, 1984).  The culture of an organization also likely shapes what 




attained, the content area or focus, and the degree source (Forbes & Piercy, 1991; Useem, 
1989). 
The UE framework is the main approach that acknowledges potential firm and 
industry differences in what predicts executive career outcomes.  Theoretically, as Figure 
B2 (Appendix B) illustrates, firm and board characteristics likely influence the type of 
executive a firm hires.  Exactly what organizational dimensions might predict education 
has not received a great deal of attention from researchers, but there is evidence to 
suggest specific content background may be more important for firms interested in 
pursuing certain strategies.  For instance, firms with high levels of R&D expenditures 
often seek top executives with technical knowledge (Datta & Guthrie, 1994; Wiersma & 
Bantel, 1992).  A CEO’s desired educational background may vary according to industry.  
After conducting several descriptive analyses of executive succession patterns and 
synthesizing the literature, Forbes and Piercy (1991) concluded,  
our research indicates that it is not meaningful to lump together firms from 
different industries when examining career paths. Different industries have 
different needs for technical expertise at the top and the most common functional 
background found at the top varies quite a bit across industries. In addition, the 
distribution of functional backgrounds of chief executives has varied over the 
years as the need for critical technical skills has changed (p. 4). 
 
Summary of the Literature 
This chapter grounds the study in three main traditions spanning several 
disciplines and summarizes the evidence around what might influence membership in the 
American corporate elite.   Although the underlying motivation for studying top 
executives varies, each of the three frameworks asserts that postsecondary education is an 




the positions held by the corporate elite are among the most prestigious occupational 
groups, and higher levels of educational attainment are associated with higher prestige 
occupations.  Upper echelon theory suggests that a company’s top management team is 
selected in part based on their educational backgrounds and this has implications for the 
company’s performance.  Power elite theory suggests that membership in the corporate 
elite is predicated upon an executive’s ability to cultivate position within the business 
community, and elite education is a common method by which this occurs (Useem, 
1984).   
As summarized in Figure A3 (Appendix A), education is only one of many likely 
influences on top executives’ careers suggested by these frameworks.  Demographics 
(e.g., race, gender, age, social class background) social-psychological characteristics 
(e.g., career aspirations, personality, motivation, values) are directly related to the 
chances of membership in the corporate elite, as well as indirectly through educational 
attainment and early career experiences.  Likewise, educational attainment is 
hypothesized to directly influence executive selection and, as status attainment and upper 
echelon theory would suggest, have an indirect effect through entering occupational 
status, functional background, and tenure at the firm. The reason why education creates 
advantages for executive careers is debated.  Explanations include signaling or screening 
based on the degrees themselves, development of knowledge or skills, and development 
of relationships or personal networks, and there is evidence to support all three of these to 
some extent.  This study builds on the theories and associated evidence discussed in this 
chapter to better understand the relationship of postsecondary education with membership 






In this chapter, I discuss the Fortune 500 ranking system, my selection strategy 
for companies and individuals, the key variables I collected in regards to each, and my 
analytic approach. As explained briefly in Chapter 1, this study has several parts. I begin 
by replicating and refining Useem and Karabel’s (1986) study of top business executives 
with contemporary data.  Next, I extend their analysis to focus on the role of 
postsecondary education – academic achievements, status-conferring experiences, 
involvement, etc. – on membership in the corporate elite.  My discussion of the study 
methodology begins with an explanation of the replication and refinement procedures 
then turns to what I did for the extension. 
Study Replication & Refinement Phase 
 
Data 
The sampling strategy is two-tiered, in that I first identified the companies of 
interest then selected individual executives employed by those companies. 
Fortune 500 companies. 
 
The Fortune 500 is a listing of United States corporations ranked according to 
their revenues.11 Privately held companies that do not file financial statements with a 
government agency (and thus are not publicly traded) as well as U.S. subsidiaries of 
                                                 





foreign-based companies are not considered for inclusion in the list.  Fortune also has 
lists based on similar criteria for the top 1,000 U.S. companies, the top 500 global 
companies, and the top 1,000 global companies but the Fortune U.S. 500 has been 
collected since 1955 and is a widely accepted representation of the largest and most 
influential corporations in the United States (Ryan, Swanson, & Buchholz, 1987).   
A full list of the 2010 Fortune 500 companies may be found in Appendix B. The 
top company was Wal-Mart, with approximately $408 billion in total revenues, of which 
$14 billion was after-tax profit.  Though Wal-Mart had a successful year, not all of the 
companies on the list fared as well. In fact, 97 incurred a financial loss including #81, 
Fannie Mae with a loss of approximately $71 billion, #54 Freddie Mac with a loss of $38 
billion, and #6 American International Group (AIG) with a loss of $11 billion. 
In addition to widely varying levels of financial success, the companies differed 
quite a bit in terms of structural characteristics. On average, the companies were 
incorporated12 in 1945 with a standard deviation of 45 years.  Two on the list were 
incorporated in the eighteenth century - Bank of New York Mellon Corporation (1794) 
and Cigna (1792). Twenty-eight companies were incorporated in 2000 or later, including 
the most recent: Dr. Pepper Snapple Group in 2007. The headquarters for the 2010 
Fortune 500 companies were scattered across 41 states as well as Washington DC, 
Quebec (Canada), and Stockholm (Sweden).  Six states (as well as Stockholm) were 
home to one Fortune 500 company only, while at the other end of the range, Texas was 
the headquarters for 57.  California (n=56) and New York (n=55) were also well 
                                                 
12 The year of incorporation is not necessarily the year that the company was founded. However, companies 




represented as headquarter locations. The majority of the companies were publicly held, 
but 8.4 percent are privately owned. 
Not only are the Fortune 500 companies a major part of the American economy, 
as the revenue and profit figures illustrate, but they also have a major direct influence on 
the lives of their millions of employees.  The median number of full-time employees was 
approximately 22,950.  At the upper end of the range, Wal-Mart had approximately 2.1 
million full-time employees; the next largest was UPS with 408,000.  These figures offer 
perspective into the vertical scale of power these executives have over the livelihoods of 
many people (not to mention consumers and investors), regardless of whether they are 
also part of the intra-business corporate elite.   
A cursory comparison of the 1977 Fortune 500 to those in 2010 suggests the 
composition of the list has changed considerably over time.  No companies have exactly 
the same ranking in both years.  In fact, only 116 of those listed in 2010 were also ranked 
among the top 500 in 1977.13  There are 52 companies that were part of the 1977 study 
sample and also part of my 2010 sample (see Appendix B).  One reason why some might 
only be on the 2010 list is obviously because they did not yet exist in 1977; 168 
companies on the 2010 Fortune 500 were not incorporated until 1977 or later.  Even those 
on both lists certainly have experienced change in their corporate forms.  In 1977, for 
example, Warner Communications was ranked #261 and Time, Inc. was ranked #217.   
The companies merged in 1989 and became Time Warner, which was ranked #82 on the 
2010 list.  The 2010 corporations continue to change in form, and this analysis is a 
“snapshot in time” rather than representing the current state of each company. 
                                                 
13 This is consistent with Capelli and Hamori’s (2004) comparison of the 1980 and 2001 Fortune 100.  Of 








I first stratified the 2010 Fortune 500 companies according to industry, following 
an approach similar to the Useem and Karabel study. A common standard designating the 
type of business in which a company is engaged is the Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) developed by the U.S. government and used by agencies such as the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC).14 The SIC scheme organizes businesses by their primary 
type of activity using several levels of classification, and I used the broadest grouping of 
ten industries for my stratification.  I discarded four industry groups from the sample – 
agriculture, construction, mining, and nonclassifiable establishments – because only a 
small number of companies fell within each (see Table 3.1). I sorted companies by 
revenues in each of the six remaining categories: manufacturing; finance, insurance & 
real estate; retail trade; wholesale trade; transportation, communications & utilities; and 
business & personal services.  Finally, I sampled a total of 250 companies according to 
their revenue rankings within the six industries (the companies that are part of my sample 
are listed in Appendix B). Table 3.1 contains the selection criteria and comparison to the 
1977 study sample criteria.  As noted previously, the composition of the 1977 Fortune 
500 is quite different from the current group of companies, so the industries from which 
each sample is drawn are not identical.  
 
                                                 
14 In	  1997,	  a	  new	  standard	  known	  as	  the	  North	  American	  Industry	  Classification	  System	  was	  
introduced,	  but	  because	  this	  did	  not	  exist	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  1977	  study,	  I	  use	  the	  SIC	  to	  describe	  my	  







 1977 Study Current Study 
Population 1977 Fortune magazine list of 
America’s largest corporations 
 
2010 Fortune 500 
Number of companies 208 companies 250 companies 
 
Stratification criterion Seven industry categories: 
• 6 Retail firms ranked 1 to 6 by sales 
• 110 Manufacturing firms ranked 1 
to 60 and 451 to 500 by sales 
volume 
• 5 Transportation companies 
numbered from 1 to 5 by operating 
revenues  
• 5 Utilities numbered 1 to 5 by 
assets 
• 24 Insurance companies ranked 
from 1 to 15, and 9 of those ranked 
41 to 50 by assets (10th company 
not included because a complete 
list of officers unavailable) 
• 22 Diversified financial firms: 13 
of those numbered 1 to 15 and nine 
of those ranked 41 to 50 by assets 
(3 not included due to 
unavailability of top executive info) 
• 35 Commercial banks ranked 1 to 
25 and 41 to 50 
 
Six industry categories: 
• 25 Retail trade companies ranked 
from 1 to 15 and 31 to 40 
• 105 Manufacturing firms ranked 
1 to 1051 
• 50 Transportation, 
Communications & Utilities from 
1 to 30 and 51 to 702 
• 50 Finance, insurance & real 
estate companies ranked from 1 
to 30 and 51 to 703 
• 10 Wholesale trade firms ranked 
from 1 to 10 
• 10 Business and personal 
services companies ranked from 
1 to 10  
Number of executives 3,105  3,789 
 
Response rate 87.9%  
(376 missing on postsecondary) 
95.6%  
(165 missing cases on postsecondary) 
 
Sample for analysis 2,729 3,624 
 
 
1 Sun Microsystems, a manufacturing company ranked 204 overall, was acquired in early 2010 by Oracle, a 
manufacturing company ranked 105 overall.  Since Oracle was already part of the sample, I replaced Sun 
with VF, which numbered 106 in revenues among manufacturing firms. 
2 Burlington Northern Railroads, a transportation company ranked 167 overall, was acquired in early 2010 
by Berkshire Hathaway, which is characterized as a “Nonclassifiable Establishment.” I replaced Burlington 
Northern with CenturyTel, which numbered 71 in revenues in the Transportation, Communications & 
Utilities group.  
3 Auto-Owners Insurance is ranked 418 but is a privately held company and I could not locate a list of 
executives or directors.  I replaced it with the next company in Finance, Insurance & Real Estate, which is 




As the descriptive statistics in Table 3.2 illustrate, this strategy resulted in a final 
group of companies that were, on average, larger than the average Fortune 500 member 
in revenues, profits, and number of employees.  They had been in existence for almost 
twenty years longer, and there were slightly more privately owned companies in the 
sample than in the population.  By industry, there were relatively more manufacturing 
firms in the sample (42%) than in the population (35%). The same was true for those 
classified as finance, insurance, and real estate (16% in population, 20% in sample) and 
transportation, communications and utilities (16% in population, 20% in sample).   In 




Descriptive statistics for 2010 Fortune 500 company population and study sample of 
companies. 
 




Average Revenues (FY 2009, in millions) 1 19,527 (32,038) 30,467 (40,839) 
Average 2009 Profit (FY 2009, in millions) 1 786 (4,348) 1,241 (5,943) 
Average Year of Incorporation1 1945 (45) 1937 (47) 
Average Number of Full-Time Employees1 47,029 (110,717) 66,737 (147,966) 
Percentage Privately Owned2 7.4% (26%) 8.4% (28%) 
Major SIC Sector2     
  Agriculture 0.4% (2) 0% (0) 
  Construction 1.0% (5) 0% (0) 
  Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 16.4% (82) 20.0% (50) 
  Manufacturing 35.4% (177) 42.0% (105) 
  Mining 2.6% (13) 0% (0) 
  Nonclassifiable establishments 1.2% (6) 0% (0) 
  Retail Trade 12.2% (61) 10.0% (25) 
  Service Industries 9.8% (49) 4.0% (10) 
  Transportation, Communications & Utilities 15.8% (79) 20.0% (50) 
  Wholesale Trade 5.2% (26) 4.0% (10) 
1 Means are displayed first; standard deviations are in parentheses 




 Sample: Executives. 
 
 The population of individuals for this study is those employed in the 2010 Fortune 
500 who hold a rank of executive vice president, senior vice president or above, as listed 
on the company’s most recent 10-K filing or annual report.  These executives typically 
include the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chairman of the Board of Directors, Chief 
Operating Officer (COO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), and other top leaders of the 
organization. Each is well positioned to influence their company policies and exercise 
influence over decisions (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Finkelstein, Hambrick & 
Cannella, 2009) – and each is accorded high social status (Nakao & Treas, 1994). 
Useem and Karabel picked six to eight of the senior-most officers and ten outside 
directors for each company for a total of 3,105.  I used a similar strategy, by selecting all 
outside directors, including the Chairman of the Board if this individual was different 
from the CEO, and between 6 to 8 senior-level managers holding ranks of vice president 
or higher as listed on the company’s most recent 10-K filing. I collected data for 
approximately 10 to 15 executives associated with each company that was part of the 
sample, for a total of 3,789 individuals. 
Variables 
After identifying the sample, I assembled data about each individual’s personal 
history, educational history, and career achievements from each company’s 10-K filing 
for 2010, their websites, and a number of publicly available business directories such as 
Standard & Poor’s Register of Corporations, Directors, and Executives, Dun & 
Bradstreet’s Reference Book of Corporate Management, Marquis’s Who’s Who in 




NNDB.com, and general internet searches. I did not use any one source exclusively and 
triangulated information when possible. One thing to note is I collected data in addition 
to those used in the prior study, all of which are described in more detail below.  
Membership in the corporate elite. 
My dependent variables are various representations of membership in the 
corporate elite.  There were 1,165 individuals, or 30.7 percent of the sample, that were 
part of the corporate elite through at least one of the positions proxying membership (see 
Table 3.3). 
I used the position titles for each executive from the 10-K statements to determine 
whether someone was currently a Chief Executive Officer of one of the 250 companies in 
the sample.  There were actually 252 individual CEOs in this group, because Whole 
Foods and Motorola had co-CEOs. In the 1977 study, they also classified someone as a 
CEO if he was currently the chief executive for any company in the Fortune list of the 
approximately 1,300 largest American companies. I therefore determined whether any of 
the board members was currently a CEO for any other company on the Fortune 1,000 list 
of U.S. corporations.  An additional 47 were CEOs of the non-sampled 250 companies in 
the Fortune 500 and an additional 35 were CEOs of companies ranked 501 to 1000 by 
Fortune, which brought the total number of CEOs to 334 individuals, or 8.8 percent of the 
total sample.  
An executive was characterized here as a multiple director if he or she was an 
outside director for at least two companies.  If a CEO (or other top level executive) sat on 
his own board, referred to as an “inside” director, this position was not included in my 




recent year as well as 10-K statements.  As with the CEOs, I determined whether 
executives were directors for one or more of the companies in my sample as well as 
directors for the other 250 companies outside of my sample and for the rest of the Fortune 
1000.  There were 564 individuals – or 14.9 percent of the sample – who were outside 
directors for two or more companies in the 2010 Fortune 500, and 777 – or 20.5 percent 
of the sample – were outside directors for two or more companies in the 2010 Fortune 
1000. 
Where the business association leaders are concerned, I used the most recent lists 
of trustees and boards as of July 2010 for the Committee for Economic Development 
(approximately 203 total), Business Roundtable (approximately 170 total), and Business 
Council (approximately 127 total) as well as the most recent list of “life members” of the 
Council on Foreign Relations (approximately 4,000 total life members) and matched to 
my sample.    There were 334 individuals, or 8.8 percent of the sample, who were leaders 
of at least one of these associations in 2010.   
 The majority of the executives in the sample were not CEOs, part of an 
association, or multiple directors. In several analyses, I divided them into two groups.  
Senior managers were the 1,459 individuals (38.5%) who held top positions in their own 
companies (e.g., executive vice president, CFO, CIO) but were not the chief executives 
nor did they serve on multiple boards of directors or associations.  Single directors were 
the 1,377 individuals (36.3%) who held one outside director position only.  Information 
about these position titles was documented and confirmed using company 10-Ks and 





Descriptive statistics for corporate positions (n=3,789) 
 
 N Percent 
Corporate Governance   
  Serves on no corporate boards 1,635 44.2% 
  Serves on one corporate board  1,377 36.3% 
  Serves on two or more corporate boards 777 20.5% 
Top Management   
  Senior manager 1,459 38.5% 
  Chief executive officer 334 8.8% 
Business Representatives   
 Not leader of an association  3,455 91.2% 
 Leader of at least one association 334 8.8% 
   Committee for Economic Development 33 0.9% 
   Business Roundtable 102 2.7% 
   Council on Foreign Relations 93 2.5% 
   Business Council 182 4.8% 
.     
 
As these statistics suggest, the three categories used here to define the corporate 
elite were not discrete. For instance, about 17 percent of CEOs (n=57) were outside 
directors for two or more companies (in addition to their own), so they were classified as 
multiple directors as well as CEOs.  The correlation between these two variables – CEO 
and multiple directorships – was not statistically significant (see Table 3.4). Membership 
in a business association was slightly correlated with holding multiple directorships 
(r=.08, p<.001) and moderately with being a CEO (r=.363, p<.001).  
Table 3.4 










Senior Manager    -0.244***      
Multiple Director       -0.026   -0.386***   
Single Director     -0.235*** -0.499*** -0.384***  
Association Member     0.363*** -0.219*** 0.080*** -0.041* 
 





The distribution of positions across this sample varies quite a bit from the 1977 
study.  As the comparison in Table 3.5 indicates, the prior study had more executives in 
each elite subgroup – 25.9 percent were multiple directors, 38.9 percent were CEOs, and 
18.4 percent were business association representatives.  Perhaps there are fewer 
interlocking relationships among major contemporary companies; also, they identified 
CEOs and directors for 1,300 companies while I used 1,000 companies. Domhoff (2009) 
stated that 15 to 20 percent of directors sit on more than one corporate board, so my 
figures appear to be consistent with other contemporary estimates. 
 
Table 3.5 
Corporate positions in 2010 compared to 1977 
 
1977 Study 2010 Study  
N Percent N Percent 
Corporate Governance     
  Serves on one board or none 2,023 74.1% 3,012 79.5% 
  Serves on two or more corporate boards 706 25.9% 777 20.5% 
Senior most Management     
  Does not hold CEO position 1,667 61.1% 3,490 92.1% 
  Chief executive officer 1,062 38.9% 334 8.8% 
Business Representatives     
  Not leader of a business association 2,227 81.6% 3,455 91.2% 
  Leader of one or more 502 18.4% 334 8.8% 
     




Demographics for replication. 
 
For social class, Useem and Karabel created a measure of upper class origin using 
information as to whether the individual’s family was listed in the Social Register15 or 
whether the individual attended one of fourteen preparatory academies that traditionally 
                                                 
15 Published by Forbes magazine, the Social Register is a reputational compilation of families that are 




enroll a high proportion of students from prominent social families.  These schools are 
Choate Rosemary Hall, Deerfield, Groton, Hill, Hotchkiss, Kent, Lawrenceville, 
Middlesex, Milton, Portsmouth Priory, St. George's, St. Mark's, St. Paul's, and Taft.  
Some scholars also include in this list Phillips Academy Andover and Phillips Exeter, and 
Useem and Karabel conducted some analyses adding these two schools and other 
analyses with the aforementioned fourteen only. I determined whether an executive 
graduated from one of these sixteen preparatory schools using alumni directories from 
each school.  I also checked the 2010 Social Register to determine if the executive’s 
family was listed.  
Just over three percent of the full sample had either or both of these characteristics 
(see Table 3.6). CEOs, business association leaders, and directors were slightly more 
likely to share these backgrounds, while only 1.5 percent of senior managers had upper 
class origins.  As a point of comparison, Useem and Karabel found 9.8 percent of their 
sample were from the upper class. 
Demographics for refinement. 
 
A large body of research discusses the role that gender plays in business career 
outcome, and I was able to collect this information for each executive from business 
databases and company websites. Race/ethnicity was a bit more difficult to determine 
than gender. I relied on company websites, nndb.com, and general Internet searches to 
identify an individual’s race/ethnicity.    Also, the Executive Leadership Council 
published a census of African American board members of Fortune 500s in 2008.  They 
listed the names and companies of all African American board members in their report, 




Asian, Hispanic, and other racial/ethnic minority groups have received comparatively less 
attention and I did not locate a source pertaining to their representation.  Finally, I 
collected information for executives’ birth year from several sources.  Some biographies 
listed an executive’s actual birthday, while others listed their ages only.  In the latter case, 
I subtracted age from 2010, so these data may be slightly off by a year for any given 
individual.  
Table 3.6 provides a demographic overview of the sample.  The executives ranged 
in age from 30 years in 2010 (born in 1980) to 94 years (born in 1916), although the 
average executive was approximately 60 (born in 1950) with a standard deviation of 8.6 
years. Board members in my sample were several years older, with multiple directors 
averaging 64 years and single directors averaging 62 years, compared to CEOs (mean=57 
years) and senior managers (mean=53 years). As a point of comparison, Useem and 
Karabel found the average age of their sample in 1977 was 56 years old. 
The 1977 study did not explicitly offer an analysis of executives’ gender, but the 
pronouns used imply that almost all were male.  In 2010, 15.7 percent of the full sample 
were female, though women were notably underrepresented in the CEO ranks (2.9%). In 
contrast, women comprised almost fifteen percent of the senior manager ranks.  Also, 
about nineteen percent of multiple directors and eighteen percent of single directors were 
female.   
Nor did the 1977 study discuss the racial/ethnic composition of their sample.  I 
was able to determine race for almost 90 percent (n=3,408) of the executives, and 87.8 
percent were white.  Multiple directors were more diverse than the remaining executives 




association members, and 90.6 percent of senior managers.  As with gender, CEOs were 
the most homogenous group; almost 94 percent were white.   
 
Table 3.6 



















 Pct N Pct N Pct N Pct N Pct N Pct N 
Female 15.7% 594 2.9% 13 14.7% 214 18.5% 144 17.7% 243 15.9% 53 
White 87.8% 2,991 93.9% 307 90.6% 1,093 82.3% 622 86.3% 1,099 87.9% 291 
Black 6.7% 230 2.4% 8 4.8% 58 12.0% 91 7.1% 90 7.3% 24 
Asian/Indian 2.8% 93 3.0% 10 2.7% 33 2.0% 15 3.2% 41 2.7% 9 
Hispanic 2.8% 94 0.6% 2 1.9% 23 3.7% 28 3.5% 49 2.1% 7 
Upper class origins 3.1% 119 4.2% 14 1.5% 22 4.1% 32 4.1% 56 4.8% 16 
Year of birtha 1950 (8.6) 1953 (5.9) 1957 (6.0) 1946 (6.8) 1948 (8.9) 1949 (7.8) 
 
Note.  The sub-categories of executives are not mutually exclusive. See Table 3.4. 
a Year of birth results are in mean years with the standard deviation in parentheses after since the measure is 




 My descriptions of the variables in the prior section included descriptive statistics.  
In this section, discussion of the postsecondary variables in the replication and extension 
analyses is limited to how I operationalized the variables – the descriptive statistics are in 
the Results chapter – because they are the response to my first research question. 
Postsecondary variables for replication. 
 
The 1977 study asserted, “the distinguishing university credentials for top 
company managers are the prestige of the undergraduate university attended and whether 
their bachelor’s degree was followed by professional training in management or law” 
(Useem & Karabel, 1986, p. 197).  Their choice of variables is guided by this assumption, 





1. Attended no college 
2. Attended college but did not complete a bachelor’s degree 
3. Completed college at a “lesser” institution and did not pursue graduate training 
4. Completed bachelor’s degree at a “top” institution and did not pursue graduate 
training 
5. Completed MBA degree at a “lesser” program 
6. Completed MBA degree at a “top” program 
7. Completed law degree (LL.B) at a “lesser” program 
8. Completed law degree at a “top program” 
9. Earned graduate degree other than MBA or LL.B 
 
I attempted to replicate these categories as closely as possible.  Where the first 
two are concerned, my analyses combine them into less than BA.  I was able to determine 
for some executives two-year degree information and/or those who attended some four-
year college but dropped out.  However, I am not confident that the biographical sources 
were thorough enough to use as separate variables in the analyses. As my descriptive 
analyses in the next chapter show, these groups together account for less than two percent 
of the current sample – a marked change from 1977 when they together accounted for 
almost seventeen percent – so even combined they are a small fraction of the total. 
I documented whether each individual earned a bachelor’s degree and if so, the 
college or university awarding the degree. Useem and Karabel’s main measure of 
undergraduate program is if an executive graduated from one of the top eleven according 
to Coleman’s 1940 ranking – which they selected because it was done at a time when 





Johns Hopkins University 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 









From this information, they created one variable representing executives whose highest 
degree earned was a BA from one of these top colleges and another variable representing 
executives whose highest degree earned was a BA from a lesser ranked school.   
An important point to note is that these variables represent executives whose 
terminal degree is a bachelor’s degree.  So for instance, if an executive held a bachelor’s 
degree from MIT as well as a PhD from the University of Michigan, he would not be 
included in the “BA only, top college” group but rather in the final group, “earned a 
postgraduate degree other than an MBA or an LL.B.”  The 1977 authors implied that 
such scenarios were uncommon in their data, stating, “these groups [the nine 
postsecondary categories] are generally mutually exclusive.  In those several instances 
when both business and law degrees had been earned, the manager was classified as 
holding the latter” (Useem & Karabel, 1986, p. 188).  Although these categories are not 
mutually exclusive in the 2010 sample – for instance, 60 managers hold an MBA and a 
law degree – I assigned executives to postsecondary groups using the same procedures as 
Useem and Karabel for the replication portion of my analyses to maintain consistency 
with the prior study.     
I created two variables representing BA only, top college and BA only, lesser 
college. The Coleman quality measure used by Useem and Karabel was not updated after 
1940, but other common representations of university quality are admissions selectivity, 
financial resources (e.g., endowments, tuition costs), faculty characteristics (e.g., research 
productivity, faculty/student ratio, percent adjuncts) or academic reputation (Brooks, 




reputational measure like Coleman’s, Barron’s, Gourman’s, or U.S. News. The 
executives in my sample were, on average, born in 1950 so they were of traditional 
college age around 1970.  Finding a measure of degree quality or prestige from 
approximately that time period was important, as was finding a measure that would 
permit me to identify eleven schools for purposes of replicating the prior study.     
A ranking system that meets both criteria is the first Gourman Report, released in 
1967 (the first US News & World Report rankings were published in 1983). Rating the 
academic departments for approximately 500 undergraduate-serving institutions, it is a 
composite representation using “data available from accrediting boards, scholarships and 
fellowship foundations, industrial and government fellowships and scholarship awards, 
publications, curriculum, and honorary societies” (Gourman, 1967, p. 2). Gourman 
assigned each school a numerical score that is supposed to mimic the SAT; the highest 
possible score is an 800 and those at the lower end of the range were scored in the 300’s.  
In 1967, nine schools were given scores above a 700 and 15 were given scores above a 
600.16  To be consistent with Useem and Karabel, I chose the top eleven according to 
Gourman’s rankings.  The schools, with their 1967 scores in parentheses, are: 
Princeton University (772) 
Harvard University (770) 
Yale University (762) 
University of Michigan (749) 
Columbia University (744) 
Cornell University (742) 
University of Notre Dame (741) 
Dartmouth College (722) 
University of Pennsylvania (709) 
                                                 
16 Those that had scores above 600 but fell below the cutoff for the top eleven are: Brown University (642), 
University of California Los Angeles (678), Carnegie Institute of Technology (600), Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (664), University of Minnesota (645), Oberlin College (636), Pomona College 
(600), Reed College (633), University of Rochester (600), Swarthmore College (623), Wesleyan University 




California Institute of Technology (697) 
University of California Berkeley (693) 
 
I collected information about graduate degrees earned by each individual, 
including where the degree was earned and what type of degree was earned.  I 
documented whether an executive held an MBA.  The 1977 study used MBA Magazine’s 
1974 list of top programs and grouped the top eleven together: 
Columbia University 
Dartmouth College 
Harvard University  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Northwestern University 
Stanford University 
University of California-Berkeley 
University of California Los Angeles 
University of Chicago 
University of Michigan 
University of Pennsylvania 
 
They also did analyses of whether the MBA was from Harvard Business School only.  As 
far as I could determine, MBA Magazine is defunct. Since 1988, Business Week has 
issued annual rankings of postsecondary business programs and they currently rank 
undergraduate, full-time MBA, executive MBA, and part-time MBA (among others).  To 
proxy top MBA program similar to Useem and Karabel, I chose the top eleven programs 
from the full-time MBA list in 2010:17 
Columbia University  
Duke University 
Harvard University 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Northwestern University 
University of California-Berkeley 
University of Chicago 
University of Pennsylvania 
University of Michigan 
University of Virginia 







For executives who held an MBA from other lesser ranked programs, I created a dummy 
variable for MBA, lesser program. 
Another set of variables pertain to whether the executives earned a law degree.  
The 1977 study defines the law degrees held by its sample as LL.B degrees, but the 
standards of legal education have shifted since that time.  The last U.S. LL.B degrees 
were granted in the late 1970s (Wall Street Journal, 2007), and today the common 
standard for bar admission is a JD from an American Bar Association (ABA) accredited 
program.  Other legal degrees include a Master of Laws (LL.M), for which the JD is a 
prerequisite, and the Doctor of Jurisprudence (J.S.D.) or Doctor of the Science of Law 
(S.J.D or J.S.D), for which the LL.M is a prerequisite.  Any executive who held a JD or 
higher (or whose bio read, “earned a law degree from XYZ”) was considered to have a 
law degree for purposes of my study.18  I did not give credit for a law degree to 
executives who only had an undergraduate degree in pre-law or executives who earned a 
master’s degree for non-lawyers as defined by the ABA, such as a Master of Science in 
Taxation, but not a JD 
In the replication analyses, law degrees are treated similar to MBA degrees by 
separating those from “top programs” apart from others.  The 1977 study relied on a 1974 
survey conducted by Blau and Margulies to identify the top nine programs, including:  
Columbia University 
Harvard University 
New York University 
Stanford University 
University of California-Berkeley 
University of Chicago 
                                                 





University of Michigan 
University of Pennsylvania 
Yale University 
 
I used the US News & World Report law school rankings for 2010 to represent top law 
program and selected the top nine programs: 
Columbia University 
Harvard University 
New York University 
Stanford University 
University of California-Berkeley 
University of Chicago 
University of Michigan 
University of Pennsylvania 
Yale University 
 
This list is, interestingly, the same nine as the Blau and Margulies list used in the prior 
study.  For executives who held a law degree from other programs, I created a dummy 
variable for law degree, lesser program. 
Finally, I created a measure to represent graduate degree other than MBA or law.  
The 1977 study did not disaggregate among these degree types or schools; nor did I in the 
replication.   
In addition to the nine main postsecondary categories above, Useem and Karabel 
developed two interaction terms for inclusion in their multivariate analysis.  These are 
dummy variables created by combinations of other main effects variables.  The first, 
lesser BA + top MBA, represents executives who earned a bachelor’s degree from a lesser 
institution but went on to earn an MBA from a top university.  The second, lesser BA + 
top family, represents executives who earned a bachelor’s degree from a lesser institution 
and came from upper class origins.  Their rationale for including these measures was to 




possessing a top credential or advantaged family background created an additional 
advantage compared to holding a lesser BA alone.  
Postsecondary variables for refinement. 
 
Gourman’s undergraduate rankings are used to represent college desirability or 
prestige in other studies of careers (e.g., Ehrenberg, 1989; Judge et al, 1994; Solmon, 
1973), but they are strongly criticized for an opaque methodology (Lawrence & Green, 
1980; Stuart, 1995). Another classification scheme published during the same time period 
is the third edition of Barron’s Profiles of American Colleges (Fine, 1966).  Barron’s 
classifies schools by admissions standards into six groups (“Most Competitive,” “Highly 
Competitive,” “Very Competitive,” “Competitive,” “Less Competitive,” and 
“Noncompetitive”).  There are 43 schools in the most selective category and they are not 
differentiated any further, so I could not choose only eleven to use in the replication 
analysis.  However, Barron’s is more accepted by scholars than Gourman (e.g., Brand & 
Halaby, 2003; Brewer, Eide, & Ehrenberg 1999).  As part of my refinement of the Useem 
and Karabel study, I replaced the Gourman measures with a series of dummy variables to 
represent from which of the six Barron’s categories an executive earned a bachelor’s 
degree. 
As part of my model refinements, I also created variables representing the 
interactions of race, gender, class, and age with education.  This permitted me to test 
whether, for example, the relationship between holding a top MBA and becoming a CEO 
was the same for men and women or whether the degree might provide more of an 





Table 3.7  
Description of variables used in multivariate analyses of full sample.    
 
 Description Scale 
Membership in Corporate Elite 
CEO Dichotomous measure of whether 
someone is chief executive officer of a 
Fortune 1,000 company in 2010 
 
0=No, 1=Yes 
Multiple Director Dichotomous measure of whether  
someone holds two or more outside 
director positions in a Fortune 1,000 
company in 2010 
 
0=No, 1=Yes 
Associational Networks Dichotomous measure of whether 
someone is a member of the Business 
Roundtable, Business Council, Council on 
Foreign Relations, or Commission for 




Demographics for Replication  
Upper class origins Dichotomous measure of whether an 
executive graduated from an elite 
preparatory high school or has parents 
listed in the Social Register 
0=Non-upper class, 
1=Upper class 
Additional Demographics  
Gender – Female Dichotomous measure representing 
whether an executive is female 
 
0=Male, 1=Female 
Birth year Continuous measure of the year an 
executive was born 
 
Range from 1916-1980 
Race – White Dichotomous measure of whether 
executive is white compared to collapsed 
group of non-white (includes black, 
Asian, Hispanic, Indian, Middle Eastern) 
0=Non-white, 1=White 
Postsecondary Characteristics for Replication 
Less than BA Dichotomous measure of whether an 
executive possessed a four-year degree or 
not 
0=bachelor’s degree or 
higher 
1=some or no 4-year 
college, no degree 
 
BA only, lesser college Dichotomous measure of whether an 
executive’s highest degree earned is from 
a lesser undergraduate program (or 
international baccalaureate equivalent) 
0=Highest degree is 
not a bachelor’s from 
lesser college 
1= Highest degree is 







BA only, top college  Dichotomous measure of whether an 
executive’s highest degree earned is from 
one of the top eleven undergraduate 
programs 
 
0=No BA from top 
college 
1=BA from top college 
MBA, lesser program Dichotomous measure of whether an 
executive holds a Master’s of Business 
Administration degree from a lesser 
program 
0=No MBA from 
lesser program 
1= MBA from lesser 
program 
 
MBA, top program Dichotomous measure of whether an 
executive holds a Master’s of Business 
Administration degree from top program 
according to Business Week’s rankings 
0=No MBA from top 
program 
1= MBA from top 
program 
 
Law degree, lesser program Dichotomous measure of whether an 
executive holds graduate level law degree 
from a lesser program  
0=No law from lesser 
program 
1= Law from lesser 
program 
 
Law degree, top program Dichotomous measure of whether an 
executive holds graduate level law degree 
from top program according to US News 
rankings 
0=No law from top 
program 
1= Law from top 
program 
 
Other graduate degree Dichotomous measure of whether an 
executive holds any graduate level degree 
with the exception of law or MBA 
0=Highest degree is 
not graduate other than 
MBA or law 
1= Highest degree is 
graduate other than 
MBA or law 
 
lesser BA + top MBA Dichotomous measure of whether an 
executive holds a non-elite BA and a top 
MBA 
0=Does not possess 
both lesser BA & top 
MBA  
0=Holds both lesser 
BA & top MBA 
 
Lesser BA + top family Dichotomous measure of whether an 
executive holds a non-elite BA and is 
from an upper-class family background 
0=Does not possess 
both lesser BA & from 
upper class family 
0=Holds lesser BA & 






Additional Postsecondary Characteristics 
BA, Barron’s Highly 
Competitive  
Categorical variable recoded to dummy 
variable.  Whether an executive earned 
bachelor’s degree from a school classified 
as “Highly Competitive” admissions 
selectivity – the second highest category 
out of six – by Barron’s in 1966. 







BA, Barron’s Very 
Competitive  
Categorical variable recoded to dummy 
variable.  Whether an executive earned 
bachelor’s degree from a school classified 
as “Very Competitive” admissions 
selectivity – the middle category out of six 
– by Barron’s in 1966. Comparison group 






BA, Barron’s Competitive  Categorical variable recoded to dummy 
variable.  Whether an executive earned 
bachelor’s degree from a school classified 
as “Competitive” admissions selectivity – 
the fourth highest category out of six – by 
Barron’s in 1966. Comparison group is the 






BA, Barron’s Less 
Competitive  
Categorical variable recoded to dummy 
variable.  Whether an executive earned 
bachelor’s degree from a school classified 
as “Highly Competitive” admissions 
selectivity – the fifth highest category out 
of six– by Barron’s in 1966. Comparison 







BA, Barron’s Non 
Competitive  
Categorical variable recoded to dummy 
variable.  Whether an executive earned 
bachelor’s degree from a school classified 
as “Highly Competitive” admissions 
selectivity – the lowest category out of six 
– by Barron’s in 1966. Comparison group 




1=BA, Barron’s Non 
Competitive 
BA, Not listed in 
Barron’s/Unknown source  
Categorical variable recoded to dummy 
variable. Whether an executive earned a 
bachelor’s degree from a school not listed 
in Barron’s 1966 edition. Comparison 











BA, International  
 
Categorical variable recoded to dummy 
variable.  Whether an executive earned 
bachelor’s degree from a school outside of 
the US. Comparison group is the most 






Less than BA Categorical variable recoded to dummy 
variable.  Whether an executive holds less 
than a four-year college degree. 




1=Less than BA 
   
 
Analytic Strategy 
My analyses of the full sample begin with descriptives comparing the corporate 
elite to all other executives. The next set of results is the replication of Useem and 
Karabel’s analyses using contemporary data. They used a series of three multiple 
regressions to estimate the odds of membership in each of the three corporate elite 
groups.  These models can be represented by the following equations: 
 
Pr(CEO) = β0 + β1(BA lesser college) + β2(BA top college) + β3(MBA lesser 
program) + β4(MBA top program) + β5(JD lesser program) + β6(JD top program) 
+ β7(other graduate degree) + β8(social origins) + β9(lesser BA + top MBA) + 
β10(lesser BA + top family)  
 
Pr(multiple director) = β0 + β1(BA lesser college) + β2(BA top college) + β3(MBA 
lesser program) + β4(MBA top program) + β5(JD lesser program) + β6(JD top 
program) + β7(other graduate degree) + β8(social origins) + β9(lesser BA + top 
MBA) + β10(lesser BA + top family) + β11(CEO)   
 
Pr(business association) = β0 + β1(BA lesser college) + β2(BA top college) + 
β3(MBA lesser program) + β4(MBA top program) + β5(JD lesser program) + 
β6(JD top program) + β7(other graduate degree) + β8(social origins) + β9(lesser 






The models have the same independent variables with two exceptions.  They added a 
control for whether someone was a CEO to the model predicting multiple directorships 
because other studies suggested being a CEO increases the odds of outside board 
membership.  Also, Useem’s (1984) research indicated that business associations were 
more likely to select CEOs or directors, so both of these are controls in the last 
regression.  
To estimate these three equations, Useem and Karabel used multiple linear 
regression and I do the same.  However, I also estimate each equation using a logistic 
regression because the dependent variables in this study are binary with only two possible 
values, yes or no.19 A binary dependent variable violates several assumptions of linear 
regression: that the dependent variable is normally distributed across all levels of the 
independent variables; that the dependent variable is linearly related to any independent 
variable holding all of the other independent variables constant; and that that the standard 
error will be the same across all possible values of the dependent variable.  Though 
multiple regression can technically be used to estimate an equation with a binary 
dependent variable, it often results in biased results especially when the distribution of 
the dependent variable is highly skewed (Dey & Astin, 1993).  This is the case here, as 
the proportion of CEOs, multiple directors, or business association leaders is 
considerably smaller than the proportion of other executives. Therefore, to replicate the 
prior research I estimate each of the three models using least squares, and I also report the 
results of logistic regression estimations.  
                                                 
19 Useem and Karabel had a footnote that, “because of the dichotomous structure of the outcome variables 
and their skewed distribution, particularly for business association leadership, we also performed a logistic 
regression. The relative magnitudes of the coefficients were virtually identical to those reported for the 




I add a set of logistic regression models to refine Useem and Karabel’s 
specification by including additional variables that fit with my conceptual framework.  
The three dependent variables are the same as the replication models, and each is 
represented by the following equations: 
 
Pr(CEO) = β0 + β1(female) + β2(white) + β3(age) + β4(social origins) + β5 
(Barron’s undergraduate rank) + β6(MBA lesser program) + β7(MBA top 
program) + β8(JD lesser program) + β9(JD top program) + β10(other graduate 
degree)  
 
Pr(multiple director) = β0 + β1(female) + β2(white) + β3(age) + β4(social origins) + 
β5 (Barron’s undergraduate rank) + β6(MBA lesser program) + β7(MBA top 
program) + β8(JD lesser program) + β9(JD top program) + β10(other graduate 
degree) 
 
Pr(business association) = β0 + β1(female) + β2(white) + β3(age) + β4(social 
origins) + β5 (Barron’s undergraduate rank) + β6(MBA lesser program) + β7(MBA 
top program) + β8(JD lesser program) + β9(JD top program) + β10(other graduate 
degree) 
 
 I estimated each of these equations for the full sample of executives.  In addition, 
I modeled the first two for subsamples of the dataset, guided by upper echelon and its use 
of firm internal labor market theory. The evidence in this tradition suggests CEOs are 
typically selected from the senior manager ranks or from CEOs of other organizations 
(Frydman, 2007; Murphy & Zabojnik, 2006; Vancil, 1987).  Outside directors are less 
frequently in the CEO candidate pool, so having them as part of the dependent variable 
reference group may obscure some of the differences between CEOs and those in their 
occupational class.  For CEOs, I determined the factors that made CEOs distinct from all 
other executives (i.e., the full sample) and then the factors that made CEOs distinct from 
other senior managers in their companies, removing the outside directors from the 




distinct from the full sample and then the factors that made multiple directors distinct 
from single directors, removing executives with internal positions only from the analysis.  
While several assumptions that researchers must make when an outcome variable 
is continuous are relaxed for logistic regression, there are three main requirements that 
remain (Field, 2009).  First, logistic regression models assume collinearity; in other 
words, all independent variables are linearly independent from one another.  For each of 
my models, I checked for multicollinearity among the independent variables by 
examining the tolerance values and variance inflation factors (VIF) and found that they 
are within the acceptable ranges; for VIF the threshold is commonly accepted to be a 
value of ten (Field, 2009). The highest VIF value is footnoted at the bottom of each table. 
Second, logistic regression assumes there is a linear relationship between any continuous 
predictors and the logit of the outcome variable.   The only continuous independent 
variable in my analyses is birth year, and I verified the assumption by testing whether the 
interaction term between the birth year and its log transformation is significant.  Finally, 
logistic regression assumes independence of error terms.  I ran a Durbin-Watson test to 
check for serial correlation among the residuals, and the statistics are all very close to a 
value of two, suggesting autocorrelation is likely not present (Field, 2009). The Durbin-
Watson is footnoted at the bottom of each regression table. To prevent mis-estimating 
standard errors due to the nesting of the executives within companies, which might 
suggest some relationships are significant when this is not the case, I used the robust 




Missing Data    
Useem and Karabel were unable to find postsecondary information about 376 
individuals in their sample.  They considered these missing cases similar to survey non-
respondents because “most biographical directory information is obtained through 
solicited disclosure by the entrant” (p. 186). Therefore, their response rate was about 88 
percent. I was unable to find postsecondary information about 165 individuals, so my 
response rate was 95.6 percent.  
Where the other variables in my replication analysis are concerned, no data are 
missing.  However, I am missing some data on race and birth year20 (Fligstein, 1990 
discusses problem of missing data from archival research of executives). To maintain as 
many cases as possible, I used pairwise deletion in all correlations and regressions  
Study Extension Phase 
The rationale behind extending Useem and Karabel’s work is to gain a better 
understanding of the similarities and differences in postsecondary education among the 
corporate elite.   Although I collected degree source information for the full sample, the 
college someone attended is only a general proxy for the benefits associated with earning 
a degree. A clear conclusion in Pascarella and Terenzini’s (1996, 2005) reviews of the 
college effects literature is that more variation in college effects exists within a given 
campus rather than across campuses.  The types of activities, involvement, relationships, 
and accomplishments during undergraduate and graduate school have significant 
                                                 
20 I ran crosstabs to compare the executives with missing data to those who were not.  There was slightly 
more information missing from those holding non-CEO senior manager positions compared to CEO and 
director positions.  However, the magnitude of the difference was only a few percentage points in each 




relationships with a host of economic and occupational outcomes, and it follows that 
these might also translate into opportunities that facilitate entrée to the corporate elite.  
Extension Sample Selection 
I selected a subsample of 336 executives using a purposive strategy. I chose eight 
of the most common undergraduate alma maters of the executives in the full sample’s 
corporate elite, aiming for geographic diversity as well as convenience in accessing 
campus records and archives related to undergraduate student involvement. I then 
selected all executives in the sample who earned undergraduate degrees from these 
schools.  The eight are:   
Cornell University 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Northwestern University 
Stanford University 
University of Michigan-Ann Arbor 
University of Notre Dame 
University of Southern California 
Yale University 
 
I opted to sample based on alma mater rather than choose a subsample of 
executives completely at random for conceptual as well as practical reasons. 
Conceptually, campus context shapes the types of involvement open to students. For 
instance, Notre Dame and Yale each have a residential college model, and Greek 
organizations are not central to undergraduate student life.  In contrast, Cornell has 39 
Interfraternity Council fraternity chapters and eleven Panhellenic Association sorority 
chapters. Campus context also shapes the relative desirability of involvement 
opportunities.  At Yale, senior societies are prestigious and only admit a small number of 
upper class students each year.  By including executives who attended the same 




for student involvement than if I randomly sampled individuals without considering their 
alma mater.  More practically, a critical source of my extension data was university 
archives, and narrowing to a smaller number of campuses was the most logistically and 
economically feasible choice.  
Extension Variables   
I grouped the variables for the extension portion of the study into two general 
categories.  Academic achievements refer to national awards or campus-specific 
recognition given for undergraduate scholastic accomplishments.  Campus involvement is 
the co- and extra-curricular activities in which a student participated during his 
undergraduate years. Data for these variables, described in more detail below, came from 
yearbooks, university alumni directories, and lists published by several sources.  
Academic achievements. 
 
 Since I was unable to directly collect information pertaining to the executives’ 
grades, I used three proxies of academic accomplishments (see Table 3.8). Two are 
national awards and one represents campus-specific awards.   
Phi Beta Kappa is a prestigious national academic honor society in the United 
States and includes top humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences students from 
member chapters on approximately 280 campuses.21 The society occasionally issues a 
print directory, and I used the 2000 volume to determine if executives are members. Phi 
Beta Kappa information was also printed in some campus yearbooks and I used that as a 
triangulating source. 
                                                 
21 Another major undergraduate honors society is Phi Kappa Phi; there are chapters on 240 campuses. I 
considered including membership in it as well as a separate variable, but I discovered that there are not any 
chapters on seven of the eight campuses on which I chose to focus.  USC is the only school with a chapter, 




 Several foundations and nonprofit organizations award highly competitive 
scholarships for academically accomplished undergraduates to pursue graduate study.  
Perhaps the best known is the Rhodes Scholars; others include the Marshall Scholars, 
Danforth Graduate Fellowship, and Fulbright Scholars. I obtained lists of past Rhodes 
Scholars and Marshall Scholars, but the Fulbright organization would not release 
information on scholar identities and the Danforth Graduate Fellowship was awarded 
between 1952 and 1978 (Jablin, 1979), but the Foundation dissolved in 2010 and 
Fellowship archives are not accessible. To give a sense of how select these awards are, 
approximately 83 college seniors per year from 20 countries including the U.S. are 
named Rhodes Scholars and 40 or fewer U.S. college seniors per year are named 
Marshall Scholars.22  The numbers of executives in the sample awarded each prize were 
small enough that I combined them into one variable, Rhodes/Marshall Scholar.  
My final academic award variable represents campus-specific academic 
achievements. Using campus yearbooks and triangulating with self-reported biographies 
in business publications, I collected information about the executives’ academic 
achievements recognized by their campuses.  These include whether the executive earned 
Dean’s List honors, graduated with honors, received a campus-specific academic 
award(s) or scholarship(s) (e.g., New York State Regents Scholarship, National Merit 
Scholarship) or was part of a campus academic honors society(s) (e.g., Notre Dame’s 
Blue Circle honors society, Cornell’s Red Key society for varsity athletes). While the 
prior two academic variables have a binary scale, this has a count scale, ranging from 
                                                 
22 From http://www.marshallscholarship.org/about/statistics, between 1954 and 2010, a total of 318 
individuals were named as Marshall Scholars from the eight universities that are represented in this sample; 
Cornell = 30; MIT = 58; Northwestern = 18; Stanford = 79; University of Michigan = 16; Notre Dame =7; 





zero to five. The sources I used from Michigan did not consistently report campus-
specific academic awards, so I coded this variable as missing for Michigan alumni. 
Finally, I used alumni directories from each campus to determine the individual’s 
academic major. I then recoded major into seven categories: business, engineering, 
liberal arts and humanities, biological and physical sciences, government and 
international relations, social sciences (except economics) and economics.  My choice of 
categories was guided by the distribution of the fields in the sample.  Economics is an 
obvious example; though it is typically included within the broader social science 
category, there were such a large number of economics majors in the sample that I opted 
to keep them separate.   
Campus involvement. 
 
To collect information about the executives’ college involvement, I examined 
student yearbooks using year of graduation as a starting point.  Each university’s 
yearbook is organized differently and its content varies from year-to-year.  I examined 
the senior yearbook and three prior yearbooks for every executive. Also, I triangulated 
yearbook information with additional sources such as university intercollegiate athletics 
media guides, published lists of student leadership societies online and in university 
archives, class books (Yale only), and alumni databases (Stanford, Notre Dame, and 
Michigan only).  
 I coded campus involvement into six variables: varsity athletics, clubs, 
fraternity/sorority, campus media, student society, and leadership position (see Table 
3.8).  As with the campus academic award variable, these have count-type scales.  Each 




participated, not the total number of years.  For instance, if an executive was in a 
fraternity for three years, I assigned him a value of “1” for the Fraternity/Sorority 
variable, not a value of “3”.  My reason for doing this was that the quality of information 
in my main source, university yearbooks, was inconsistent and in many cases, discerning 
the length of time for which someone was involved in a given activity was difficult.  
For varsity athletics, I assigned someone a value of “1” for every varsity sport in 
which he participated.  I discerned among teams but as noted above, not among number 
of years that an individual participated on the team.  For example, if an executive was on 
the varsity football and varsity soccer teams, he was assigned a value of “2” for varsity 
athletics.   
Executives coded as part of the campus media and student publications included 
yearbook, newspaper, literary magazine, and university radio station staff. As with 
athletics, if someone participated in yearbook and newspaper, for example, she was 
coded as “2” but being on the yearbook staff for three years was coded as a “1.” 
 The fraternity/sorority variable is one of two variables in this group on a binary 
rather than a count scale.  Someone who was a member of a fraternity or sorority at least 
once during their undergraduate years was coded as “1” and all others as “0.”  Notre 
Dame does not have Greek organizations, so the Notre Dame alumni were coded as 
missing for this variable.   
The other binary-scaled variable is student society, which represents membership 
in elite campus specific organizations that are not formally overseen by the university but 
that admit a very small number of junior and/or senior class leaders. These organizations 




& Courage, and St. Elmo's), Cornell (i.e., Quill & Dagger, Sphinx Head, Aleph Samach, 
and Raven & Serpent), Northwestern (i.e., Deru), and Michigan (i.e., Michigamua, now 
known as the Order of Angell).  From what I could determine, the other four universities 
in the subsample – MIT, Stanford, USC, or Notre Dame – did not have equivalent 
organizations so I coded all executives from these schools as missing on this variable.   
 The other student organizations measure is a catchall, comprising all other forms 
of co- and extracurricular student involvement not captured by the prior variables that did 
not recur frequently enough to code into more discrete groups.  Examples of the types of 
activities represented here are intramural sports teams, special interest and discipline-
specific clubs, ROTC, university band, a capella groups, theater, and volunteer/service 
groups. If someone was in an academic honors society, I coded it as “campus academic 
awards” rather than the student organization variable.  
 If an executive held a leadership position for any of the above organizations, I 
coded this separately. For instance, a member of Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity would 
be assigned a “1” for the greek life variable, but the Rush Chairman of SAE would be 
assigned a value of “1” for the greek life variable and “1” for the leadership variable. 
Those who held student government leadership positions or were Resident 





Table 3.8  
Description of variables used in extension analyses    
 
 Description Scale 
Academic Achievements 
Phi Beta Kappa  Member of Phi Beta Kappa national 
honors society, from membership directory 
(2000) 
0=Not member  
1=Member 
 
National Scholar Awarded Rhodes or Marshall Scholar 
recognition 





Honor roll/Dean’s list for at least one 
semester and/or graduated with honors  
(Michigan alumni excluded 
Count; range from 0 to 5 
 
Academic major 1) Business includes Accounting, 
Management, Marketing, Finance, 
Industrial & Labor Relations, Real 
Estate, Administrative Sciences, and 
Business Administration. 
2) Engineering includes Mechanical, 
Chemical, Aeronautical, Industrial 
Engineering as well as Mathematics 
and Computer Sciences. 
3) Liberal Arts & Humanities include 
History, English, Speech, American 
Studies, Philosophy, 
Languages/Linguistics, Journalism, 
and General Studies or Arts & Letters 
4) Biological & Physical Sciences 
include Biology, Chemistry, Physics, 
and Anatomy 
5) Government & International Relations 
6) Social Sciences (except economics) 
include Political Science, Sociology, 
Psychology, Anthropology, and 
Education 
7) Economics 
Categorical but recoded 







Campus Involvement   
Student Society Member of elite undergraduate student 
society (Michigan, Cornell, Northwestern, 




Varsity Athletics Number of varsity sports played 
 
Count; range from 0 to 3 
Other student 
organizations 
Number of student organizations and clubs 
in which an executive was a member 
 
Count; range from 0 to 
10 
Fraternity/Sorority Member of a fraternity or sorority 0=Not member 
1=Member 
 
Campus Media Number of campus media organizations, 
including paper, radio, and yearbook, for 
which an executive was staff 
 
Count; range from 0 to 3 
Leadership Position Number of campus leadership positions 
held, including athletic team captain, 
student government representative, 
fraternity or sorority officer, newspaper 
editor, and student organization officer 




The small number of executives that are part of the subsample limits the types of 
analyses that can be used on the data.  I used a series of independent sample t-tests to 
better understand the differences in undergraduate accomplishments of those who held 
positions characterized as part of the corporate elite (i.e., CEOs, multiple directors, 
association leaders) compared to other top executives.  The null hypothesis for each test 
was the means of the executive subgroups were equal.  The alternative hypothesis for 
each two-tailed test was the means of the executive subgroups were significantly different 
using a 90 percent confidence interval.23  
                                                 
23 The most commonly used threshold for significant findings is 95 percent confidence interval, or p<0.05, 
established by Ronald Fisher in the early 1920s although it is acknowledged to be a somewhat arbitrary 
cutpoint (Cowles & Davis, 1982). I use p<0.05 in my first two sets of analyses, but I chose to report 
findings at p<0.10 for the final section because the sample size in these analyses is much smaller than the 




There are five series of independent sample t-tests.  I compared the mean 
achievements of CEOs to those of all other executives and to those of other internal 
senior managers only:  
HO: mCEO = mAll other execs 
HA: mCEO  ≠ mAll other execs 
 
HO: mCEO = mSenior managers 
HA: mCEO  ≠ mSenior managers 
 
Similarly, I compared the mean achievements of multiple directors to those of all other 
executives and to those of single directors only: 
HO: mMultiple directors  = mAll other execs 
HA: mMultiple directors  ≠ mAll other execs 
 
HO: mMultiple directors = mSingle directors  
HA: mMultiple directors  ≠ mSingle directors 
 
Finally, I compared the mean achievements of association leaders to those of all other 
executives: 
HO: mAssociation leaders = mAll other execs 
HA: mAssociation leaders ≠ mAll other execs 
                                                 
Increasing the confidence interval is an acceptable choice for researchers using small sample sizes who are 
willing to trade off the increased chance of Type I error, i.e., the null hypothesis is true but is rejected, for a 








The study results are organized according to my research questions. I begin by 
presenting descriptive characteristics of postsecondary degree attainment for the full 
sample of 2010 executives.  The next section updates and contrasts the key findings from 
Useem and Karabel’s research in 1977 to mine in 2010, again highlighting the 
comparisons around postsecondary attainment.  I then present the results of additional 
analyses using the full sample of 2010 executives, refining the Useem and Karabel model 
to add demographic variables and more postsecondary distinctions.  Finally, I discuss 
patterns in the academic achievements and campus involvement of a subsample of the 
2010 executives.  This chapter concludes with a summary of the study limitations. 
Descriptive Results  
 
In this section, I address my first research question:  What are the higher 
education backgrounds of top corporate executives?  Are there differences in the 
backgrounds of Chief Executive Officers, multiple directors, and business association 
leaders compared to other senior executives?   My results are organized into four main 
categories of postsecondary attainment: undergraduate degrees, MBA degrees, law 




To begin, Table 4.1 offers a basic overview of degree attainment for the sample.  
Almost all of the executives earned at least a four-year bachelor’s degree; only 73 (or 2% 
of the total) did not.  This latter group includes people whose highest degree earned is an 
associate’s, as well as those who attended a four-year college but dropped out before 
completion.   
The majority of executives – over two thirds of the sample – also held at least one 
graduate degree, and 7.5 percent earned multiple graduate degrees.  The most common 
graduate degree earned was a Master’s of Business Administration, which approximately 
one third of the sample held.  Just over seventeen percent had a law degree, and about the 
same percentage held a master’s degree other than an MBA (17.7%).  Nine percent 
earned a doctoral degree (i.e., PhD, MD, Doctorate of Business, Doctorate of Laws, or 
other discipline specific terminal degree with the exception of a JD).  
 Contrasting the degree attainment of the executive subgroups, CEOs were 
moderately less likely to have earned any type of graduate degree (63.1%) than were 
other executives, while business association members were most likely to have done so 
(78.1%). Looking at specific graduate degrees, CEOs and multiple directors were 
moderately more likely to have an MBA than other executives (41.5% and 39.6%, 
respectively), though both groups held slightly fewer law degrees (13.1% and 14.8%, 
respectively). Senior managers were the most likely to hold JDs (20.3%), which makes 
sense because at least some were in positions directly responsible for legal matters facing 
their company (e.g., general counsel, chief legal officer).  Terminal doctoral level degrees 




business association leaders (14.4%) than among CEOs (4.9%) or other senior managers 
(4.8%).  
 
Table 4.1.  
Descriptive statistics for postsecondary attainment 
 
















 Pct N Pct N Pct N Pct N Pct N Pct N 
Bachelor’s degree 
 
98.0% 3,551 97.0% 318 98.4% 1,352 98.6% 760 97.4% 1,275 99.7% 332 
At least one  
   graduate degree 
67.7% 2,453 63.1% 207 65.4% 898 72.1% 556 69.9% 915 78.1% 260 
Multiple graduate  
   degrees 
7.5% 373 7.3% 206 6.2% 85 8.7% 67 8.0% 108 9.0% 30 
MBA degree 
 
33.6% 1,272 41.5% 136 35.2% 484 39.6% 305 32.6% 427 36.9% 123 
  Top ranked  
   programb  
16.8% 608 18.6% 61 13.1% 180 21.8% 168 17.6% 231 20.1% 67 
Law degree 17.5% 633 13.1% 43 20.3% 279 14.8% 114 16.7% 219 19.5% 65 
  Top ranked  
   programb  
6.5% 235 5.2% 17 8.4% 116 6.4% 49 7.6% 99 11.7% 39 
MBA and law  
   degree 
1.7% 60 2.4% 8 1.8% 25 1.6% 12 1.4% 18 1.8% 6 
Other master’s  
   degree 
17.7% 642 14.0% 46 13.6% 187 20.9% 161 20.9% 274 24.3% 81 
Doctoral degreea 9.3% 337 4.9% 16 4.8% 58 11.5% 89 13.9% 182 14.4% 48 
 
Note. The education categories are not mutually exclusive and the percentages do not add up to 100%.  So for instance, 
if an executive has an MBA and a PhD, she will be counted in both rows.  Also, education information is missing for 
165 executives, which is why the sample N for this table is 3,625. 
a The doctoral degree group includes PhD, MD, doctorate in business, doctorate in law, or other advanced degree 
beyond a master’s (does not include postgraduate studies without degree completion) 
bThe Business Week top eleven MBA programs in 2010 were: Columbia University, Duke University, Harvard 
University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Northwestern University, University of California Berkeley, 
University of Chicago, University of Pennsylvania, University of Michigan, University of Virginia and Stanford 
University.  
bThe US News & World Report law programs in 2010 were: Columbia University, Harvard University, New York 
University, Stanford University, University of California-Berkeley, University of Chicago, University of Michigan, 




To place these statistics into broader perspective, according to the 2005-09 
American Community Survey five-year estimates, 27.5 percent of U.S. adults age 25 and 
over held a bachelor’s degree or higher (compared to 98.0% of this sample).  Also, 10.1% 
of adults held a graduate or professional degree (compared to 67.7% of this sample). All 
of the executives here clearly have markedly higher levels of educational attainment than 
the general American population. 
Undergraduate Degree Characteristics 
 
Table 4.2 contains more information about characteristics of the colleges and 
universities from which the executives earned their undergraduate degrees.24  Just over 
nine percent of those who had four-year bachelor’s (or bachelor’s equivalent) degrees 
graduated from a program outside of the United States.  Multiple directors (5.0%) and 
business association leaders (5.4%) were slightly less likely to have earned their degree 
from an international university than others and single directors were the most likely 
(12.2%).  
Among the 3,172 executives who graduated from U.S. institutions, 15.9 percent 
earned their degrees from a school ranked among Gourman’s top eleven in 1967. The 
average Gourman ranking for all executives was 530 points with a range of 245 to 772 
and a standard deviation of 132.   Senior managers were the relatively least likely group 
to have graduated from a top Gourman school (11.4%) and they had the lowest average 
ranking as well (513 points). Single directors were the most likely to have graduated from 
a top Gourman school (19.4%), though business association leaders had the highest 
average Gourman score (559 points).  
                                                 
24 Appendix D has more institutional characteristics but since they are not part of the multivariate analyses I 




According to my other measure of college prestige, Barron’s admissions 
selectivity ratings in 1966, 20.7 percent of the executives’ bachelor’s degrees were from 
the Most Competitive schools.  As with the Gourman rankings, senior managers were the 
least likely to have a BA from a Barron’s Most Competitive school (14.6%).  Business 
association leaders were the most likely to have a top Barron’s undergraduate degree 
(32.2%).  
 
Table 4.2.  
Descriptive statistics for characteristics of bachelor’s degree institutions 
 












 Pct N Pct N Pct N Pct N Pct N Pct N 
International school 9.2% 322 11.0% 35 8.8% 116 5.0% 38 12.2% 153 5.4% 18 
Barron’s Rankings             
  Most Competitive 20.7% 656 21.3% 60 14.6% 176 23.6% 169 25.2% 278 32.2% 101 
  Highly Competitive 14.4% 457 14.5% 41 14.4% 173 15.1% 108 13.9% 153 15.3% 48 
  Very Competitive 17.6% 559 16.3% 46 17.7% 213 17.6% 126 18.0% 198 17.2% 54 
  Competitive 20.8% 659 19.1% 54 24.0% 288 20.2% 145 18.9% 208 14.0% 44 
  Less Competitive 12.7% 402 15.6% 44 12.9% 155 11.6% 83 12.3% 136 10.5% 33 
  Noncompetitive 2.7% 87 2.8% 8 3.2% 38 2.4% 17 2.4% 26 1.9% 6 
  Not listed in   
   Barron’s  
11.1% 352 10.3% 29 13.2% 159 9.6% 69 9.4% 104 8.9% 28 
Gourman Rankings             
  Top eleven schoola 15.9% 505 17.4% 49 11.4% 137 16.7% 120 19.4% 214 17.8% 56 
  Continuous rankb 530(132) 536(131) 513(125) 534(132) 543(137) 559(133) 
 
Note. In this table, the full sample N represents those who earned a bachelor’s degree – executives without bachelor’s 
degrees are not included in the total, which is 3,172 for all rows except the first. Three groups are not part of the 
statistics: 1) I could not confirm whether 165 had earned a bachelor’s degree or not, 2) 73 do not have a bachelor’s 
degree, and 3) 57 have a bachelor’s degree (because I was able to verify that they held a graduate degree) but I could 
not determine where that degree was from.  In addition, there are 322 who earned international baccalaureate degrees. 
They are only included in the first row.   
Full Sample: first row n=3,494, rest n=3,172; For CEOs: first row n=317, rest n=282; Senior Managers: first row 
n=1319, rest n=1203; Multiple Directors: first row n=755, rest n=717;  Single Directors: first row n=1256, rest n=1103; 
Association: first row n=332, rest n=314. 
aThe Gourman top eleven undergraduate universities in 1967 are: Princeton University, Harvard University, Yale 
University, University of Michigan, Columbia University, Cornell University, University of Notre Dame, Dartmouth 
College, University of Pennsylvania, California Institute of Technology, and University of California Berkeley.  
bThe Gourman continuous measure is in mean years with the standard deviation in parentheses after since the measure 






There were 585 four-year colleges and universities represented among the 
individuals who earned a bachelor’s degree from a U.S. school. To put this figure into 
broader context, when the average executive in the sample was age 18 in 1968, there 
were approximately 1,850 degree-granting four-year colleges and universities in the 
United States (Snyder & Dillow, 2010) so clearly, not every possible institution is 
represented here. While the mean number of executives per school was just over five, the 
median was two, indicating that the alma maters were not normally distributed across the 
sample.  In fact, there were 228 schools from which only one executive graduated, and 95 
from which only two executives graduated.   
Almost one third of the full sample (n=1,008 individuals) earned a bachelor’s 
degree from one of 25 schools (see Table 4.3). Harvard University topped the list with 98 
graduates (3.1%), followed by Princeton University with 68 (2.1%) and Yale and 
Stanford with 67 (2.1%) each. While these four are often cited among the top 
undergraduate universities in the nation, if not the world, the remaining schools on the list 
included twelve public schools, the United States Naval Academy, as well as the rest of 
the Ivy League members with the exception of Columbia. 
Are these university patterns consistent across the entire sample, or do the 
executives who are part of the corporate elite share certain undergraduate alma maters 
that differ from others?  Table 4.4 lists common institutions from which the CEOs, 
multiple directors, and business association leaders graduated.  For purposes of 
comparison to the overall sample, I cut each list where the overall percentage column 
totaled roughly 30 percent of the given position.  Harvard was the most frequent 




on the list for multiple directors (2.7%), who were most likely to have graduated from 
Princeton (2.9%).  In addition to Harvard and Princeton, common among all three lists 
were Notre Dame, Stanford, Yale, and the University of Pennsylvania. 
 
Table 4.3.  
Most common undergraduate alma maters: Full sample (n=3,171) 
 
 N Percent 
Harvard Universitya 98 3.09% 
Princeton Universitya 68 2.14% 
Yale Universitya 67 2.11% 
Stanford University 67 2.11% 
University of Pennsylvaniaa 62 1.96% 
Cornell Universitya 51 1.61% 
University of Notre Damea 46 1.29% 
Michigan State University 44 1.39% 
University of Michigana 39 1.23% 
University of Texas Austin 38 1.20% 
Duke University 37 1.17% 
Dartmouth Collegea 34 1.07% 
University of Illinois  31 0.98% 
Iowa State University 29 0.91% 
University of North Carolina  29 0.91% 
University of Virginia 29 0.91% 
University of California Los Angeles 28 0.88% 
Pennsylvania State University 28 0.88% 
University of Wisconsin Madison 28 0.88% 
United States Naval Academy 27 0.85% 
Brown University 27 0.85% 
Purdue University 26 0.82% 
Georgia Institute of Technology 25 0.79% 
Northwestern University 25 0.79% 
University of Minnesota 25 0.79% 
Total 1,008 31.63% 
 
Note. In terms of the next most common, there are four schools that graduated 23 executives each, two 
schools that graduated 22, three that graduated 21, and one that graduated 20.  
a To proxy top bachelor’s degree institutions for the replication analyses, I used the eleven highest rated by 
the Gourman list in 1967.  The Gourman schools correspond well with the sample’s alma maters; eight 
from Gourman indicated with the superscript are among those here.  Not included in the table but part of 
Gourman’s group are Columbia University (from which 23 executives earned bachelor’s degrees), 
California Institute of Technology (from which five executives earned bachelor’s degrees), and the 




 Although the six schools recurring on the three lists in Table 4.4 are also present 
on the two lists in Table 4.5, the mix attended by senior managers had a slightly different 
character, at least descriptively.  None of the executive subgroups was concentrated in 
any single school, but senior managers were even more distributed than the other four 
groups. Only 5.7 percent of senior managers graduated from their subgroup’s three most 
common alma maters, compared to 8.2 percent of CEOs graduated from their three most 
common, 8.0 percent of multiple directors, 11.2 percent of association leaders, and 10.0 
percent of single directors. 
Michigan State University was the single most common school from which senior 
managers earned undergraduate degrees (2.1%).  While Michigan State is a well-
respected school, it is not commonly accorded the same level of external prestige as 
Harvard (most common alma mater of CEOs, single directors, and association leaders) or 
Princeton (most common alma mater of multiple directors).  Overall, the schools listed in 








Table 4.5.  
Most common undergraduate alma maters: Senior managers, single directors 
 
Senior Managers  
(n=1,203 individuals; N=394 schools) 
Single Directors  
(n=1,103; N=349 schools) 
 N Pct  N Pct 
Michigan State University 25 2.08% Harvard University 54 4.90% 
Stanford University 23 1.91% Yale University 28 2.54% 
Yale University 20 1.66% University of Pennsylvania 27 2.45% 
University of Texas at Austin 19 1.58% Princeton University 26 2.36% 
Harvard University 18 1.50% Stanford University 26 2.36% 
University of Michigan 18 1.50% Cornell University 23 2.09% 
University of Illinois 17 1.41% Dartmouth College 17 1.54% 
University of Notre Dame 17 1.41% Duke University 15 1.36% 
Princeton University 16 1.33% Brown University 14 1.27% 
University of Virginia 16 1.33% 12 1.09% 
Cornell University 15 1.25% 
University of California Los 
Angeles    
University of Pennsylvania 15 1.25% Georgia Institute of Technology 11 1.00% 
Iowa State University 14 1.16% University of Notre Dame 11 1.00% 
Indiana University  13 1.08% University of North Carolina 11 1.00% 
Duke University 13 1.08% Boston College 11 1.00% 
University of North Carolina  12 1.00% University of Minnesota 11 1.00% 
Pennsylvania State University 12 1.00% University of Arkansas 11 1.00% 
Texas A&M University 12 1.00%    
University of Wisconsin  12 1.00%    
University of Minnesota  11 0.91%    
Miami University (Ohio) 11 0.91%    
Total individuals 329 27.35% Total individuals 308 27.92% 
 
 
MBA Degree Characteristics 
 
Almost exactly one third of the full sample (n=1,272) held a Master’s of Business 
Administration degree.  Proportionally more CEOs (n=136; 41.5%) and multiple 
directors (n=305; 39.6%) earned MBAs than senior managers (n=484; 35.2%) single 
directors (n=427; 32.6%), or business association leaders (n=123; 36.9%). 
Generally, the programs represented here were highly ranked (see Table 4.1). Half 
of the executives who hold MBAs earned them from one listed among the top eleven by 




to have graduated from a top ranked MBA program (20.1%), while senior mangers were 
the least likely of any executive subgroup to have graduated from a top ranked MBA 
program (13.1%). Less than two percent (n=55) earned MBAs from programs located 
outside of the United States. CEOs were slightly more likely to hold an international 
MBA (5.9%), while multiple directors were the least likely (2.0%) of any executive 
subgroup (see Appendix D, Table D.2). 
Focusing on individual programs, 199 different U.S. schools were represented 
among the 1,217 executives’ MBA alma maters. According to the Association to 
Advance Collegiate Schools of Business, 434 U.S. universities offered MBA degrees in 
2010, so just under half were observed in this sample (AACSB, 2010). There were 88 
schools from which only one individual earned an MBA, and certain programs were 
overrepresented (see Table 4.6).  As with undergraduate alma maters, Harvard was the 
most common. In fact, Harvard was even more popular among MBAs than BAs; among 
those who held an MBA degree, 19.4 percent were graduates of Harvard Business 
School. The University of Chicago was the next most frequent, with 6.4 percent, 
followed by University of Pennsylvania with 5.5 percent, Stanford University with 5.0 
percent, and Northwestern University with 4.3 percent.   
These schools overlapped considerably with Business Week‘s rankings of the top 
MBA programs.  Eight of the eleven most frequent attended by the sample were among 
the top eleven on Business Week’s list in 2010.  The remaining three were also highly 
ranked by Business Week – New York University is 18, University of California Los 





Table 4.6.  
Most common MBA alma maters: Full sample (n=1,217) 
 
  N Percent 
Harvard Universitya 234 19.2% 
University of Chicago (Booth School)a 78 6.4% 
University of Pennsylvania (Wharton School)a 67 5.5% 
Stanford Universitya 61 5.0% 
Northwestern University (Kellogg School)a 52 4.3% 
Columbia Universitya 48 3.9% 
New York University (Stern School) 43 3.5% 
University of Michigan (Ross School)a 22 1.8% 
University of California Los Angeles (Anderson School) 21 1.7% 
Dartmouth College (Tuck School) 19 1.6% 
University of Virginia (Darden School)a 16 1.3% 
 Total Individuals 661 54.3% 
 
Note. In terms of the next most common MBA alma maters, three schools (Michigan State, UC Berkeley, 
and Cornell) graduated 14 each, one graduated 12, and one (Indiana) graduated 11. 
a School is one of the top eleven on Business Week’s 2010 MBA rankings.   
 
Table 4.7 disaggregates this information further, listing the common institutions 
from which each executive subgroup earned MBAs.  In this instance, I cut each list where 
the overall percentage column totaled roughly half of the given position.  So for example, 
54.3 percent of multiple directors who had an MBA earned the degree from one of the 
seven programs listed in Table 4.7. It is important to note that the group sizes are unequal 
but even adjusting for that, certain MBA programs seemed to be especially concentrated 
among multiple directors, business association leaders (53.8% graduated from six 
programs listed), and single directors (53.5% graduated from seven programs listed).  
Two fifths of the CEOs (40.5%) who held MBAs graduated from five programs, while 
half of the senior managers (51.0%) graduated from sixteen programs.  
Which specific schools recurred across all of the groups? Again, Harvard 
Business School was most common, especially among directors and business association 




most common MBA alma maters of all five subgroups, though not nearly to the extent of 
Harvard. There were sharp drop-offs to the next most frequent school, which was the 
University of Chicago for multiple directors (10.5%) and Northwestern University (6.8%) 
for association representatives.   
However, the proportion of executives in the top-most positions that graduated 
from Harvard Business School in 2010 was different than in the past.  Useem and 
Karabel reported that 41.4 percent of CEOs had a Harvard MBA, while 19.8 percent did 
in the current study.  Similarly, they found that 33.6 percent of multiple directors had a 
Harvard MBA, compared to 24.0 percent in 2010.  A slight reversal of this trend was 
apparent for business association leaders; 21.6 percent had a Harvard MBA in 1977 in 
contrast to 26.5 percent in 2010.   
Placing these numbers into the larger context of MBA recipients is important, as 
Harvard enrolls a large number of students.  For example, the Harvard Business School 
awarded 806 MBAs in 1975 (and there were 3,381 applicants in 1975, although Harvard 
did not report the percent admitted or yield).25  In 1974-75, the total number of MBAs 
awarded in the United States was 35,75826, so Harvard graduates represented roughly 2.2 
percent of the total. Harvard’s enrollment stayed relatively constant over the next few 
decades, although the number of applicants increased substantially,27 and the number of 
MBAs awarded nationally increased substantially as well.25 Over the last several years, 
Harvard moderately increased the size of their classes; there were 937 MBA students in 
the 2010-11 class (and 9,093 applicants that year).24 In 2009-10, a total of 168,375 
                                                 
25 Data are from http://www.hbs.edu/about/statistics/mba.html 
26  Data are from http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2002/digest2001/tables/dt284.asp 
27 The number of Harvard MBA students in the 1985 class was 793 and the number of applicants for 
admission to that class was 5,709. There were 789 students in the 1995 class and the number of applicants 




master’s degrees in business were awarded,28 so Harvard awarded 897, or 0.533 percent 
of the total. Among the other schools ranked in the Business Week top eleven, New York 
University awarded the most MBAs: 1,615 or 0.956 percent of the total in 2009-10.29 
Thus, while these individual schools do enroll a large number of students, they 
nonetheless represent a small proportion of overall MBA degrees nationally.    
Though Harvard is the alma mater that also graduated the most non-corporate 
elite senior managers in the current study, these individuals comprised only 10.4 percent 
of the overall subgroup.30 Similar to what was observed for patterns in bachelor’s 
degrees, senior managers had a more diverse distribution of MBA degree sources than 
other executives.  In other words, senior managers were comparatively less concentrated 
and attended a relatively wider array of MBA programs.   
                                                 
28 The grand total completion is from 2010 Digest of Education Statistics, 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d10/tables/dt10_283.asp 
29 From IPEDS, the remaining top Business Week schools awarded MBA degrees as follows in 2009-10: 
Columbia University: n=1,168 or 0.694% of total nationally; Dartmouth: n=253 or 0.150%; Northwestern: 
n=1,376 or 0.817%; Stanford: n=424 or 0.252%; UCLA: n=677 or 0.402%; University of Chicago: 
n=1,288 or 0.765%; University of Michigan: n=822 or 0.488%; University of Pennsylvania: n=915 or 
0.543%; and University of Virginia: n=553 or 0.328%. 
30 The proportion of senior managers and single directors with Harvard MBAs was not separately reported 
by Useem and Karabel; they only presented this information for CEOs, multiple directors, and business 







Law Degree Characteristics 
 
 Approximately 18 percent of the sample held a JD (n=633).  Senior managers 
were slightly more likely to be lawyers (n=239; 20.3%) as were business association 
representatives (n=65; 19.5%) in contrast to 16.4 percent of single directors (n=279), 15.0 
percent of multiple directors (n=84), and 13.1 percent of CEOs (n=43). 
Almost two fifths of those with law degrees graduated from one of the top nine 
schools (6.5% of full sample; see Table 4.1).  Business association leaders were notably 
more likely to hold a top law degree than any other executive subgroup: 11.7 percent 
compared to 8.4 percent of senior managers, 7.6 percent of single directors, 6.4 percent of 
multiple directors, and 5.2 percent of CEOs. 
 By far, the most common school from which an executive earned a law degree 
was Harvard Law School (14.7% of those with law degrees).  Second on the list was 
Columbia University, from which 5.4 percent of those with JDs graduated, followed by 
the University of Virginia (5.1%), Yale University (4.3%), and the University of 
Michigan (3.5%).  Almost half of the full sample graduated from one of the twelve 
schools listed in Table 4.8.  Seven were also among 2010 U.S. News top nine law 
schools, namely Harvard, Columbia, Yale, the University of Michigan, New York 
University, the University of Pennsylvania, and Stanford. Not in Table 4.8 but on the U.S. 






Most common law alma maters: Full sample (n=607) 
 
  N Percent 
Harvard University a 89 14.7% 
Columbia University a 33 5.4% 
University of Virginia 31 5.1% 
Yale University a 26 4.3% 
University of Michigan a 21 3.5% 
University of Pennsylvania a 20 3.3% 
New York University a 19 3.1% 
Georgetown University 15 2.5% 
George Washington University 13 2.1% 
Stanford University a 11 1.8% 
University of Minnesota 10 1.6% 
Duke University 10 1.6% 
 Total Individuals 298 49.1% 
 
a School is one of the top nine of US News 2010 law rankings.   
 
 
Harvard was the most common alma mater of the law school graduates that 
comprise each of the five executive subgroups (see Table 4.9).  However, a higher 
proportion of business association leaders – 28.6 percent – and multiple directors –  22.2 
percent – graduated from Harvard Law compared to the other groups.  Only ten percent 
of senior managers with law degrees, fifteen percent of CEOs with law degrees, and 18.7 
percent of single directors with law degrees earned them from Harvard.  Yale Law 
School was the second most frequent alma mater of business association members 
(9.5%), multiple directors (6.5%), and single directors (6.7%) but did not rank among the 







Other Graduate Degree Characteristics 
 
Almost 18 percent of the sample held a master’s degree other than or in addition 
to an MBA or law degree, and 9.3 percent earned a terminal degree such as PhD or MD.  
More specifics about the fields of study for these degrees are in Table 4.10.  One fifth of 
the master’s degrees were in engineering, 14.6 percent were in business fields (e.g., 
accounting), 11.4 percent were in the social sciences, and 10.1 percent were in public 
administration. Two thirds of the social science degrees (i.e. 49 out of 73) were in 
economics.  A smaller number of the executives held master’s degrees in the biological 
or physical sciences (7%) and other fields such as law (5%), liberal arts/humanities (4%), 
education (3.1%), health professions (3.1%), computer sciences (2.3%), mathematics 
(2.0%), and communications (1.6%).   
The most common doctoral degrees were in the biological/physical sciences 
(19.3%) and the health professions (e.g., MDs) (11.9%). There were 51 executives 
holding a PhD in a social science (15.1%), and of these 39 – or 76.5 percent – were in 
economics.  Also well represented were doctorates of business or a PhD in a business 
field such as management or finance (12.5%). The remaining seven fields each 
represented three percent or less of doctoral degrees in the sample.  
Comparing the specific schools from which these executives earned their master’s 
and doctoral degrees presents more complex task, because the quality/prestige/ranking of 
programs often vary quite a bit within a single university. Therefore, I did not examine 
the sources of these degrees in much depth and did not create tables for each field.  
Harvard University was most common, graduating 39 of the master’s degrees (6.1% of 




University, from which 25 of the master’s graduates earned degrees (3.9%) and 18 of the 
doctoral graduates (5.3%). 
 
Table 4.10. 
Frequency of other graduate degrees by field. 
 
Master’s Degrees Doctoral Degrees  N Pct N Pct 
Business a 94 14.6% 42 12.5% 
Communications & journalism 10 1.6% 1 0.3% 
Computer & information sciences 15 2.3% 8 2.4% 
Education 20 3.1% 10 3.0% 
Engineering 132 20.6% 40 11.9% 
Health professions b 20 3.1% 64 19.0% 
Legal professions & studies c 32 5.0% 6 1.8% 
Liberal arts & humanities d 26 4.0% 7 2.1% 
Mathematics 13 2.0% 5 1.5% 
Biological & physical sciences 45 7.0% 65 19.3% 
Public administration & international affairs e 65 10.1% 9 2.7% 
Social sciences f 73 11.4% 51 15.1% 
Not classified g 97 15.1% 29 8.6% 
Total 642 100.0% 337 100.0% 
 
a Examples of business master’s degrees are Master’s of Accountancy, Master’s of Human Resources 
Management, Master’s of Industrial Management or Relations (not MBAs, however); terminal degree 
examples are Doctorate of Business, PhD in Finance, PhD in Marketing 
b Example of health master’s degree is master’s in public health; terminal degree examples are MDs, D.O. 
c Examples of legal master’s degrees are LLM, Master’s in Tax Law (not JDs, however) 
d Examples of liberal arts and humanities are English, history, languages, philosophy 
e Public administration & international affairs also includes Public Policy  
f Examples of social sciences are economics, psychology, sociology, political science  
g Not classified are those executives whose biographies stated that they hold a master’s or doctoral degree 
without specifying the field 
 
Summary of Descriptive Results 
 The sample of executives had high levels of postsecondary attainment, and in 
several cases, those in the corporate elite had even higher levels although this depended 
on the specific subgroup. CEOs had especially high levels of MBA attainment but 
relatively lower levels of JDs, other master’s and doctoral degrees. Multiple directors also 




share of MBAs from top programs. Business association leaders had more JDs generally, 
and they had the largest share of JDs from top programs. Also, they held the highest 
proportion of other master’s degrees and doctoral degrees.  
 Although a bachelor’s degree was almost universal across all of the executive 
subgroups, association leaders were the most likely to have graduated from a Barron’s 
top tier school as well as the highest average Gourman ranking.  Single directors held the 
highest proportion of degrees from schools in the top eleven according to Gourman.  
Senior managers were the least likely to have earned bachelor’s degrees from top 
Barron’s or Gourman schools.  When I disaggregated alma maters into specific schools, 
those considered to be elite by most classification schemes were most common among 
CEOs, directors, and association leaders although no single school dominated.  The 






The research question guiding this section is how has the relationship between 
postsecondary attainment and membership in the corporate elite changed between 1977 
and 2010? Useem and Karabel were dually interested in social class background and 
education, but I focus primarily on the postsecondary findings.  I begin by comparing the 
overall levels of attainment in 1977 to 2010, then describe patterns of attainment among 
CEOs, multiple directors, and business association members.  Finally, I replicate the 
multivariate portion of the analysis using Ordinary Least Squares regression as did the 
prior study, and I also estimate the same models using logistic regression. 
Postsecondary Attainment: Full Sample Descriptive Comparison 
 
The comparison in Table 4.11 clearly demonstrates the expansion in degree 
attainment that has occurred among top executives over the past thirty years.  In 1977, 
over sixteen percent of the sample did not have a bachelor’s degree, in contrast to two 
percent in 2010.   Also, 30.3 percent of the current sample held only a bachelor’s degree 
compared to approximately 40 percent in 1977.  Roughly two thirds of the 2010 
executives had at least one graduate degree – 35.1 percent had an MBA, 17.5 percent had 
a law degree, and 22.8 percent had another type of master’s, doctoral, or professional 
degree.  In contrast, less than half of the 1977 executives had at least one graduate degree 
– 17.1 percent had an MBA, 17.4 percent had a law degree, and 10.1 percent had another 
type of master’s, doctoral, or professional degree.  The expansion in degree attainment, 
therefore, was most evident in MBA and other graduate degrees. 
Focusing more closely on the institutions from which executives earned their 




universities was unchanged from 1977 to 2010 (i.e., 27.6%). Only 2.7 percent of the 
executives in 2010 held a bachelor’s degree only from a top ranked college, while this 
was the case for 11.2 percent of the 1977 executives.  This finding does not necessarily 
indicate executives in 2010 were no longer attending top undergraduate institutions, 
because 15.9 percent of those who were college graduates (n=505) earned their degrees 
from one of the Gourman ranked schools (see Table 4.2).  However, 81 percent of these 
top college BA holders went on to earn one or more graduate degrees.  In contrast, of the 
3,120 executives who graduated from a lower ranked school, 67.1 percent obtained one 
or more graduate degrees. Relatively more of the 2010 executives who earned their 
bachelor’s degrees from one of the top eleven schools continued on to additional study, 
therefore, compared to those from lower ranked schools.  This information is not given 
for the 1977 study but offers one possible explanation for the decline between 1977 and 
2010 in the “BA only, top college” group.  
There was clearly an expansion in the proportion of executives who earned MBA 
degrees over the thirty year period, and much of the growth comes from attendance at 
programs outside of the top eleven.  In 1977, only 3.0 percent of the total held MBAs 
from these schools, in contrast to 19.3 percent in 2010.  A slightly higher proportion of 
the current executives also graduated from top MBA programs (16.8%) compared to the 
past (14.1%).  The overall percentage of law program graduates remained the same, 
though slightly fewer in 2010 earned their degrees from top ranked schools (6.5%) 






Study replication: Descriptive comparison of postsecondary attainment for full sample 
 
1977 Study 2010 Study University Background  
N Pct N Pct 
  No collegea 291 10.7% 
  College drop-outa 161 5.9% 
73 2.0% 
  BA only, lesser college 753 27.6% 1002 27.6% 
  BA only, top college 306 11.2% 97 2.7% 
  MBA, lesser programb 81 3.0% 699 19.3% 
  MBA, top programb 385 14.1% 608 16.8% 
  Law, lesser programb 274 10.0% 398 11.0% 
  Law, top programb 203 7.4% 235 6.5% 
  Other graduate degreeb 275 10.1% 825 22.8% 
Total 2,729 100.0% 3,625 100.0% 
     
Note. Data for 1977 study reproduced from Useem and Karabel (1986) Table 1, p. 188. 
a No college and college drop-outs combined for 2010. 
b In 2010, 60 executives (1.7% of the total sample) possessed both law and MBA degrees.  For the 1977 
study, the authors observed, “these groups are generally mutually exclusive. In those several instances 
when both business and law degrees had been earned, the manager was classified as holding the latter.” (p. 
188). For consistency, I therefore coded these 60 as having a law degree only for the replication analyses in 
this section.  In addition, 85 executives who held a law degree also had another non-MBA graduate degree 
and 138 executives who held an MBA also had another non-law graduate degree. These executives I 
assigned to law or MBA, not in the “other graduate degree” group.  
 
Postsecondary Attainment: Corporate Elite Descriptive Comparison 
 
 Whether the shifts in degree attainment observed for the full sample of executives 
held for those in the corporate elite is the focus of this section.  Table 4.12 is a 
crosstabulation of degree attainment for CEOs, multiple directors, and business 
association members in 1977 and the corresponding results for 2010.  Each cell displays 
the proportion of the executive subgroup represented in the corresponding column that 
possesses the characteristic for that row. For example, in 1977, of all executives in the 
study who did not have a college degree, 26.5 percent were CEOs. This finding is more 
meaningful when compared to the first row, which indicates that 38.9 percent of the full 
sample were CEOs.  Therefore, CEOs were underrepresented in the group of executives 




corporate elite subgroups and pays special attention to contrasting the 1977 findings 
regarding executives’ postsecondary attainment to those from 2010.  
CEO comparison. 
 
Only two percent of all executives in 2010 did not possess a bachelor’s degree.  
However, as the “no college” row in Table 4.12 suggests, CEOs were disproportionately 
more likely to be part of this group; 13.7 percent had less than a four-year college 
education although they comprised only 8.8 percent of the full sample. This is a reversal 
from 1977, when 38.9 percent of the sample were CEOs but only 26.5 percent of those 
with less than a BA were CEOs.  
The undergraduate degree patterns of CEOs were also different in 2010 compared 
to 1977. A finding emphasized by Useem and Karabel was just over half of all executives 
who earned a bachelor’s degree only from a top college were CEOs (51.6%), though they 
comprised 38.9 percent of the total sample. In 2010, this clear pattern was no longer 
apparent.  While CEOs made up 8.8 percent of the sample, they comprised 10.3 percent 
of the executives in “BA only, top college,” a 1.5 percent margin of difference that is 
certainly narrower than the 12.7 percent observed in 1977.   
In 1977, chief executives also represented a disproportionate percentage of MBA 
holders from top programs, as 44.9 percent of these executives were CEOs. However, in 
2010, an even smaller gap than the “BA only” pattern was observed for CEOs who hold 
MBAs from top programs; they made up 9.9 percent of this group for a 1.1 percent 
margin of difference in contrast to 6.0 percent in 1977.   For law degrees from ranked 
programs, CEOs in 2010 held less than their relative share of the overall sample (7.2%), 




Useem and Karabel’s conclusion from their data reproduced in Table 4.18 was 
“the attributes acquired in a top liberal arts program, top MBA program, or top law 
school all apparently provide resources that facilitate the final upward climb [to CEO]” 
(p. 196). These statistics suggest this is no longer the case. CEOs in 2010 were less likely 
to hold a disproportionate share of top bachelor’s degrees alone, top MBA degrees, or top 
law degrees compared to other senior managers and directors.   
 Multiple director comparison. 
 
Although the postsecondary attainment of CEOs relative to other executives 
changed from 1977 to 2010, fewer differences were evident across the other two 
corporate elite groups.  Multiple directors were less likely to be among the executives 
who were not college graduates in 1977, as well as those who held a BA degree only 
from a lesser program, and the same was true in 2010.  Multiple directors were more 
likely to be among the executives who had a BA degree only from a ranked program as 
well as an MBA from a ranked program, and the same was true in 2010.  The most 
notable change in the attainment patterns of multiple directors from 1977 to 2010 was the 
proportion with law degrees from top programs.  Multiple directors in 1977 held more 
top law degrees (36.0%) in proportion to their representation in the overall sample 
(25.9%).  This pattern was reversed in 2010, as 16.3 percent of multiple directors held 
law degrees from top schools though they represented 20.5 percent of the overall sample. 
Business association comparison. 
 
Business association representatives comprised 8.8 percent of the full sample but 
only 1.4 percent of those without a bachelor’s degree, a pattern consistent with the 1977 




group that did not graduate from college.  Of all levels of degree attainment, association 
leaders were relatively overrepresented among those who earned ranked law degrees in 
both years.  Though they comprised 8.8 percent of the full 2010 sample, they represented 
16.6 percent of top law graduates.  In 1977, they were 18.4 percent of the sample and 
25.6 percent of top law graduates.  Also, association leaders were slightly 
overrepresented among MBA recipients from top programs in 1977 (23.4%) as well as 
2010 (11.3%).  
 
Table 4.12.  
Study replication: Descriptive comparison of postsecondary attainment for corporate 
elite 
 
1977 Study 2010 Study  
University Background CEOs Multiple 
Directors 
Assoc. CEOs Multiple 
Directors 
Assoc. 
All managers 38.9% 25.9% 18.4% 8.8% 20.5% 8.8% 
No college 26.5% 9.6% 4.5% 13.7% 15.1% 1.4% 
BA only, lesser college 36.4% 20.5% 14.9% 10.1% 18.2% 6.6% 
BA only, top college 51.6% 37.9% 22.5% 10.3% 22.7% 6.2% 
MBA, top program 44.9% 29.6% 23.4% 9.9% 27.9% 11.3% 
Law, ranked program 45.3% 36.0% 25.6% 7.2% 16.3% 16.6% 
MBA, lesser program    11.1% 20.8% 8.1% 
Law lesser program     6.5% 20.9% 6.5% 
Other graduate degree    5.9% 24.5% 12.9% 
 
Note. Data for 1977 study reproduced from Useem and Karabel (1986) Table 2, p. 190 and Table 6, p. 195. 
I added the final three rows for the 2010 study to give a more complete picture of the contemporary 
executives’ schooling, but that information was not published in the 1977 study. 
 
Replication: Predictors of Membership in the Corporate Elite 
 
 To better understand the unique “advantaging effects” of executives’ education 
and other background characteristics, Useem and Karabel created three linear regression 
models using educational background, social origins and company position as predictors 
of the chances that an executive would be a CEO, multiple director, or business 




relied on a linear regression technique for these estimates, though the binary distributions 
of the dependent variables call for the use of logistic regression.  Table 4.13 presents an 
ordinary least squares estimate for the 2010 executives juxtaposed with the results of the 
1977 linear regression.31  Tables 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16 have logistic regression estimates 
for the odds an executive is a CEO, multiple director, and association member, 
respectively. My discussion of the results here contrasts the linear regressions, and I also 
note the instances where the 2010 logistic estimates diverged from the OLS.  
There are a few key differences between linear and logistic regressions in terms of 
interpreting the results. Model fit is an important consideration; in other words, to what 
degree the statistical model accurately represents the observed data (Field, 2009). In 
linear regression, the R2 represents the percent of variance in the dependent variable that 
is explained by the included independent variables.  Assessing model fit for a nonlinear 
probability model is less straightforward, and there are a number of fit statistics including 
the chi square likelihood ratio test, log likelihood comparisons, pseudo-R2, Akaike’s 
Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Criterion (BIC) (Long & Freese, 2006). 
Comparing the log likelihood for the intercept to the log likelihood for the full model will 
indicate whether the model better estimates the population parameters when all 
independent variables are included than when no independent variables are included. If 
the log likelihood is closer to zero in the final iteration compared to the first iteration, the 
fit is relatively better. The McFadden’s pseudo R2 does not have the same meaning as an 
OLS R2; it offers a rough approximation of fit. If greater than zero, the full model fits the 
data better than the intercept-only model (a similar conclusion to the change in log 
likelihood).  Finally, AIC and BIC are useful for comparing the fit of one model to 
                                                 




another.  BIC is slightly more conservative than AIC, but low values of both are desired. 
A model with a lower AIC or BIC will fit the data better than a model with higher values 
(Field, 2009). 
Interpreting the relationship between each independent variable in a logistic 
regression model is similarly more complex than for linear regression.  The metric for 
linear regression coefficients is the metric of the dependent variable, while the metric for 
raw logistic regression coefficients is “log odds.” When the log odds for a given 
independent variable have a positive sign, the variable increases the likelihood of the 
dependent variable occurring.  When the log odds are negative, the variable decreases the 
likelihood of the dependent variable occurring.  In addition to the coefficients, odds ratios 
are an alternative metric often used for interpreting the independent variables.  Any odds 
ratio above one indicates that an independent variable has a positive influence, and vice 
versa for a negative odds ratio. In all tables, I include both raw coefficients (column 
labeled “b”) and odds ratios (column labeled “odds ratio”).  When discussing the results, 
however, I use odds ratios because “a change of βk [the unique effect of independent 
variable k on the dependent variable] in the log odds has little substantive meaning for 






Predictors of being a CEO 
 
In 1977, four postsecondary variables were significantly associated with being a chief 
executive.  Compared to executives without postsecondary degrees, those who held a bachelor’s 
degree only from a lesser college were 0.08 more likely to be a CEO, those who held a 
bachelor’s degree only from a top college were 0.184 more likely to be a CEO, those with a top 
MBA were 0.120 more likely to be a CEO, and those with top law degrees were 0.072 more 
likely to be a CEO.   
In 2010, no variables emerged as a significant distinction between the CEOs and any 
other top executive in the sample according to the OLS model in Table 4.13 (F10, 3612=2.03; 
p<.05).  However, the logistic regression estimate in Table 4.14 (χ210, 3612=28.36; p<.01) 
indicated that holding a JD from a lesser program (compared to no JD at all) significantly 
reduced the odds an executive would be a CEO by 57 percent and holding another type of 
graduate degree (compared to no graduate degree) reduced the odds by 61 percent. No other 








Table 4.14.  




b SE Odds 
Ratio 
Sig. 
     
Educational background     
  BA only, lesser college a -0.385 0.482 0.755  
  BA only, top college a -0.280 0.357 0.681  
  MBA, lesser program b -0.262 0.430 0.742  
  MBA, top program b -0.298 0.363 0.770  
  Law, lesser program c -0.844 0.397 0.430 * 
  Law, top program c -0.719 0.424 0.487  
  Other graduate degree d -0.943 0.382 0.390 * 
Upper social origins -0.438 0.620 0.645  
Interaction terms     
  Lesser BA, top MBA  -0.128 0.295 0.880  
  Lesser BA, top family 1.038 0.705 2.823  
Business position     
  Chief executive - - -  
  Multiple director - - -  
BIC -28889 
AIC 0.595    
Log likelihood: intercept only -1129.9 
Log likelihood: full model -1115.7 
McFadden’s Pseudo R-square 0.013    
N 3,622    
 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
Note. Collinearity statistic: highest VIF was 6.8 for MBA lesser.  
          Independent errors statistic: Durbin-Watson = 1.96. 
a Reference group is “No BA” 
b Reference group is “No MBA” 
c Reference group is “No JD” 
d Reference group is “No other graduate degree” 
 
Predictors of being a multiple director. 
 
 All postsecondary variables significantly increased an executive’s odds of being a 
multiple director in 1977.  Those with a lesser BA only had a 0.08 higher probability, 
with a ranked BA only had a 0.138 higher probability, with a top MBA had a 0.099 




ordinary least squares estimation, the same significant patterns were observed in 2010 
(F11, 3611=4.77; p<.001). Holding only a lesser BA increased an executive’s chances by 
0.133, holding a ranked BA increased the chances by 0.160, holding a lesser MBA 
increased the chances by 0.167, holding a top MBA increased the chances by 0.184, 
holding a lesser law degree increased the chances by 0.120, holding a top law degree 
increased the chances by 0.161, and holding another graduate degree increased the 
chances by 0.193.   
 Comparing the magnitudes of these coefficients, Useem and Karabel noted a top 
law degree had the single largest effect size on being a multiple director in 1977.  In 
2010, this was no longer true. Of all types of credentials considered here, multiple 
directors were most likely to hold another form of master’s, professional, or doctoral 
degree. An MBA from a top program was the next largest coefficient in 2010.  This also 
runs a bit contrary to the 1977 study’s observation that the “BA only, top college” 
coefficient was relatively larger than the “MBA top program” coefficient.  
 However, an important point to note is that most of these relationships lost 
significance in the logistic regression estimates in Table 4.15, including the BA only 
measures, MBA measures, top JD, and other graduate degree (χ211, 3611=79.01; p<.001).  
The only postsecondary variable that was significant was a JD from a lower ranked 
program, and the direction of the relationship shifted from positive in the OLS estimate to 
negative here.  All else held constant, it reduced the odds that an executive would be a 











b SE Odds 
Ratio 
Sig. 
     
Educational background     
  BA only, lesser college a -0.098 0.196 0.907  
  BA only, top college a -0.201 0.103 0.818  
  MBA, lesser program b 0.119 0.152 1.126  
  MBA, top program b -0.026 0.127 0.974  
  Law, lesser program c -0.339 0.158 0.713 * 
  Law, top program c -0.066 0.178 0.936  
  Other graduate degree d 0.160 0.108 1.174  
Upper social origins 0.613 0.325 1.847 ~ 
Interaction terms     
  Lesser BA, top MBA  0.282 0.199 1.326  
  Lesser BA, top family -0.558 0.436 0.573  
Business position     
  Chief executive -0.274 0.153 0.760 ~ 
  Multiple director - - -  
BIC -27350.2 
AIC 1.00    
Log likelihood: intercept only -1920.8    
Log likelihood: full model -1881.2 
McFadden’s Pseudo R-square 0.021    
N 3,622    
 
~ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
Note. Collinearity statistic: highest VIF was 6.8 for MBA lesser.  
          Independent errors statistic: Durbin-Watson = 1.69. 
a Reference group is “No BA” 
b Reference group is “No MBA” 
c Reference group is “No JD” 
d Reference group is “No other graduate degree” 
 
Predictors of being business association leader. 
 
Of the three models, this had the best overall fit, explaining 15.9 percent of the 
variation in business association leadership (F12, 3610=56.63; p<.001). This is even higher 
than the multiple R square in 1977 of 13.8 percent.   In the ordinary least squares model, 




higher chances of being an association leader. An executive who earned a bachelor’s 
degree only from a top college was not any more likely to be part of an association than 
an executive without a bachelor’s degree.  This was also the case in 1977. Nor was there 
a statistically significant relationship with having a lesser bachelor’s degree only in 1977, 
though in 2010 this increased the odds that an executive would be an association leader 
(b=0.084).  Otherwise, in both years, holding an MBA from a top program (b=0.130 in 
2010; b=0.086 in 1977) or a law degree from a top program (b=0.193 in 2010; b=0.121 in 
1977) increased the likelihood that an executive would be an association leader.  Also 
consistent in both years: the law coefficient was relatively larger than the MBA 
coefficient.   
Patterns in the non-postsecondary variables were similar from 1977 to 2010 as 
well. Executives from the upper class background were more likely to be in the business 
associations in 2010 (b=0.091) and in 1977 (b=0.086).  Also, executives who were CEOs 
or multiple directors were more likely to be in a business association in 1977 and in 2010 
than those not in these alternative representations of corporate power. 
 As Table 4.16 illustrates, the logistic estimation again changed the results 
somewhat (χ212, 3610=421.17; p<.001). The sign switched on the lower ranked bachelor’s 
degree coefficient; here, executives were 59.5 percent less likely to be in an association.  
A top law degree increased odds of being in an association by over 200 percent, though 
lower ranked law degrees were not significant. Nor was either MBA variable. Another 





Study Replication: Predictors that an executive will be member of business association 




b SE Odds 
Ratio 
Sig. 
     
  BA only, lesser college a -0.905 0.385 0.405 * 
  BA only, top college a -0.246 0.183 0.787  
  MBA, lesser program b -0.049 0.218 0.952  
  MBA, top program b 0.350 0.241 1.419  
  Law, lesser program c -0.026 0.263 0.974  
  Law, top program c 1.099 0.240 3.003 *** 
  Other graduate degree d 0.778 0.179 2.177 *** 
Upper social origins 1.035 0.430 2.814 * 
Interaction terms     
  Lesser BA, top MBA  0.006 0.302 1.006  
  Lesser BA, top family -1.270 0.634 0.281 * 
Business position     
  Chief executive 2.732 0.144 15.367 *** 
  Multiple director 0.715 0.141 2.044  
BIC -29265.8 
AIC 0.492    
Log likelihood: intercept only -1129.9    
Log likelihood: full model -919.3    
Pseudo R-square 0.186    
N 3,622    
 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
Note. Collinearity statistic: highest VIF was 6.8 for MBA lesser.  
          Independent errors statistic: Durbin-Watson = 1.99. 
a Reference group is “No BA” 
b Reference group is “No MBA” 
c Reference group is “No JD” 
d Reference group is “No other graduate degree” 
 
 
Summary of Replication Results 
 
Three key conclusions from the prior study are listed below, and I assess the 
degree to which they applied to executives in 2010.   
1. “Corporate ascent is facilitated by the possession of a bachelor’s degree from a 




prominent program, or a degree in law from a leading institution” (Useem & 
Karabel, 1986, p. 184). 
 
In other words, the odds of being a CEO compared to any other senior level 
corporate position were higher when an executive had a BA only from a top institution, a 
ranked MBA, or a ranked law degree.  This finding did not hold in 2010.  None of the 
variables representing educational degree attainment were statistically significant in the 
ordinary least squares model.  In the logistic regression, holding a lesser law degree or 
another graduate degree were  negatively associated with being a CEO (Table 4.14). 
 
2. “Controlling for educational credentials, an upper-class background increases 
the likelihood of rising to the top ranks of corporate management” (Useem & 
Karabel, 1986, p. 184). 
 
Useem and Karabel did not find a significant relationship between social origins 
and likelihood of being CEO, but there was a positive association between an upper class 
background and being a multiple director or a member of a business organization.  In 
2010, these relationships held in the OLS and the logistic models.  Multiple directors 
were 84.7 percent more likely to be from socially prominent families (Table 4.15), and 
representatives of key business organizations were 181 percent more likely (Table 4.16). 
 
3. “The impact of a law degree and an upper-class origin are most pronounced for 
successful movement beyond the firm into formal and informal inter-corporate 
networks” (Useem & Karabel, 1986, p. 184).  
 
In other words, the coefficients for “law, top program” and “upper social origins” 
were statistically significant and relatively larger in magnitude for multiple directors and 
business association members compared to CEOs.  This finding was still true for business 
association leaders in 2010 in the OLS (Table 4.13) as well as the logistic estimates 




other postsecondary variable, and an upper class family background increased an 
executive’s odds, though to a lesser magnitude.  However, the 2010 results for multiple 
directors were less pronounced.  The OLS model indicated holding a top law degree did 
increase someone’s chances of having two or more director positions (Table 4.13), but 
this was not statistically significant in the logistic regression model (Table 4.15).  
Refinement Results 
 
The analyses presented here refine the models in the prior section with three 
changes. I added controls for age, gender, and race and tested the interactions of these 
variables with postsecondary education; I changed the undergraduate degree distinction 
from the Gourman measure to Barron’s admissions selectivity categories; and I added 
models comparing CEOs to other internal executives only and multiple directors to single 
directors only (in addition to comparisons to the full sample).  In all of the models, which 
are logistic regression estimates,32 I adjusted the standard errors for company affiliation 
and I entered the variables in two blocks.  The first block was the postsecondary variables 
alone, then I added demographics in order to illustrate how the direct postsecondary 
relationships change when controls were included. The research question is: Is 
postsecondary attainment related to the chances an executive will be part of the 
corporate elite?   
Predictors of being a CEO 
 In the logistic regression that replicated Useem and Karabel’s analysis, two 
postsecondary variables were significant (Table 4.14).  Having a top JD or another type 
of graduate degree each reduced an executive’s odds of being CEO. After refining the 
model, holding another graduate degree was the only statistically significant 
                                                 




postsecondary variable initially, reducing the odds of being CEO by 36.2 percent (Table 
4.17, “full sample” column). When the demographic controls were added, however, 
CEOs did not differ from the rest of the sample on any postsecondary characteristics 
(χ213, 3031=23.54 p<.05).   There were several statistically significant differences in 
demographic characteristics.  CEOs had 97.7 percent higher odds of being white and 80.1 
percent lower odds of being female. Also, for every year decrease in age, an executive’s 
chances of being a CEO increased by 3.9 percent.  
 The second set of results in Table 4.17 (“internal executives only” column) 
compared CEOs to other top internal executives33 (χ213, 1780=33.50 p<.01).  When single 
or multiple directors were removed, several variables changed in significance and/or 
magnitude. In terms of demographics, gender remained statistically significant though the 
effect size was reduced. CEOs were 69 percent less likely to be female compared to other 
internal executives.  The variable proxying race/ethnicity was no longer significant, but 
social class became significant.  CEOs were 130 percent more likely to be from an upper 
class family background. Also, while age remained significant, the direction of the 
relationship reversed, as CEOs were significantly older than the other internal executives 
in their firms. For every year decrease, an executive’s chances of being a CEO 
diminished by 11.2 percent. 
CEOs significantly differed from other executives within their firms on several 
aspects of postsecondary attainment as well.  Those with an MBA from a top program 
were 65.2 percent more likely than those without an MBA to be a CEO, , though no 
                                                 
33 Examples of the positions held by the comparison group in these analyses were executive vice presidents, 
group vice presidents, Chief Financial Officers, General Counsels and Chief Legal Officers, company 
president if this person differed from the CEO, Chief Operating Officers, Chief Information Officers, and 




differences were observed between executives with MBAs from lesser-ranked programs 
compared to no MBA at all. Executives with a JD from a lesser program compared to no 
law degree at all were 48.1 percent less likely to be a CEO.  The only measure of 
undergraduate degree selectivity that was statistically significant in the final block was 
the middle tier of Barron’s ranking compared to the top tier. Executives who had a BA 
from a school characterized as “Competitive” were 40.3 percent less likely to be CEO 







Predictors of being a Multiple Director 
 
A number of characteristics distinguished multiple directors from all other 
executives (Table 4.18, full sample columns; χ213, 3031=66.96 p<.001). In the logistic 
regression that replicated Useem and Karabel’s study (Table 4.15), only a law degree 
from a lower ranked program was significant; it was associated with reduced chances of 
being a multiple director. Prior to controlling for demographic characteristics, a JD from 
a lesser-ranked university was again associated with 25.4 percent lower odds of being a 
multiple director, but this lost significance in the full model.  However, holding a top JD 
was associated with 32.8 percent lower odds of being a multiple director when 
demographics were added. Also in the full model, executives who held a BA from a 
school not listed in Barron’s 1966 edition were 59.3 percent less likely than graduates of 
a Most Competitive school to be multiple directors. Compared to those without an MBA, 
executives with an MBA from a lesser school had 30.4 percent higher odds of being a 
multiple director, and executives with an MBA from a top school had 53.1 percent higher 
odds. The “other graduate degree” variable was associated with 38.3 percent higher odds 
of being a multiple director in the first block, but it lost significance and the sign turned 
negative when the demographics were added. 
For every year decrease in age, an executive was eight percent less likely to be a 
multiple director. Someone who was female was 54.8 percent more likely to be a multiple 
director, and someone who was white is 65.8 percent less likely.  This finding might 
appear counterintuitive at first read, but it’s important to keep in mind the full sample was 




executive ranks (and are part of this sample) were disproportionately more likely have 
connections with more than one company.   
The second set of results in Table 4.18 (“directors only” column) compared 
multiple directors to single directors, removing internal senior executives not in an 
external oversight position from consideration (χ213, 2297=45.96 p<.001).  There were 
fewer differences between multiple directors and single directors. The same 
undergraduate variable that was significant in the full sample model also emerged here; 
directors who held a BA from a school not listed in Barron’s were 69.0 percent less likely 
to be multiple directors than graduates of a Most Competitive school.  Multiple directors 
were also 28.0 percent more likely to have a lower ranked MBA and 31.7 percent more 
likely to have top MBA than single directors. While multiple directors were still less 
likely to be white (odds were only one percent, however) and older (1.5 percent lower 









Predictors of being Business Association Leader34 
 
As Table 4.19 indicates, a number of postsecondary variables were significantly 
associated with being a business association leader, even after controlling for 
demographics (χ213, 3031=72.73; p<.001).  
The replication results indicated possession of only a bachelor’s degree from a top 
ranked school did not change the odds that an executive would be a business association 
representative while a lesser BA reduced executives’ chances; the comparison group was 
executives without a bachelor’s degree.  When undergraduate degree source was 
redefined according to Barron’s rather than Gourman’s rankings in this analysis, 
statistically significant differences were again apparent.  Even after controlling for 
demographics, compared to those who graduated from an undergraduate school ranked in 
the top Barron’s category, executives with less than a bachelor’s degree were 94.2 
percent less likely to be an association leader, those with a BA from a school not listed in 
Barron’s were 72.2 percent less likely, those with a BA from a less competitive school 
were 50.7 percent less likely, and Competitive were 54.6 percent less likely.  
In the replication results, holding a top JD or another graduate degree each 
increased the chances of association leadership.  Both remained statistically significant 
with the addition of the demographic controls.  The odds were 80.7 percent higher that a 
                                                 
34 The four business associations included in these results are the Committee on Economic Development, 
Council on Foreign Relations, Business Council, and Business Roundtable. Domhoff (2009) asserts that the 
business interests of the contemporary corporate community are protected and advocated for in the 
policymaking process by the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the 
Conference Board, the Business Council, and the Business Roundtable.  He also discusses the role that the 
Council on Foreign Relations plays in international policy but he explicitly cites the Committee on 
Economic Development as a group in decline.  I created an updated association variable excluding the 
Committee on Economic Development and adding leaders from the National Association of Manufacturers, 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the Conference Board to the Council on Foreign Relations, Business 
Council, and Business Roundtable.  However, none of the models with this updated association 
membership as the dependent variable changed in terms of the direction or significance of the coefficients, 




top law graduate would be an association representative and 81.2 percent higher for 
someone with another type of graduate degree besides MBA or JD. 
Association leaders were significantly older than the other executives in the 
sample; for every year decrease in age, an executive’s odds of being in an association 
were reduced by 4.6 percent.  Women were 46.6 percent more likely to be an association 
leader, though there were no differences in whether someone was white versus another 
racial/ethnic background.   Although the results replicating Useem and Karabel’s research 
indicated association leaders were more likely to be from upper social class origins (see 











* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
Note. Collinearity statistic: highest VIF = 1.8 for Barron’s Competitive.   
          Independent errors statistic: Durbin-Watson = 1.96. 
a Year of birth is a continuous variable that represents the year an executive was born.  A negative b 
coefficient or odds ratio below 1.0 for this variable indicates that as year of birth increases (i.e., an 
executive is younger), the chances of being in an association decrease.   
b Reference group is “BA, Barron’s Most Competitive”  
 
 
Block One Block Two  
 
B SE Odds 
Ratio 
Sig. B SE Odds 
Ratio 
Sig. 
Demographics         
Female     0.428 0.164 1.534 * 
White      -0.080 0.212 0.923  
Year of Birth a     -0.047 0.007 0.954 *** 
Upper Class     -0.135 0.300 0.874  
CEO     2.950 0.164 19.098 *** 
Multiple Director     0.443 0.147 1.558 ** 
Postsecondary Education         
BA, Barron’s Highlyb -0.345 0.189 0.708  -0.325 0.214 0.723  
BA, Barron’s Veryb -0.401 0.186 0.669 * -0.377 0.210 0.686  
BA, Barron’s Competitive b -0.777 0.199 0.460 *** -0.789 0.228 0.454 ** 
BA, Barron’s Lessb -0.574 0.219 0.563 ** -0.707 0.253 0.493 ** 
BA, Barron’s Non-Comp b -0.669 0.443 0.512  -0.686 0.491 0.504  
BA, Not listed in Barron’s b -1.210 0.271 0.298 *** -1.279 0.307 0.278 *** 
BA, International b -0.598 0.232 0.550 ** -0.499 0.257 0.607  
Less than BA -2.260 1.019 0.104 * -2.854 1.057 0.058 ** 
MBA, lower ranked  0.107 0.168 1.113  0.049 0.192 1.050  
MBA, Business Week top  0.172 0.164 1.188  0.132 0.185 1.142  
JD, lower ranked  -0.273 0.221 0.761  -0.129 0.242 0.879  
JD, US News top  0.497 0.205 1.644 ** 0.592 0.238 1.807 * 
Other graduate degree 0.494 0.136 1.638 *** 0.594 0.156 1.812 *** 
BIC -27424.6 -24813.2 
AIC 0.602 0.619 
Log likelihood: intercept only -1112.04 -1066.75 
Log likelihood: full model -1075.69 -1011.10 
McFadden’s Pseudo R-square 0.033    0.052    




Interactions of Demographics with Postsecondary Education  
 For each of the models explained in this section, I tested whether the demographic 
effects varied according to an executive’s educational attainment. These interactions were 
not significant for the most part, so for parsimony I did not create separate results tables 
but summarize the results here.   The odds of leading an association were not associated 
with the interaction of demographics and postsecondary education.  Nor were the odds of 
being a CEO compared to the remaining full sample of executives.  
When I limited the sample to CEOs compared to internal senior managers only, 
however, the interaction of age and holding an undergraduate degree from a school in the 
highest Barron’s tier was significant (b=0.072; p<0.05).  The direct effect of age was 
significant, in that younger executives had higher odds of being CEOs (Table 4.17). The 
interaction suggests that having a top BA gives younger executives an even better chance 
of attaining a CEO position.   
 Similarly, I found an interaction between age and top Barron’s tier for multiple 
directors (b=0.040, p<0.01) as well as age and possessing a graduate degree other than JD 
or MBA (b=0.037, p<0.01).  The interpretation of these coefficients is the same as for the 
CEOs; younger executives were advantaged in their chances of becoming an outside 
director for two or more companies by holding a BA from a top school or earning an 
additional graduate degree.  I also found a significant interaction of race and possessing 
another type of graduate degree for directors (b= -0.482, p<0.05), indicating that 
executives who were not white received an advantage from earning a graduate degree 




comparison of multiple directors to all other executives; when limited to multiple 
compared to single outside directors only, there were no significant interaction terms. 
 Scholarship in the status attainment tradition supports the assumption that that an 
individual’s ascriptive background and social-psychological makeup will interact with 
education, as some groups historically have benefited more from possessing an 
educational credential than others (Sewell, Hauser & Wolf, 1980). Wilson, Sakura-
Lemessy and West (1999), for example, found the influence of some college or college 
completion on entry into upper tier management and professional occupations was 
stronger for African Americans than for whites. In these data, although the direct effects 
of race, gender and age were associated with membership in the corporate elite, the 
interactions with education were not significant, by and large.  Perhaps the main 
advantages produced by education and specific to gender or race emerged earlier in the 
career process for the top executives studied here. 
Summary of Refinement Results 
 Adding demographic controls to the logistic estimates, adjusting how the 
undergraduate degrees are represented, and refining the executive comparisons changed 
the results in several instances compared to the models that more closely replicated 
Useem and Karabel’s work.   
Representing undergraduate degrees with a three-category variable – 
distinguishing the top eleven schools from all other schools and comparing each to those 
with less than a four-year degree – resulted in only one significant difference in the study 
replication; executives with a lower ranked BA were less likely to be part of the corporate 




schools as part of the refinement resulted in at least one significant difference for each of 
the three dependent variables, in each case favoring those who graduated from a top tier 
Barron’s undergraduate school.  
Multiple directors were more likely to have any type of MBA (compared to all 
other executives as well as to single directors only), and CEOs were more likely to have 
top ranked MBAs (compared to other internal executives only).  Holding a lower ranked 
JD reduced the chances of being a CEO.  Association leaders were still more likely to 
have another type of graduate degree than all other executives.  Also, they were the only 
corporate elite group with higher odds of holding a top JD.   
Extension Results 
 
The research questions guiding this section are: does the undergraduate academic 
achievements of the corporate elite differ from other top executives? and does the 
undergraduate involvement of the corporate elite differ from other top executives?  My 
analysis is based on a subsample purposively selected according to undergraduate alma 
mater; the 336 executives who received bachelor’s degrees from Yale University, Cornell 
University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Northwestern University, University 
of Notre Dame, University of Michigan, University of Southern California, and Stanford 
University are included.  
I begin by summarizing the academic achievements and campus involvement for 
the full subsample, then I use independent sample t-tests to compare the three corporate 
elite subgroups, i.e., CEOs, multiple directors, and association leaders, to other executive 






 Berger, Webster, Ridgeway and Rosenholz (1998) suggested academic honors are 
an “indicative” cue that make a clear claim about an individual’s expertise and 
competency. Three categories of awards, as well as undergraduate major, represent the 
executives’ academic achievements (Table 4.20).   The first is Rhodes and Marshall 
Scholar awards, which are highly competitive and distributed on a national basis for 
postgraduate study. Three percent of the study subsample received a Rhodes or Marshall 
scholarship. Considerably less than one percent of all college graduates are former 
recipients of these awards, so though the numbers are still small, scholars are 
overrepresented among these executives compared to the general population.  
Another academic award that is less exclusive but still widely known is the Phi 
Beta Kappa national honors society.  Eight percent of the subsample were members of 
Phi Beta Kappa. This figure is a bit misleading; although each of the eight universities in 
this study has a campus chapter of the organization, only students majoring in liberal arts 
and sciences are eligible for election.35  Removing Business, Engineering, Education, and 
Journalism majors from consideration, Phi Beta Kappa members comprised 13 percent of 
the 195 executives who majored in qualified fields. To put this into context, Phi Beta 
Kappa’s website estimates that ten percent of all postsecondary institutions in the United 
States have chapters, and about ten percent of arts and science majors are selected by 
each chapter.  Therefore, the sample appears to be at least slightly more accomplished 
than the general population of college graduates in terms of these awards. 
For the third measure of academic achievement, I collected information about 
campus-specific awards given to the subsample members, including dean’s list 





recognition, local scholarships and election to honors societies other than Phi Beta Kappa 
that did not have chapters on all of the eight campuses.  The executives received an 
average of 0.45 campus academic awards, with a range of zero to five.  More specifically, 
71 percent of the executives did not receive a campus academic award, 18 percent 
received one award, 7 percent received two awards, 2 percent received three awards, one 
percent received four awards and less than one percent (i.e., one person) received five 
awards.  
The three prior measures are intended to be a rough proxy of an individual’s 
academic performance and perhaps knowledge gained during college or general intellect.  
Another possible source of knowledge development for executive management and 
governance positions is the subject focus of their undergraduate programs. I collected 
academic major information for 326 of the 336 subsampled executives.  The most 
common category of major36 was engineering (22%), followed closely by the liberal arts 
and humanities37 (21%).  Sixteen percent of the executives majored in a business field,38 
and an additional sixteen percent majored in economics.  Twelve percent majored in a 
                                                 
36 Campus context is an important mediating variable, as not all universities offer the same range of majors 
for undergraduates.  Business is an example most appropriate to this study; neither Yale nor Stanford 
currently allows undergraduate students to major in business administration or specific fields traditionally 
considered part of the profession like finance, marketing, management, or accounting. To illustrate the 
differences in major across campuses, Appendix F is a crosstabulation of major by university.  For instance, 
engineering was the most frequent major category across the full sample, and it was most prevalent among 
MIT (63.6%) and Cornell graduates (30.0%) and tied at the top for University of Michigan (27.8%) and 
Stanford (23.9%) alumni.  Business was the most popular major among alumni from two schools: Notre 
Dame (47.8%) and University of Southern California (36.8%). 
37 Of the 21 percent (n=67) who majored in liberal arts and humanities, 40 percent (n=27) were History, 17 
percent (n=11) were English or Speech, 10 percent (n=7) were American Studies, 7 percent (n=5) were 
Philosophy, 7 percent (n=5) were Languages/Linguistics, 7 percent (n=5) were Journalism, and the 
remaining 10 percent (n=7) were General Studies or Arts & Letters. 
38 Of the 53 business majors, 25 percent (n=13) were Accounting, 23 percent (n=12) were Industrial and 
Labor Relations, 20 percent (n=10) were Business Administration, 11 percent (n=6) were Finance, 8 
percent (n=4) were Management, 8 percent (n=4) were Marketing, 5 percent (n=3) were Administrative 




social science other than economics39, seven percent in biological or physical sciences, 
and seven percent in government/international affairs. 
Upper echelon theory, as well as the work of Rivera (in press), would suggest that 
the executives’ accomplishments might vary according to the industry in which they are 
associated. I tested this by examining correlations with the six sampled industry 
categories (see Appendix H). None of the academic award variables were related to 
industry, but I observed several significant differences in the undergraduate major 
choices of executives and the type of company with which he or she was associated.   
Manufacturing firms – for example, Exxon Mobil, Dell, Boeing, Kraft Foods – were less 
likely to have executives with a bachelor’s degree in a social science field (r=-0.131, 
p<0.05) but more likely to have engineering majors (r=0.144, p<0.01).  Companies such 
as Wal-Mart and Amerisource Bergen that are categorized in the Wholesale/Retail Trade 
industry also were positively associated with executives from engineering undergraduate 
programs (r=0.122, p<0.01).  Conversely, finance, insurance, and real estate corporations 
such as Fannie Mae, JP Morgan & Chase, Goldman Sachs, and Wells Fargo were less 
likely to have executives with engineering (r=-0.113, p<0.05) or 
government/international relations degrees (r=-0.09, p<0.10).  These firms tended to 
have more leaders from liberal arts (r=0.104, p<0.10) and social sciences backgrounds 
(r=0.101, p<0.10).  None of the aforementioned industries was associated with an 
undergraduate major in business. However, the final industry group, service industry 
companies (e.g., Microsoft, Google, Manpower), was comparatively less likely to have 
                                                 
39 Of the 12 percent (n=38) who majored in social sciences other than economics, 55 percent (n=21) were 
Political Science, 24 percent (n=9) were Psychology, 11 percent (n=4) were Sociology, 5 percent (n=2) 




leaders executives who majored in business (r=-0.124, p<0.05) though they were 
positively associated with economics majors (r=0.130, p<0.05).40  
Campus Involvement 
There is limited scholarly consideration of the role that campus involvement 
might play in occupational outcomes, with the recent exception of Rivera (in press). In a 
study of the hiring practices of elite firms, she found that in addition to a highly 
prestigious degree source, extracurricular accomplishments were an important 
consideration for employee selection, trumping grades, standardized test scores, and 
previous job experience. Namely, job applicants involved in a variety of high status 
activities were favored, as employers saw these as signals for personality, sociability, 
ability to balance and effectively manage multiple commitments, and underlying 
ambition. Activities requiring considerable investment of resources and effort, such as 
varsity athletics or major leadership positions, were especially valued by employers. 
Rivera’s study was of entry-level employment in super-elite investment and law firms.  
The focus of this study is on top-level career outcomes among those in a more diverse set 
of firms; nonetheless, there is evidence to support Rivera’s conclusions.   
I found the executives were involved in an average of 0.25 sports.  While 79 
percent were not varsity athletes, 16.3 percent played one sport, 4.0 percent played two 
sports, and 0.3 percent played three sports. According to the Equity in Athletics Data 
Analysis website41 for the 2009-10 academic year, varsity athletes comprised about six 
percent of full-time undergraduate students at these eight schools.  Participation may 
                                                 
40 Note, however, that service firms were modestly associated with earning a top MBA (r= 0.095, p<0.10) 
although not at all with earning any other type of MBA.  




have changed over time, but this comparison offers at least some indication that top 
executives were more likely to be varsity athletes than the average undergraduate student.   
Approximately 37 percent were in a fraternity or sorority at the seven schools that 
have Greek life.  Information about participation in Greek life is more difficult to 
ascertain than intercollegiate athletics, but college guides indicate that the 2010 average 
at these schools ranges from roughly one out of ten undergraduate students (Stanford and 
Yale) to one third (Cornell, MIT, and Northwestern).42   As with athletics, therefore, there 
is at least some evidence to suggest top executives were perhaps more likely to have been 
fraternity or sorority members than the average student.   
Fifteen percent of the executives who graduated from the four schools that have 
undergraduate student societies were named to one.  This is almost certainly a higher 
proportion than average, because sources indicate that less than one percent of all 
undergraduates are part of these groups (Robbins, 2002).   
Eleven percent of the sample was part of a campus media organization (e.g., 
student newspaper, radio station, yearbook). The remaining forms of involvement are 
combined together, and the executives were members of 0.83 organizations in addition to 
those mentioned above.  More specifically, 65 percent were not members of any of these, 
13.2 percent were members of one organization, 8.8 percent were members of two 
organizations, 5.7 percent were members of three organizations, 3.7 percent were 
members of four organizations, 2.0 percent were members of five organizations, and the 
remaining 1.2 percent were members of six to ten organizations.  The experiences of 
Lucio Noto, an outside director of Penske Automotive and Phillip Morris who graduated 
                                                 
42 According to the http://collegeprowler.com college guide in 2010, fraternity/sorority members represent 
10% of Yale students, 13% of Stanford students, 16% of Michigan students, 20% of USC students, 33% of 




from the University of Notre Dame in 1959, offer a representative example of what is 
included in this category. According to the Dome yearbook, Noto was a member of the 
Physics Club, the International Relations Club, and the Young Christian Students.  Since 
none are a varsity sport, a fraternity or sorority, or a media organization, I included them 
together in this final involvement category.   
I separately documented if the executives were leaders in a student organization 
as well as in student government, and they averaged 0.66 leadership positions.  About 69 
percent did not hold any leadership positions (for instance, Lucio Noto from Notre Dame 
referenced above), 15.2 percent were leaders in one organization, 7.1 percent were in two 
leadership positions, four percent were in three leadership positions, 2.7 percent were in 
four leadership positions, and 2.3 percent had five, six or seven.  An example of a highly 
involved leader is George H. Walker. Before graduating from Yale University in 1953, 
Walker was President of the Dwight Hall Freshman cabinet, Vice President of Dwight 
Hall government, chairman of the Campus Council, treasurer of Delta Kappa Epsilon 
fraternity, chairman of the 1952 Charities Drive, and secretary of the Torch honors 
society.  
As with the academic accomplishments, I examined the correlations of company 
industry type with undergraduate involvement. Former varsity athletes were associated 
with service firms; Google, Microsoft, and IBM are among the ten companies in this 
industry (r=0.211, p<0.01). Executives with backgrounds in campus media groups were 
more likely to be in retail or wholesale trade companies such as Sysco, Target, and Best 
Buy (r=0.124, p<0.05), although less likely to be with manufacturing firms (r=-0.11, 








Study extension: Descriptive statistics for undergraduate achievement & involvement 
(n=366) 
 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Academic Achievements     
Phi Beta Kappa 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Rhodes or Marshall Scholar 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Campus Academic Awarda 0.45 0.85 0 5 
Major     
  Engineering 0.22 0.41 0 1 
  Liberal Arts & Humanities 0.21 0.40 0 1 
  Business 0.16 0.37 0 1 
  Economics 0.16 0.37 0 1 
  Social Sciences 0.12 0.32 0 1 
  Biological & Physical Sciences 0.07 0.25 0 1 
  Government/International Affairs 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Campus Involvement     
  Varsity Athletics 0.25 0.54 0 3 
  Fraternity/Sorority 0.37 0.49 0 1 
  Campus Media 0.11 0.36 0 1 
  Student Society 0.15 0.41 0 1 
  Club 0.83 1.50 0 10 





CEOs’ Undergraduate Accomplishments 
 
Are there any differences in the undergraduate academic achievements and 
campus involvement of CEOs compared to everyone else? To answer this question, I ran 
two sets of independent sample t-tests for each independent variable.  One compared the 
CEOs’ means to all other executives, and one compared the CEOs’ means to those who 
are senior managers only (removing directors from the analysis).  The number of CEOs 
was small, so many of the differences did not achieve statistical significance, but there 
were nonetheless several noteworthy findings (see Table 4.21).  
I found that CEOs had lower means on the academic achievements measures.  
They received an average of 0.28 campus academic awards but the rest of the executives 
received an average of 0.47 campus academic awards (p<0.10).  Senior managers had 
virtually the same average awards as CEOs (mean=0.26), so this finding reflects the fact 
that outside directors received more campus academic awards than those who are internal 
employees of sampled companies.  
There were not any significant differences in the academic focus of CEOs 
compared to others, although their most common major was in liberal arts and humanities 
(mean=0.29 compared to 0.20 for all other executives as well as senior managers only), 
and they were slightly less likely than the others to major in economics (mean=0.11 
compared to 0.17 for all other executives as well as senior managers only). As a point of 
general comparison, Boone, Kurtz, and Fleenor (1988) studied the college backgrounds 
of 243 CEOs of the largest 800 American companies. In contrast to the results here, they 




followed by 24 percent in engineering, 12 percent in liberal arts, 7 percent in science, 3 
percent in law, 2 percent in journalism and 9 percent in other fields. 
In this study, CEOs were different from the others on several aspects of 
undergraduate involvement.  They were significantly more likely to have been a varsity 
athlete (mean=0.52) compared to all other executives (mean=0.23; p<0.01) and to senior 
managers only (mean=0.19; p<0.05).  A representative example is the two Boeing 
executives that were part of this subsample.  Before graduating from Yale University in 
1971 with an American Studies degree, Boeing’s CEO James McNerney played varsity 
baseball and was a member of the sailing team (he also played JV hockey as a 
sophomore, junior, and senior but because this was not a varsity sport I included it with 
other clubs rather than athletics).  The other Boeing executive in this subsample, outside 
director John Bryson, graduated from Stanford in 1965 with a degree in history. While he 
was involved in a number of extra- and co-curricular activities (e.g, Stanford in 
Government, Administration Assistant with the Associated Students of Stanford 
University, studied abroad in Germany), Bryson was not a member of a varsity athletics 
team.    
Also, I found CEOs had higher average participation in campus media 
organizations (mean=0.28) when contrasted to all other executives (mean=0.10; p<0.05) 
and to senior managers only (mean=0.05; p<0.01).  An especially illustrative example is 
the CEO of Sysco, William DeLaney, who was a member of the Observer student 
newspaper, the Dome yearbook staff, and the Scholastic magazine staff before graduating 
from Notre Dame in 1976 with a major in Accounting.  Incidentally, DeLaney was also a 




Finally, CEOs were more likely to be part of an undergraduate student society on 
their campuses (mean=0.22 compared to 0.14 for all other executives and 0.09 for senior 
managers only).  Because this variable is only relevant for executives who graduated 
from Yale, Cornell, Northwestern, and Michigan, the lack of statistical significance is not 
surprising.    
Table 4.21. 
Study extension: CEO undergraduate achievements and involvement 
 
 
~ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
Note. Each column displays the mean for the relevant executive subgroup.  I used independent sample t-
tests to compare the CEO means to All Other Executives and Senior Managers Only, and the statistically 
significant differences are noted with asterisk next to the comparison group mean. The full results of these 
tests are in Appendix G, Tables G1 and G2. 
a Variable is dummy coded. 
b Variable is on a count scale. 
c The student society variable is for only executives who graduated from Cornell, Yale, Northwestern and 
Michigan – see Chapter 3 for further explanation about the organizations it represents.  












Academic Achievements    
Phi Beta Kappaa 0.03 0.08 0.04 
Rhodes or Marshall Scholar 0.00 0.03 0.02 
Campus academic awardb 0.28 0.47~ 0.26 
Major    
  Businessa 0.18 0.16 0.21 
  Engineeringa 0.21 0.22 017 
  Liberal arts & humanitiesa 0.29 0.20 0.20 
  Biological & physical sciencesa 0.04 0.07 0.05 
  Government/international affairsa 0.07 0.07 0.05 
  Social sciencesa 0.11 0.12 0.15 
  Economicsa 0.11 0.17 0.17 
Campus Involvement    
  Varsity athleticsb 0.52 0.23* 0.19* 
  Fraternity/sororitya,d 0.39 0.37 0.33 
  Campus media 0.28 0.10* 0.05** 
   Student societya,c 0.22 0.14 0.09 
  Clubb 0.60 0.86 0.56 





Multiple Directors’ Undergraduate Accomplishments 
 
 To better understand whether multiple directors differed in their academic 
achievements and campus involvement compared to everyone else, I followed a similar 
procedure to the CEO analysis.  The results here are based on two sets of independent 
sample t-tests comparing multiple directors’ means to all other executives and comparing 
multiple directors’ means to those who are single directors only (removing non-director 
senior managers and CEOs from the analysis; see Table 4.22). 
Unlike CEOs, multiple directors had higher average undergraduate academic 
awards compared to other executives. They were proportionally more likely to have been 
named a Rhodes or Marshall scholar (6%, compared to 2% of all other executives and 1% 
of single directors only) as well as part of Phi Beta Kappa (10%, compared to 7% of all 
other executives and 9% of single directors only).  These differences, however, were not 
statistically significant.  Multiple directors were statistically less likely to have majored in 
business (9%) compared to the rest of the subsample (19%; p<0.05) as well as single 
directors alone (17%; p<0.10), but more likely to have majored in engineering (30% 
compared to 19% of all other executives, p<0.05, and 20% of single directors only, 
p<0.10) and social sciences (14%, compared to 11% of all other executives, n.s., and 7% 
of single directors, p<0.10).   
The academic accomplishments of David Boren, an outside director for Texas 
Instruments, AMR (American Airlines), and Torchmark in 2010, encapsulate those of the 
multiple directors in this study.  Boren, a native of Washington DC, graduated from Yale 
University in 1963 and was a History honors major.  He was named a Rhodes Scholar 




national forensics (debating/politics) honors society.  He was a Ranking Scholar, which 
designates the top two percent of a Yale class cohort, from 1959 through 62. 
 In terms of campus involvement, the multiple directors were more likely to have 
participated in several activities – the significant comparisons are all different from those 
in the CEO analyses, however.   Almost half of the multiple directors (46%) were 
members of a fraternity or sorority compared to roughly one third of all other executives 
(34%; p<0.10) and single directors only (35%; n.s.).  Also, the average multiple director 
participated in more than one student club during college (mean=1.14), compared to less 
than one for all other executives (mean==0.72; p<0.10) and single directors (mean=0.88; 
n.s.).  As with CEOs, multiple directors were more likely to be part of an undergraduate 
student society on the three campuses with these types of organizations, and the 
comparison was significant (mean=0.23 compared to 0.12 for all other executives, 
p<0.10, and 0.14 for single directors, n.s.).  Contrary to CEOs, however, multiple 
directors were less likely to be a member of a campus publication staff (mean=0.08 
compared to 0.13 for all other executives, n.s., and 0.16 for all other executives; p<0.10).  
Though not significant, multiple directors held more campus leadership positions than 
other executives (mean=0.80 compared to 0.60 for all other executives and 0.75 for single 
directors).  
  David Boren, the corporate director and Yale graduate used above as an example 
for academic awards, also represents the types of out-of-class achievements common 
among multiple directors.  Though not in a fraternity, Boren was a member of several 
student organizations at Yale, including Army ROTC, the Cannon & Castle military 




(from 1959-63), the Freshman Debate Team, the Varsity Debate Team, and the Wesley 
Foundation (a religious organization). He was also in the Skull & Bones senior society.  
Boren did not participate on a varsity athletics team nor was he part of a campus 
publication; both types of involvement that were less common among multiple directors 
generally. In terms of leadership positions, Boren was a member of the Calhoun 
residential hall council for two years, a member of his class council and the speaker and 






Study extension: Multiple director undergraduate achievements and involvement 
 
~ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
Note. Each column displays the mean for the relevant executive subgroup.  I used independent sample t-
tests to compare the Multiple Director means to All Other Executives and Single Directors Only, and the 
statistically significant differences are noted with asterisk next to the comparison group mean. The full 
results of these tests are in Appendix G, Tables G3 and G4. 
a Variable is dummy coded. 
b Variable is on a count scale.  
c The student society variable is for only executives who graduated from Cornell, Yale, Northwestern and 
Michigan – see Chapter 3 for further explanation about the organizations it represents.  















Academic Achievements    
Phi Beta Kappaa 0.10 0.07 0.09 
Rhodes or Marshall Scholara 0.06 0.02 0.01 
Campus academic awardb 0.52 0.43 0.55 
Major    
  Businessa 0.09 0.19* 0.17~ 
  Engineeringa 0.30 0.19* 0.20~ 
  Liberal arts & humanitiesa 0.21 0.21 0.22 
  Biological & physical sciencesa 0.06 0.07 0.09 
  Government/international affairsa 0.06 0.07 0.08 
  Social sciencesa 0.14 0.11 0.07~ 
  Economicsa 0.15 0.17 0.15 
Campus Involvement    
  Varsity athleticsb 0.29 0.24 0.25 
  Fraternity/sororitya,d 0.46 0.34~ 0.35 
  Campus media 0.08 0.13 0.16~ 
   Student societya,c 0.23 0.12~ 0.14 
  Clubb 1.14 0.72~ 0.88 




Association Leaders’ Undergraduate Accomplishments 
 
 My analyses of the academic awards received by CEOs and multiple directors 
indicated few differences between these groups and other executives.  However, business 
association leaders were more likely to have been a Rhodes or Marshall Scholar (12% 
compared to 1% of all other executives; p<0.01) and also to have received a campus 
academic award (mean=0.81 compared to other executives’ mean=0.39; p<0.05) (see 
Table 4.23). They were also slightly more likely to have been part of Phi Beta Kappa, but 
this difference was not significant.  In terms of academic major, the association leaders 
were more likely to have a degree in a liberal arts or humanities discipline (34% 
compared to 19%; p<0.05) but less likely to have an engineering degree (10% compared 
to 24%; p<0.05).  
An individual example of the association leaders’ academic achievements is 
Thomas Gerrity, a member of the Committee for Economic Development as well as an 
outside director of Sunoco and Pharmerica.  Gerrity graduated from MIT in 1963 and was 
a Rhodes Scholar. He was not in Phi Beta Kappa but was not eligible for membership, as 
he is one of the few association leaders who majored in engineering although he later 
earned a PhD in Management from MIT. Among his campus-specific awards, Gerrity 
was named to the Dean’s list for eight terms, to the Beaver Key junior honorary society 
(for MIT students involved in sports and campus activities but also maintain high grades), 
to Eta Kappa Nu as a senior (honors society for electrical engineering), and to Tau Beta 
Pi as a junior and senior (honors society for all engineering majors displaying noteworthy 




Though not statistically significant in every case, association leaders were more 
involved on almost every measure compared to their colleagues.  The only exception was 
the campus publications (mean for association=0.10 and all others mean=0.11, n.s.).   
Most notably, they were more likely to have held student leadership positions 
(mean=1.10 compared to mean=0.59; p<0.05).  As with multiple directors and CEOs, 
association leaders who attended Yale, Michigan, and Cornell were more likely to have 
been part of an elite student society (34% compared to 12%; p<0.01).  They were in more 
student clubs, fraternities or sororities, and varsity sports teams as well, though none of 
these margins were significant.  
In 2010, Stephen Friedman was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations as 
well as an outside director of Goldman Sachs. Friedman earned a bachelor’s degree in 
sociology from Cornell University in 1959, and his undergraduate experiences at Cornell 
illustrate the types of activities more common among association leaders compared to 
their fellow executives.  A member of Tau Delta Phi fraternity, Friedman was also part of 
the Aleph Samach student society (for junior men only) and the Quill & Dagger student 
society (for senior men only). Also, Friedman was on the varsity wrestling team.  In 
terms of his leadership achievements, Friedman was a “wearer of the ‘C’”, a “wearer of 
the numbers” (both of the former are athletics leadership designations) and the president 






















Academic Achievements   
Phi Beta Kappaa 0.10 0.07 
Rhodes or Marshall Scholara 0.12 0.01* 
Campus academic awardb 0.81 0.39* 
Major   
  Businessa 0.10 0.17 
  Engineeringa 0.10 0.24* 
  Liberal arts & humanitiesa 0.34 0.19* 
  Biological & physical sciencesa 0.05 0.07 
  Government/international affairsa 0.10 0.06 
  Social sciencesa 0.17 0.11 
  Economicsa 0.15 0.17 
Campus Involvement   
  Varsity athleticsb 0.34 0.24 
  Fraternity/sororitya,d 0.42 0.37 
  Campus media 0.10 0.11 
  Student societya,c 0.34 0.12** 
  Clubb 1.02 0.80 
  Leadership positionb 1.10 0.59* 
 
~ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
Note. Each column displays the mean for the relevant executive subgroup.  I used independent sample t-
tests to compare the Association means to All Other Executives, and the statistically significant differences 
are noted with asterisk next to the comparison group mean. The full t-test results are in Appendix G, Table 
G.5. 
a Variable is dummy coded. 
b Variable is on a count scale.  
c The student society variable is for only executives who graduated from Cornell, Yale, Northwestern and 
Michigan – see Chapter 3 for further explanation of the organizations it represents.  








Study Limitations, Delimitations, and Assumptions 
Study Limitations 
The data for this study were collected from secondary sources.  I was able to 
gather equivalent measures to those used in the 1977 study, but I was unable to locate 
information to fully represent all of the variables in my proposed conceptual framework 
that are likely influences on executive career outcomes. For instance, a key set of 
variables missing from my analysis were psychological measures.  The entire population 
of top executives probably has psychological attributes that qualitatively differ from other 
American adults – for instance, a strong work ethic might be important in ascending the 
corporate ladder – so some of these may be controlled for with a design that only samples 
from top executives.   Yet even within this population, the corporate elite may be distinct 
from the others in qualities like level of ambition, drive for power, or social/interpersonal 
skills.  I was unable to test these attributes with this study design.  
My measures for the executives’ social class background were the same used by 
the 1977 study, but they likely do not have the same contemporary meaning - or even the 
same meaning when the executives in this sample were adolescents compared to when 
the executives in the prior study were adolescents.43 Social Registers have lost favor 
among established families and are no longer as comprehensive as they were in the past 
(Domhoff, 2006a). Though identified by some scholars as “the elite of the elites” (Khan, 
2008, p. 11; also Baltzell, 1964), the sixteen preparatory schools used here are by no 
means the only exclusive secondary schools that educate children of the most established 
and wealthy American families.  Other lists of elite preparatory schools are proposed by 
                                                 
43 To give a sense of the generational differences, in this study, the mean age was 60 in 2010, so the 
average executive was 15 years old in 1965. In the prior study, the mean age was 56 in 1977, so the average 




scholars including Baird (1977), Domhoff (2009), and Persell and Cookson (1985), 
although the sixteen considered here are typically included with the addition of other 
schools. Another possible limitation related to the class variable is, as Useem and Karabel 
acknowledge, studies44 of elite prep schools have shown that they explicitly aim to 
prepare students for leadership positions.  So, any effects associated with this variable 
might be from that rather than the measure as a proxy for social class.  
The study design would be strengthened if I had more measures of early career 
positions, in terms of promotion history as well as firm(s) where the executives were 
employed.  A number of studies in the status attainment tradition suggest the direct 
impact of education on occupational status diminishes over time and is strongest 
immediately after degree completion (Alon & Tienda, 2000; Hauser et al, 1996; Warren, 
1998; Warren, 2001; Warren, Sheridan, & Hauser, 2002). My dependent variable is later-
in-life, and I do not control for early or mid-career experiences. The model fits are not 
extremely high, indicating there are important influences unaccounted for in the 
estimations.  There is anecdotal discussion of certain companies as “feeders” to the 
corporate elite; Rothkopf (2008), for example, notes the prevalence of Goldman Sachs. 
When collecting data about the executives in my sample, I came across an article about 
the CEO of Heineken discussing one of his top senior executives who was promoted to a 
U.S. position after spending ten years in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  According 
to the CEO, the Congo experience was “certainly worth three times Harvard Business 
School.”45 Unfortunately I cannot test that assertion but it is another example of the types 
                                                 






of experiences that are likely important predictors of career outcomes but not accounted 
for by my models.   
Many of the data sources are from executives’ self-reported biographies. In a 
study of the discrepancies of self-reported degree attainment compared to institution-
reported degree attainment using NELS data, Attewell and Domina (in press) suggested 
that six percent of those who claim to have a bachelor’s degree do not.  For the most part, 
these individuals attended the schools but never completed their coursework.  In this 
study, when collecting additional data from the Yale University archives for the 
extension phase, I discovered one executive whose biography listed he had attended Yale 
for his undergraduate did attend Yale but did not complete his bachelor’s degree at Yale.  
This was the only instance among the 300 executives who were part of the study where I 
found this sort of discrepancy, but it illustrates the potential limitations of self-reported 
data.  
Finally, although this is a replication of a study conducted 33 years ago and I 
compare results from past to present, it is nonetheless a cross-sectional design.  I do not 
track individual executives over time, and no causal relationships can be inferred from 
my findings.   
Study Delimitations 
This study is designed to replicate research conducted in 1977, so many of the 
choices about sample definition and variable selection were guided by Useem and 
Karabel (1986).  The sample is drawn from companies that were listed in the 2010 U.S. 
Fortune 500.  This list is limited to those that are publicly incorporated in the United 




investment banks and other types of privately held financial services, hedge funds, and 
consulting companies.  These firms are perhaps a bigger institutional player in the 
corporate power structure today than they were in the late 1970s. Also, they draw a 
disproportionate number of graduates from top universities. Rothkopf (2008) quotes a 
hedge fund manager, who told him, 
‘there are only every year a few hundred people coming out of the best schools in 
the U.S. – maybe a few thousand worldwide – who are the cream of the cop. 
Where do they start? Once it might have been the Foreign Service or law or some 
other field.  But today, we have such a huge advantage in terms of the 
compensation we can offer that we get first crack. Of course, all that ebbs and 
flows too with market cycles. A couple years ago, we hedge funds were the 
pinnacle because we were paying starting MBAs base salaries of a couple 
hundred thousand and bonuses that could double that. Now private equity firms 
are offering bases of $300,000, $400,00 and total first-year packages of like $1.2 
million.  This is to Harvard MBAs or whatever, twenty-five year olds. So what 
would you do if you were that MBA? Where would you work?’ (p. 131). 
 
These firms are outside the scope of this study; also, the identities and backgrounds of 
their top executives are generally more difficult to determine because public reporting 
responsibilities for privately held firms are considerably lower than those that are 
publicly traded (which is the case for most of the Fortune 500). They nonetheless 
represent an intriguing possibility for future study.  
 The hedge fund quote above alludes to another aspect of executive that is beyond 
the scope of this study, that of compensation.  Top American executives are extremely 
well-paid46 even in the midst of a major recession and in the face of Congressional 
reforms (Anderson, Collins, Pizzigati & Shih, 2010), but I did not collect information 
about individual salaries, bonuses, stock options, etc. Also, my review of the literature is 
constrained to research on occupational outcomes and how postsecondary education may 
                                                 
46 In the 1970s, the median annual compensation for a CEO leading one of the top 50 largest American 
firms was the equivalent of $1.2 million in 2009 dollars.  The median CEO in 2009 was paid $8.5 million 




affect executive careers, and my analyses do not incorporate income, earnings, wealth, or 
similar variables representing an individual’s economic standing.   
Because the Fortune 500 is a list of U.S. companies only, some of the largest 
companies on a global level are excluded. To illustrate, five of the world’s ten largest 
corporations in 2010 were based in the United States: JP Morgan Chase, General Electric, 
Bank of America, ExxonMobil, and Wells Fargo.  The rest were distributed across 
several countries: ICBC (China), Banco Santander (Spain), HSBC Holdings (UK), Royal 
Dutch Shell (Netherlands), and BP (UK). Nonetheless, the U.S. has the largest total GDP 
of any single country in the world, so the companies that are part of this study are major 
contributors to the global economy (CIA, 2009). 
A related delimitation of this study is that my analyses focus on U.S. colleges and 
universities.  The literature review in Chapter Two is limited to research pertaining to 
U.S. executives and universities.  There is a solid foundation of comparative work in 
education – a cursory search produced articles from Australia, Ireland, Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, Israel, and Canada – but because the structural makeup of education is so 
different in every country, it is outside the scope here. I found that just under ten percent 
of the sampled executives earned a bachelor’s degree or its equivalent from a college or 
university outside of the United States.  In my analyses, I note whether the institution 
awarding the degree was international or not, but I do not create detailed measures for the 
international universities.  For instance, I do not represent “top” international universities, 
although some such as Oxford, Cambridge, the Ecole Polytechnique, the Indian Institute 
of Technology, and the University of Tokyo are often considered to have prestige and 




A final delimitation pertaining to education is that my focus is on various 
combinations of postsecondary degree completion. As I began my data collection, I 
noticed some executive biographies not only listed their degrees but also executive non-
degree programs in which they had participated.  Many of these programs are offered by 
the top business schools, so having “Harvard Business School Advanced Management 
Program” in a biography might signal business knowledge and competence although 
probably not to the extent of Harvard MBA. However, the role they play in upper level 
executive career outcomes and power is not addressed in this study.   
Study Assumptions 
A major assumption I make, consistent with the power elite theory, is that the 
dependent variables – the positions of Chief Executive Officers, multiple directors, and 
association leaders – represent those who have relatively more power over national 
business decisions than other executives.   A competing perspective to power elite is the 
pluralist perspective (Lerner, Nagai & Rothman, 1996).  Applied to this study, both 
perspectives would agree that top executives wield much power over their companies.  
The views diverge in terms of the power that executives exert beyond their respective 
institutions. Pluralists acknowledge there is a subgroup of the population that holds 
disproportionate decision-making power over important social issues, policies, programs, 
and activities but this power is diffuse among different individuals and institutions 
representing many domains – economic, political, religious, intellectual, cultural, military 
etc. The relative distribution of power is functionalist, shifting across these domains over 
time and according to specific issues, such that a single dominant elite is never in control 




suggested in his study of community power in New Haven that there is little overlap 
among the powerful positions in one domain with another.  On occasion a business might 
attempt to block a law contrary to its interests, but pluralists contend that there is no 
ongoing systemic involvement in or initiation of programs by businesses in the policy 
arena. As I discuss in Chapter Two, the power elite theory asserts there is a unified 
corporate power structure and the dependent variables used here represent that power.  
However, it is important to acknowledge that there is a longstanding body of literature 









Discussion, Implications and Conclusions 
 
This study improves our understanding of how postsecondary education might 
shape a small and understudied population that is a high status occupational class (Blau & 
Duncan, 1967; Sewell & Hauser, 1992), the top management team responsible for major 
corporate decisions (Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders, 2004; Hambrick & Mason, 
1984), and a powerful “inner circle” with positions in cross-corporate structures that 
shape national business interests and influence policy (Domhoff, 2006; Dye, 1995; Mills, 
1956; Useem, 1984; Useem & Karabel, 1986).  In this final chapter, I discuss key 
findings, suggest directions for further research generated by the results, and offer 




I begin my discussion by summarizing the descriptive results for the full sample, 
which add to prior research on top executive degree attainment patterns and degree 
sources. The multivariate results offer insight into the role that education plays in shaping 
the corporate elite, so I also summarize the types of postsecondary degrees that were 
associated with being a CEO, a multiple outside director, and a business association 
leader.  My discussion is especially attentive to the similarities and differences between 




Postsecondary Backgrounds of All Top Corporate Executives 
Degree attainment. 
 
These results contribute to the long line of executive educational profiles 
(summarized in Table 2.2) and update our understanding around the continuing trend of 
overall degree expansion in the U.S. population generally as well as this specific 
occupational sector. Allen’s (1978) study of directors indicated 63.9 percent had 
bachelor’s degrees in 1935, and 80.0 percent had bachelor’s degrees in 1970. Useem and 
Karabel found that 83.4 percent of corporate leaders in 1977 held at least a bachelor’s 
degree, and 44.6 percent had at least one graduate degree as well. In 2010, I determined 
98 percent of corporate leaders held a bachelor’s degree, and two thirds had at least one 
graduate degree (see Figure 5.1).  Returning to the study introduction, these findings 
underscore that Bill Gates, Michael Dell, and other famous college dropouts who have 
been wildly successful leading major corporate institutions are clear exceptions rather 
than the norm.   Anyone aspiring to a high level position in a Fortune 500 firm would be 









Together with prior studies, the descriptive findings pertaining to MBA 
attainment offer insight into the professional identity of business management as a field. 
Whether management is a profession has long been debated by business faculty and by 
sociologists (Abbott, 1988; Bowen, 1955; Keiser, 2004; Khurana & Nohria, 2008; 
Khurana, Nohria & Penrice, 2005). A defining feature of a profession is the possession 
and application of expert knowledge (Abbott, 1988), and the process of 
professionalization is to assert jurisdiction over that specific body of knowledge through 
a system of certification, most notably mandatory professional associations, educational 
requirements (e.g., MD for medical profession, JD for legal profession), codes of 
conduct, and licensures, and this certification establishes an implicit social contract. None 




formal requirement for entry.  Yet as these study results indicate, the MBA is prevalent 
among those at the top of the field and is increasingly accepted as a certifying device 
(Khurana, Nohria & Penrice, 2005). Not only did more executives possess an MBA 
compared to thirty years prior (36.1% versus 17.1%), I found CEOs were especially 
likely to have earned one (41.5%). These findings offer evidence for the continuing 
professionalization of the field, but certainly not definitive or sufficient proof to claim 
business is a profession.  
Why does it matter if an occupation is a profession? Khurana and Nohria (2008) 
assert an established profession is accorded high levels of public confidence, something 
large corporations have struggled with in recent years. Given the evidence here that many 
top executives do possess an MBA, business schools – along with accreditation groups 
such as the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business  – could take the lead 
in moving the field toward more acceptance as a profession and engender social trust by 
agreeing on consistent and publicly transparent standards to which their graduates should 
be held (for instance, explicitly incorporating a universal code of ethics or mandated 
ethics component into all programs47). To prepare future generations of executive leaders, 
such an effort would have to cut across all MBA programs and not be limited to the most 
elite schools.  If the comparisons from 1977 to 2010 are any indication, the proportion of 
top executives with MBA degrees from all programs, not just the top eleven, will expand 
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This leads to another question: are those in the top levels of corporations 
constrained to graduates of certain schools, a form of the “good old boys club,” or is any 
bachelor’s (or MBA or JD) degree sufficient?  My descriptive results suggest this is not 
an either/or proposition, as both alternatives are supported somewhat by these data. 
In a study of the hiring practices of elite professional services firms, Rivera (in 
press) found employers commonly screened resumes for educational credentials, seeking 
only those with what she characterized as “super-elite” university affiliations.  These 
were BA degrees from Harvard, Princeton, Yale and Stanford only, MBA degrees from 
Harvard, Stanford, and the University of Pennsylvania (Wharton) only, and JDs from 
Yale, Harvard, Columbia, and Stanford law schools only.  The companies studied here 
are much larger and have more open hiring practices at the lower levels of the 
organization than the firms studied by Rivera, but nonetheless it is interesting that my 
descriptive findings offer some credence to the role these schools might play in reaching 
the top of these major corporations as well. Rivera’s super-elite universities were in fact 
the four most common undergraduate alma maters for the full sample of executives. 
Though the schools were not as ubiquitous in this sample as in the elite private firms 
studied by Rivera, 9.5 percent of executives with bachelor’s degrees in this study 
graduated from one of these schools. For MBAs, the most common of the full sample of 
executives were Harvard (19.2%), Chicago (6.4%), Wharton (5.5%) and Stanford (5.0%), 
and for JDs, the most common were Harvard (14.7%), Columbia (5.4%), University of 
Virginia (5.1%), and Yale (4.3%). Chicago’s MBA program and Virginia’s law program 




Rivera.  How far the overrepresentation of these degrees extend down the organizational 
charts of Fortune 500 companies and whether they are used as screening devices at 
different promotion points is not answered by this study, but the consistency with 
Rivera’s results indicates super-elite credentials may also be valuable in larger corporate 
settings.  
Yet these same data might be interpreted quite differently.  While 9.5 percent of 
bachelor’s degrees were earned from four schools, obviously the other 90.5 percent were 
earned from 581 different schools.  Is this a change from the past; are degree sources 
comparatively more democratized?  Returning to the Useem and Karabel results, it is 
difficult to conclude that the proportion of executives earning a bachelor’s degree from a 
top eleven school declined from 1977 to 2010 although at first glance Figure 5.1 suggests 
this might be the case.  The proportion of executives with BAs only from a top college 
was 11.2 percent in 1977 and 2.7 percent in 2010, but perhaps more graduates of top 
bachelor’s programs in the 2010 sample continued on for further study.  I found that over 
80 percent of the executives who graduated from a top BA program go on to earn at least 
one graduate degree, in contrast to 60 percent of executives who earned their BAs from 
lesser programs. Useem and Karabel did not report the proportion of top BA graduates 
who continued to graduate study in their sample, so I am unsure as to whether today’s 
executives attended a more diverse array of undergraduate schools than in the past.  For 
business and law schools, however, this is definitely the case.  Overall, more executives 
today hold MBA degrees and while the number holding MBAs from top programs 
increased slightly since 1977, graduates of lower ranked programs increased substantially 




top school declined slightly (7.4% in 1977, 6.5% in 2010) while the proportion from a 
lower ranked school increased slightly (10.0% in 1977, 11.0% in 2010).  
Postsecondary Backgrounds of the Corporate Elite 
This study compared the postsecondary attainment of executives who were part of 
the corporate elite, in the highest positions of power, to that of other top executives.  An 
important point to reiterate is the sample does not represent all workers, so the results do 
not indicate the effect of a college degree globally.  The executives here were a very 
narrow slice of the labor force. If a larger range of workers were part of the sample, the 
relationships among the variables may be more pronounced. However, even within this 
sample, there were differences between executives who were part of the corporate elite 
and others who were in less powerful positions, though these underlying relationships 
proved to be complex – contingent upon how postsecondary attainment was defined, how 
the corporate elite was defined, and to whom they were compared. 
A technical point apparent in this study was the marked differences in results 
depending on the estimation technique, in contrast to Dey and Astin (1993), who found 
few substantive variations in the results of a probit, logit, and linear regression estimation 
on college student retention. My results add to the solid body of evidence supporting the 
use of logistic regression to estimate a binary outcome variable (Cabrera, 1994), and my 
discussion therefore concentrates on the logistic rather than linear results.  
Another observation related to the model specification is the results varied 
depending on whether I limited the sample to an internal labor market-type comparison 
or used the full group, especially for the CEO models. Multiple directors compared to 




the full sample together, and if being a CEO, a multiple director, or an association leader 
are substantially different types of corporate power, then including all of the executives in 
the analysis together is reasonable. The selection/ascension process to these positions is 
an under theorized aspect of power elite theory beyond asserting that the group is likely 
to share certain background characteristics (e.g., education) and be part of a small 
networked class.   However, the contrast of CEOs with other top internal executives is 
conceptually sound from an upper echelon theory standpoint, as these are often the 
internal candidates for promotion to the next (and highest) level of day-to-day firm 
management.  Outside directors have more diverse functional backgrounds. Although 
many are business executives themselves, leaders from other sectors such as university 
administrators, foundation presidents, former elected officials, and representatives of 
ethnic and racial minorities are common as well (Domhoff, 2009). 
Key results from the series of logistic regressions in the replication and 
refinement analyses are summarized in Figure 5.2.  The relationship between 
postsecondary education and membership in the corporate elite varied according to the 
three dependent variables representing the elite, suggesting that the processes underlying 





Summary of findings: Postsecondary predictors of membership in corporate elite 
 
 CEOsb Multiple 
Directorsc 
Assnd 
Study Replicationa     
  BA, lower ranked (Gourman)   – 
  BA, top ranked (Gourman)    
  MBA, lower ranked    
  MBA, top ranked    
  JD, lower ranked – –  
  JD, top ranked   + 
  Other graduate degree –  + 
Study Refinement    
  BA, top ranked (Barron’s)e + + + 
  MBA, lower ranked  +  
  MBA, top ranked + +  
  JD, lower ranked –   
  JD, top ranked  – + 
  Other graduate degree   + 
 
Note. A plus sign indicates a significant positive relationship, a negative sign indicates a significant 
negative relationship. No sign means the relationship was not significant at p<0.05 
a Summary is from Tables 4.14-4.16 of logistic regression results for the replication, not the OLS results.  
These estimates did not include controls for gender, race, or age. 
b The significant CEO results are from Table 4.17 – the contrast with other internal executives and the 
Block Two results, controlling for demographics. No significant postsecondary differences observed for 
contrasts with full sample in the refinement after controlling for demographics. 
c The significant multiple director results are from Table 4.18 - the contrast with full sample and the Block 
Two results controlling for demographics. The only differences in the contrast with single directors only 
was that the top JD coefficient was not significant. 
d The significant multiple director results are from Table 4.19 - the Block Two results controlling for 
demographics. 
e At least one contrast with the other types of BAs were significant.  BA top ranked was the reference group 
for all others. 
 
 
Useem and Karabel concluded a top MBA degree offered the same advantages as 
a bachelor’s degree alone from a top college or a top law degree.  Also, the executives in 
their study who held an MBA degree from a lesser-ranked program were no more likely 
to be in a powerful position than those without MBAs.  In 2010, MBA degrees played a 
more important and consistent role.  Not only were all executives more likely to have top 




MBAs (19.3% in 2010 compared to 3.0% in 1977), but also MBAs were associated with 
membership in the corporate elite.  I found association leaders were more likely to hold a 
top MBA degree than the rest of the sample, though this relationship lost significance 
after I refined the model specification. Yet even after controlling for demographics, 
multiple directors were more likely to have a top MBA, as were CEOs compared to other 
high-level non-director executives in their firms. 
There are several possibilities as to why a top MBA degree would be associated 
with advantages even at the very top of these major corporations that are opportunities for 
further inquiry.  It could be a function of the executives’ innate abilities; perhaps those 
admitted to top MBA programs were more intelligent or had higher incoming aptitudes 
for business. The Graduate Management Admissions Test (or GMAT, the standardized 
test required by most MBA programs) is incorporated into many MBA rankings, so it is 
reasonable to assume most alumni of elite programs performed well on the test.48 The 
data used here did not include any measures of cognitive ability, leadership traits, or other 
psychological characteristics, so I am unable to test whether the MBA variable remains 
significant with their inclusion, but this is an interesting direction for further inquiry.  
Along the same lines, perhaps elite MBA programs facilitate skill development in 
a way other programs do not. Bennis and O’Toole (2005) assert Ford and Carnegie 
foundation efforts as well as postwar demand for skilled managers improved the rigor 
and quality of top MBA program curricula beginning in the 1960s.  The executives in 
Useem and Karabel’s study may have predated this overhaul, but many of the executives 
in this study are of the generation that would have encountered these improvements.  
                                                 
48 It should be noted however, that whether the GMAT is a valid measure of the skillset necessary for 





Incidentally, elite MBA schools have come under criticism as of late for rewarding 
faculty research production with limited relevance to practitioners and overemphasizing 
analytical skill development and narrow functional specialization while losing focus on 
student learning of practice-based competencies, leadership preparation, or ethics training 
(Bennis & O’Toole, 2005; Mintzberg, 2004; Pfeffer & Fong, 2004; Schatz, 1997) – but 
pundits suggest these trends took hold in the 1990s, most likely after most of these 
executives completed their graduate training.  
Alternatively, certain MBA programs might socialize their students to pursue the 
types of positions studied here in a way other MBA programs or career experiences do 
not. Van Maanen (1983) compared the MBA student experience at MIT’s Sloan School 
of Management to Harvard Business School.  He found clear differences in the culture of 
each program and the types of careers students seemed to be socialized to enter, 
suggesting  
on average, Harvard graduates are more likely to find large Fortune 500 
companies attractive, especially those that emphasize managerial teamwork as the 
key to career advancement. MIT graduates are responsive to rewards claimed to 
be linked to individual performance. Teamwork and group-based management 
practices hold relatively little fascination for Sloan graduates…” (p. 447).   
 
The job placement statistics he examined and recruiter reports supported this assertion; 
Harvard graduates took positions with major corporations while MIT MBAs were more 
likely to work for smaller firms in more specialized positions.  Integrating more 
characteristics of the executives’ early careers into this dataset would permit me to test 
this hypothesis further.   
Finally, some sociologists argue elite MBA programs might function as an 




graduate students at an elite university, Schleef (2000) concluded their motivation to 
pursue the degrees was “not so much by an ardent interest or perceived aptitude in these 
fields, but by the need for credentials to remain in and to have the salary, prestige, and 
lifestyle of the upper middle class … for most, however, professional education was 
really about maintaining a possibly precarious class status” (p. 156). In this study, the 
measure of high social origins had a positive correlation with earning a BA from a 
Barron’s top tier school (r=0.160, p<0.001), a modest positive correlation with earning a 
top MBA degree (r=0.076, p<0.001) and a modest negative correlation with earning a 
lower ranked MBA degree (r=-0.043, p<0.01). However, my representation of social 
class was not nuanced enough to test this hypothesis in depth, and I was unable to assess 
the associations among upper middle class backgrounds, attendance at top schools, and 
entry into the corporate elite. 
Which of these hypotheses explains the significance of elite MBA degrees in 
corporate elite membership cannot be ascertained from my results.  In my review of the 
literature, I did not locate any research of the longer-term career impact of earning an 
MBA; most studies focus on job placement immediately after degree completion or on 
salary. Further research, perhaps interviews with executive search firms or directors who 
have been part of CEO searches in these major firms, would offer more insight into why I 
observed these patterns. 
Useem and Karabel (1986) found top law school graduates had the same odds of 
corporate elite membership as did top MBA graduates.  The authors suggested, “in the 
contemporary corporate environment, the legal and political capacities developed in law 




whatever the reason, graduation from a top law school provides an alternative pathway 
that is apparently as smooth as the more familiar route traveled by holders of top MBAs” 
(p. 196).  My findings indicated this was less true in 2010.  Holding a law degree from a 
top school was not significantly associated with being a CEO or multiple director, and in 
several cases, holding a law degree from a lesser-ranked law school had a negative 
relationship.   
Perhaps graduates of top law schools today do not want to work for corporations. 
Heinz and Lauman (1982) determined general corporate law ranked eighth out of thirty 
areas in prestige according to members of the Chicago bar, below securities, tax, antitrust 
defense, patents, antitrust plaintiffs, banking, and public utilities.  For many, the ideal job 
out of law school is with an elite law firm.  Not only are these organizations associated 
with the highest entry-level salaries, but they also reflect the sense of collective eminence 
and prestige cultivated through attendance at top law schools (Granfield & Koenig, 1992; 
Samuels, 2000).  However, elite law firms are also associated with high levels of turnover 
and burnout (Fortney, 2000). There is not much evidence considering longer-term career 
paths of top law graduates and whether they transition from these elite firms to corporate 
jobs, but regardless, the results here suggest any skills, abilities, or relationships 
exclusively developed in law school are not in high demand at the highest levels of 
corporations today.   
A notable exception, however, were the business association leaders. They 
represented 16.6 percent of top law graduates in the full 2010 sample (though only 8.8 
percent of the total executives), and the “top law” coefficient was positive and significant 




advising process is one of the foremost, explicitly stated roles of business association 
leaders. For example, in 2010 the Obama administration asked the Business Roundtable 
to provide a list of specific regulations that impeded domestic job creation (Williamson, 
2010). In contrast, the policy involvement of CEO and multiple director positions is more 
implicit. Perhaps the legal knowledge and legal connections that come from a top law 
program are more valuable in the association setting than the other powerful positions.  
Undergraduate Achievement and Involvement 
 
The study extension considered patterns in the undergraduate academic 
achievements and campus involvement of the corporate elite. Unless otherwise noted, the 
findings discussed here were all statistically significant at p<0.10 according to 
independent sample t-tests.  
Of all characteristics examined in the extension analysis, other scholars have 
given the most attention to business executives’ major. Frydman’s (2007) longitudinal 
study of top executives in the 50 largest corporations revealed a trend toward majoring in 
business fields and a decline in technical degrees in science or engineering. Some of this 
is a function of the growing popularity of business as a major generally.  According to 
Rukstad and Collis (2001), it is the largest single field among postsecondary students 
nationally, comprising 20 percent of bachelor’s degrees, 25 percent of master’s degrees 
and 3 percent of doctoral degrees.  At Yale, history is the most popular major but over the 
last decade economics – “the closest thing to an undergraduate business degree an 
anxious parent can find” (Goldstein, 2005, ¶6) – has replaced English as the second most 
popular. There is also some evidence that business majors are in demand from 




major service sector company had a significant relationship with majoring in business as 
an undergraduate. Majoring in engineering was significant only for a cohort who entered 
the firm in 1972 but not one who entered in 1982. 
In this study of top executives, no one undergraduate major dominated.  
Executives were split relatively evenly among engineering, liberal arts & humanities, 
business, economics, and the social sciences.49 I did not find statistically significant 
differences in CEOs’ majors compared to the full sample or to internal senior managers 
only.  However, for multiple directors, a background in business was less common than 
the rest of the sample and than single directors only, while more multiple directors 
majored in engineering. Wise (1975) and more recently Spilerman and Lunde (1991) 
each found that majoring in math/science or engineering increased workers’ promotion 
rates. Spilerman and Lunde suggested these fields may proxy intellect or they develop 
specific analytic skills that translate to success in the middle levels of a corporation, the 
primary focus of their analysis.  Useem’s survey of managers supports this latter 
hypothesis; he found those with liberal arts majors felt underprepared in terms of their 
quantitative and technical skills, although they felt better prepared in their leadership 
abilities and appreciation for ethical issues. Alternatively, according to signaling theory, 
directors with an engineering background might indicate to Wall Street and other 
investors that a company’s board members are especially intelligent and hard workers so 
these individuals might be more in demand across multiple corporations. Testing whether 
major investors do have perceptions about educational background that affect their views 
                                                 
49 An important caveat that I also mentioned in the Results chapter is not all of the schools studied here 
permit undergraduates to major in business (see Appendix G).  This is something other researchers should 





of a firm’s potential and their investing behavior, as well as whether companies consider 
these characteristics in director selection (as upper echelon theory assumes), would be 
interesting directions for further research.  Also, certain firms may value some content 
backgrounds more than other content backgrounds (Useem, 1989). A direction for further 
analyses with these CEO and director data would be to examine variations in major as 
well as the other graduate degree fields besides MBAs and JDs according to the 
company’s industry. 
However, Spilerman and Lunde (1991) asserted that,  “in the highest corporate 
ranks the dominant activities are policy formulation, negotiation with external actors, and 
alliance building. A background in humanities or the social sciences would appear 
beneficial for these tasks” (p. 696), although they did not test this hypothesis. I found that 
more association leaders majored in liberal arts & humanities and fewer were engineering 
compared to the rest of the sample (also fewer in business, although that did not reach 
significance). In a study of Stanford University graduates, Katchadourian and Boli (1994) 
found that those who became lawyers reported they possessed a broader array of liberal 
arts/humanities competencies than any other occupational group.  Coupled with my 
finding from the refinement analysis that association leaders were more likely to have a 
top ranked JD, perhaps certain communication skills honed in the liberal arts disciplines 
as well as in law school (e.g., the ability to construct persuasive arguments) are especially 
useful for association leaders’ work lobbying policymakers. Although CEO and multiple 
directors engage with policymakers too, it is not the only major responsibility of their 




their tenure depends in a large part on stock performance, profits, and other company-
specific metrics.  
 Association leaders stood out from the rest on my other dimensions of academic 
achievements as well.  There were more national scholars and recipients of campus 
academic awards in this group compared to the rest of the sample. No differences existed 
for multiple directors in terms of academic awards, and CEOs actually had significantly 
lower average campus academic awards than the rest of the full sample. Perhaps there is a 
meritocratic dimension in the selection of the business association leaders, since even 
within a population of very smart people (at least by virtue of their educational 
attainment), those who were recognized for their intellectual abilities in college 
comprised a higher proportion of these elite organizations.  
  Also, association leaders held more campus leadership positions than the others.  
Of the different executive roles considered here, leading a business association is perhaps 
most similar to an undergraduate leader, in that each is selected to publicly represent their 
peers (albeit on a quite different scale).  In contrast, CEOs are selected to lead an 
organization, and outside directors are selected to represent the interests of stockholders. 
The type of individual who is drawn to run for an undergraduate office and has the 
personal characteristics to get elected might be more likely to pursue and be selected for 
similar opportunities throughout his professional career. 
While not any more likely to be in campus leadership positions, I found that 
CEOs were more likely to be a varsity athlete.  Shulman and Bowen’s (2001) study of 30 
colleges and universities revealed that among male athletes who entered college in 1976, 




other students.  More specifically, 24 percent of the athletes were executives, compared 
to 19 percent of students at large.  Although Shulman and Bowen did not conduct fine-
grained analyses of the executives’ positions, their findings corroborate mine. I also 
determined CEOs were more likely to be in campus media organizations, which is 
interesting since a major corporate leadership position is not the most expected career 
outcome associated with journalists.  The communication skillset reflected by this type of 
involvement, however, is perhaps especially useful for someone who is often in the 
public eye and speaks for the company to stockholders, the board, and the community at 
large. 
For undergraduate involvement, one of the common variables across the groups 
were the elite student societies.  Of the graduates from the four schools that had these for 
upperclassmen, association leaders and multiple directors were more likely to be 
members, and the same was true for CEOs though not significant.  The relationships 
formed in those societies are probably not directly affecting whether someone reaches 
one of these powerful positions, but at the least this evidence suggests the types of people 
who gain entry to elite undergraduate organizations have qualities that make them 
attractive (or attracted) to similar rarefied elite circles in the corporate world.  Power elite 
scholars highlight the close connections between the corporate elite and membership in 
prestigious private clubs, a famous example being the Bohemian Grove in California 
(Domhoff, 1974b; Wehr, 1994). Such clubs help establish the social cohesion of this class 
(Wehr, 1994), and elite undergraduate societies are similarly cohesive (Robbins, 2002).  
With the exception of the athlete studies, there is little evidence on how 




large (Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005). As bachelor’s degrees become universal across the 
population, it follows that activities during college might become more important to 
employers trying to discern among equally credentialed applicants. The executives 
studied here graduated from college over 40 years ago on average; whether my findings 
about their involvement will persist in younger generations is uncertain. 
Implications for Theory 
 
This study drew from three theory bases – status attainment, upper echelon, and 
power elite – and contributes to our understanding of each as well as directions for 
further inquiry. 
Status Attainment 
Guided by the assumption that “modern American elites are defined primarily by 
their occupational position” (Lerner, Nagai & Rothman, 1996, p. 11), the status 
attainment tradition focuses on the relative prestige associated with a given occupation as 
a life outcome (Blau & Duncan, 1967; Hodge, 2001; Nakao & Treas, 1989; Siegel, 
1971). To represent occupational status, researchers traditionally use a continuous scale 
with all occupations assigned a ranking relative to one another, but this does not offer an 
explanation as to how inequality develops because the distinctions among groups are 
unclear (Hauser & Warren, 1997; Sorensen, 2001; Wright & Perrone, 1977; Zhou, 2005).  
Also, determining how an individual might move from a lower to higher status over his 
life course is confusing, because most of the rankings are impractical for understanding 
movement (e.g., an individual rarely moves from lawyer, which is a 75 in the Nakao and 
Treas, 1989 prestige ratings, to physician, which is an 86). Most contemporary 




disaggregate occupations into discrete groups (Kerckhoff, 1995, 1999), and this study 
illustrates how differences in individuals’ backgrounds do exist even when contrasts of 
status levels are very refined.  The model comparing CEOs to other top internal senior 
managers could be thought of as a comparison of one discrete level of occupational status 
to another.  Few studies follow this approach and examine whether education comes into 
play for finer grained status distinctions within an occupational sector, profession, or 
specific firm – for instance, law firm practicing partners compared to managing partners; 
or investment bank employees who are hedge fund managers (high status) compared to 
those who manage bank operations or compliance (lower status).   
 A major contribution of status attainment scholarship is documenting the critical 
role of education in socioeconomic achievements.  In fact, Baker (in press) makes the 
bold claim that “educational attainment of diplomas and their use in the labor market 
have come to replace all traditional forms of status attainment, and for most in 
postindustrial society the educational credential is the only path to adult status.” (p. 11).  
However, beginning in the 1980s, social scientists paid comparably more attention to 
understanding how education affects income (and reduces poverty) rather than status 
(Hauser & Warren, 1997). The comprehensive reviews conducted by Pascarella and 
Terenzini (1993, 2005) of research published in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s suggest a 
paucity of studies examine the relationship between different colleges and occupational 
attainment.  Those that exist often use education as a control, without focusing on what 
types or levels of education are relatively more important in causing high status 
outcomes. Yet as the findings here demonstrate, there is a clear connection between 




As this study and others (Rivera, in press) establish, more fine-grained distinctions 
among degrees are needed in the status attainment tradition, especially as more people 
earn graduate level credentials that are qualitatively distinct though quantitatively 
identical.  Also, the extension results offered preliminary evidence that within college 
differences, or individuals’ academic achievements and campus involvement, may 
distinguish those who ascend to highest status positions. Testing these relationships in 
other status contexts is an important direction for further research. 
Upper Echelon   
The top management team’s education is assumed to be an important factor in 
selection and in firm outcomes, but evidence is scant as to what educational 
characteristics are in demand and why they matter. This study offers insight into the 
former (see Figure 5.2). 
For CEOs, the internal labor market contrast was important. There were not any 
differences in their postsecondary backgrounds when directors were included in the 
comparison group.  However, when CEOs were compared to non-director top executives 
only, several differences in their postsecondary histories emerged.  Removing outside 
directors from the analysis is consistent with upper echelon theory because outside 
directors are a more diverse group – their backgrounds, ages, and current positions do not 
situate them to assume a CEO position as well as internal senior managers (Vancil, 
1987). Studies of CEO succession often use inside directors as part of their sample but 
not outside directors (e.g., Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003).  Therefore, these results speak 
directly to the internal labor market of Fortune 500 firms and offers evidence that even at 




below on the organizational chart. CEOs were more likely than other internal executives 
to have a top ranked MBA, and CEOs were less likely than other internal executives to 
have a lower ranked JD or another graduate degree.    
When I compared multiple outside directors to single outside directors only, there 
were not any significant differences in terms of postsecondary credentials.  This indicates 
the kinds of skills, relationships, or other qualities represented by postsecondary degrees 
do not, on average, facilitate an individual’s likelihood of being involved in networks of 
ties across several corporations as opposed to a single outside tie.  However, multiple 
directors were different than the full sample of executives, in that they were more likely 
to have any type of MBA but less likely to have a JD. 
A definite direction for further research would be to incorporate firm data with 
the executive data. What are the implications of these degree patterns for organizational 
outcomes including corporate performance? Do companies led by prestigious MBA 
graduates perform better or pursue different strategies than other companies whose top 
leaders did not have this type of (assumed) expert technical classroom-based learning 
experience?   
Also, how do variables not included here but hypothesized to be important from 
an upper echelon standpoint mediate the relationship between educational background 
and top management team selection (illustrated in Figure A2)? For instance, a firm’s 
organizational characteristics such as industry probably affect the demand for certain 
types of backgrounds (Bassiry & Dekmejian, 1990). Or perhaps there is a connection 
between the geographic proximity of a firm’s main offices to an executive’s alma mater, 




relocate to “flyover” country compared to someone who graduated from a school in that 
region  (Rivera, in press)? Board characteristics are another possible mediator.  What is 
the likelihood that CEOs’ credentials and board members’ credentials will match with 
one another, perhaps reflecting homophilic tendencies based on postsecondary affiliations 
for “birds of a feather to flock together?” (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook, 2001). 
Westphal and Zajac (1995) assessed similarities in the level of attainment for CEOs and 
boards, but there is not any information about degree source patterns. 
Power Elite 
 Much has changed within the broad contours of American society and American 
business since Useem and Karabel’s study. The population as a whole is more educated; 
women and people of color have made inroads into management positions that were 
exclusive to white males; technology has evolved at a rapid rate; decline in U.S.-based 
manufacturing has been accompanied by growth in the service sector; and economic 
competition is at a global rather than national scale. Yet their study still stands in the 
power elite tradition as definitive evidence for the postsecondary preparation of the most 
powerful business leaders, so the updates in the present study are a direct contribution to 
this literature base.      
These results indicate that the corporate elite were less concentrated in prestigious 
undergraduate schools, especially Harvard, Princeton and Yale, in 2010 compared to 
1977, though they were certainly still more likely to have attended these top schools than 
the average American.  The corporate elite were more likely to have attended graduate 
school in 2010, and in several cases a degree from a top MBA program was specifically 




executives, therefore, were no longer apparent at the BA level but only at the graduate 
level.  In several cases, directly opposite to the 1977 results, I observed a negative 
relationship between possessing a JD and being in the most powerful positions. This 
finding should not be interpreted as suggesting these degrees are worthless (or even 
worse, have negative worth)! They probably facilitate entry and promotions at lower 
levels of the firms – but when it comes to the transition to the highest position of internal 
status, power, and leadership these results indicate that law degrees and other graduate 
degrees besides an MBA do not proxy or signal the types of skills, traits, abilities, or 
networks that facilitate acquisition of power at the top levels of business. 
Most power elite theorists today agree that the class cohesion of the corporate 
elite is not a function of social reproduction or origins in a national patrician class as it 
was in the time of Mills, Baltzell, or even Useem and Karabel (Domhoff, 2009).  To 
support this, I found there were considerably fewer executives from this background in 
2010 (3.1%) compared to 1977 (9.8%). Yet those in powerful positions were still more 
likely to come from a highly privileged background, though the overall N’s were small. 
In the logistic estimate controlling for other demographics and postsecondary attainment, 
CEOs were 130 percent more likely to be from upper class origins than other top senior 
managers in their firms.  Business association leaders were also more likely to be from 
this background according to the OLS model, but once the estimates were refined, the 
significance disappeared. These numbers are still very small, and the study would benefit 
from additional variables representing family background, such as whether the 
executive’s father was also a business executive or whether the company the executive 




Another direction for further research using this theoretical base would be to 
extend beyond business to other spheres where power is desired and fought for.  The 
power elite is defined in terms of key political and economic institutions50 that are 
interlocked to ensure major decisions are communicated and coordinated (Domhoff, 
1974a; Domhoff, 2009; Mills, 1956). Those political institutions include the federal 
government as well as foundations, think tanks, and policy-discussion groups (Domhoff, 
2009). Little is known about the role of higher education in shaping the careers of these 
leaders. Dye (1995) descriptively summarized the postsecondary backgrounds of top 
Clinton cabinet members and not surprisingly, many had a legal background, but we do 
not know whether systematic patterns exist in the backgrounds of those in relatively more 
powerful positions compared to less powerful positions (e.g., those who win elections 
versus those who lose elections, federal judges in lower level courts versus upper level 
courts).  The 2010 confirmation of Elena Kagan for the U.S. Supreme Court triggered a 
rush of commentary (and some backlash) about the fact that all of the justices were 
graduates of either Harvard or Yale law schools (e.g., Edley, 2010).  Beyond such 
anecdotes, the prevalence of alma maters is unknown, so too is whether powerful 
politicians gain early practice through their undergraduate college experiences.  One of 
the executives in this study was Richard Gephardt, a former U.S. senator who was on the 
boards of Ford Motor Company, CenturyTel, United States Steel, and Centene as well as 
a member of the Business Roundtable and the Committee on Economic Development. 
                                                 
50 According to the classic power elite perspective proposed by Mills in 1956, power in American society is 
concentrated in three areas: the economy, politics, and the military. Soon after Mills published his work, 
power elite scholars observed that the military’s role diminished after World War II and was not equal in 
standing to that of corporations or the political directorate (Domhoff, 2006b). In addition, areas that may be 
power centers in other societies, such as families, religions, or schools, do not generate or shape national-





Gephardt attended Northwestern, was student body president, a member of the 
Norleggama and Deru student societies, and held more campus leadership positions than 
any other Northwestern alumni in the sample.  His undergraduate accomplishments were 
more similar to others in the corporate elite than other top executives with comparatively 
less power; is the same true in the political arena? 
Implications for Policy & Practice 
 
Most of the elites studied here were highly educated, which implies they value 
education (or at least they valued it for themselves). Corporate leaders often talk about 
the need for an educated workforce.  The Business Roundtable, for instance, has an 
Education, Innovation and Workforce Initiative that advocates for improved training, 
professional skill development, and lifelong learning in the workforce.  A major 
recommendation from the Commission on the Future of Higher Education convened by 
U.S. Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings in 2006 was that American colleges and 
universities must better develop transferable workforce skills to meet the labor market 
needs. In addition to professors, university presidents/for-profit education CEOs, and 
foundation representatives, among the 18 Commission members were Richard Stephens 
of The Boeing Company, Nicholas Donofrio of IBM and Gerri Elliott of Microsoft. The 
Commission’s final report was viewed by many academics, agencies, associations, and 
journalists as representing the predominant corporate opinion on the state of U.S. higher 
education (Ruben, Lewis & Sandmeyer, n.d.)  
Whether and how that sort of rhetoric translates to action on their part in terms of 
promoting educational attainment is unclear. Does the almost universally high level of 




practices that value education?   Companies are, of course, profit-driven and there is at 
least some evidence that corporate policies valuing education may benefit the bottom 
line.  One example is United Parcel Service’s Metropolitan College program in 
Kentucky.  Experiencing high levels of turnover among employees at its international 
hub, UPS began to offer tuition remission at a local community college and the 
University of Louisville. According to its website, the annual turnover rate for new UPS 
hires went from 100 percent in 1998 to 20 percent, generating what the company 
characterized as a 600 percent return on investment in its students. What prompts some 
executives like those at UPS to translate the rhetoric around an educated workforce into 
practice while other executives do not?  
Focusing more closely on specific degree types and sources, many of the most 
powerful in corporate America hold MBAs from a small number of programs.  These 
leaders are positioned to influence their organizational workforce education policy.  
Useem (1989) studied internal corporate cultures around education and found a) chief 
executives were very influential in defining their companies’ educational cultures and 
recruitment policies/preferences (e.g, liberal arts, technical fields, MBAs), and b) clear 
differences exist in educational cultures across corporations in terms of what is valued.   
Power elite theory would suggest that leaders also indirectly influence policies of other 
corporations, through the business associations and other more informal channels like 
multiple directorships. How can the types of policies like UPS’s be encouraged more 
broadly; more specifically, where this study concerned, is there a way to integrate these 
into curriculum in MBA or executive education programs that, as this study 




What do we know about the curriculum, content, and underlying moral principles 
of MBA programs? Are top programs truly providing the “best” training in graduate level 
business?  Do they differ in the technical knowledge - the business practices and 
strategies - imparted?  What about the values emphasized? Evans, Trevino and Weaver 
(2006) studied over 200 MBA programs and found a positive association between 
admissions selectivity and requirement of an ethics course as well as the prevalence of 
ethics requirements in the curriculum.  However, the linkages between the educational 
content of certain programs and how/whether they ultimately shape the policies of the 
corporate elite is uncertain.  In a 2010 New York Times editorial, David Brooks contended 
that ascending to a position of power in America’s major political and corporate 
institutions has become more meritocratic over the past century, but these institutions 
have worse reputations today than in the past when they were run by “blue bloods.”  
Since these top MBA programs are at least part of the basis for this perceived 
meritocracy, are there ways by which they could restore some of this lost trust as they 
prepare future corporate leaders? 
Agenda for Further Research 
 
Given the myriad findings of this study, several questions are especially 
interesting lines of inquiry for further research. First, given the discussion above, how do 
MBA degrees create advantages? What are the underlying causal processes that reward 
executives who graduate from, for example, Harvard Business School? To what degree 
do the signaling/screening, acquisition of knowledge and skills or formation of networks 
and relationships explanations hold? Does it depend on the MBA program attended, on 




school’s executive MBA and non-degree advanced management programs similar to a 
traditional MBA degree? Does it depend on how “elite schools” are defined? While some 
schools consistently rank among the top, the placement of other schools varies quite a bit 
depending on the ranking schema. Employing a qualitative lens would be beneficial to 
study these questions, gathering data from the executives themselves in relation to their 
own experiences, data from those who sit on boards that select other leaders, or perhaps 
faculty from top business schools responsible for preparing these leaders. 
In addition, to what extent are postsecondary degrees from top universities or 
graduate programs associated with successful careers outside of the major corporations 
that were the focus here?  As I observed in my review of the literature, the occupational 
outcomes associated with postsecondary degrees are under-studied.  Whether and why 
pathways exist between specific undergraduate or graduate institutions and specific 
career directions is unclear.  These results support further inquiry into nuanced 
distinctions among different occupational groups that might be more informative in 
practice compared to global occupational prestige measures. For example, plastic surgery 
and dermatology are among the most competitive medical specialties for prospective 
doctors (National Resident Matching Program, 2009). How and why do a prospective 
doctor’s postsecondary choices, undergraduate institution and/or medical school, affect 
her odds of pursuing and being admitted to these most competitive specializations 
compared to less competitive ones, such as internal medicine?  
Another related direction for further research is: to what extent are undergraduate 
experiences and involvement associated with other types of career outcomes?  My 




labor market screens for degrees themselves and also for within-college 
accomplishments.  However, our studies are specific to elite contexts.  The connections 
between academic and extracurricular activities and other career pathways are under-
studied, but the evidence here offers reason to believe they might exist.   Business is, of 
course, only one of many careers that college graduates pursue.  How are patterns of 
involvement connected to other fields that have varying levels of expectations around the 
competencies, skills, and personalities of successful employees? Also, we do not have a 
good understanding of how these processes play out from the student’s perspective. Do 
their choices of extracurricular activities and associated accomplishments shape their 
decisions around specific jobs and firms to which they apply?  Or is the causal direction 
reversed; do students have a clear career path in mind and strategically select activities 
that will position them for the future? How can colleges better assist this occupational 
decision in terms of matching students with out-of-class opportunities?  
Conclusion 
 
Although the findings raise many questions for further research, what does this 
study contribute that was not known already? Useem and Karabel’s (1986) study is still 
cited today (e.g., McDonald & Westphal, 2010; Mullen, 2010), but many of their findings 
no longer hold.  There has been an expansion in the number and types of degrees earned 
by top executives, such that a bachelor’s degree is virtually universal, as well as a 
democratization of undergraduate sources.  Earning only a bachelor’s degree from a top 
university is no longer associated with membership in the corporate elite. Focusing more 
closely on executives’ undergraduate experiences rather than their alma maters alone, 




successful and powerful. Variations also exist in the types and sources of graduate 
degrees possessed by the corporate elite compared to other top executives. CEOs today 
are less likely to hold any type of law degree, although business association leaders are 
more likely to have JDs and more specifically top ranked JDs.  As in 1977, MBA degrees 
continue to distinguish those in top positions of corporate power from their colleagues.  
I approached this study with the lens of a higher education researcher. Although 
informative to the fields of sociology and organizational studies, it offers a unique 
contribution to higher education, where consideration of socioeconomic effects 
associated with college mostly focus on income.  Far less frequent are studies of 
occupation, and the idea of power as a theoretically distinct college outcome has not 
received attention in the field of higher education. Yet modern American society is 
stratified in a way that concentrates a disproportionate amount of power under the control 
of a small group in the top tier of the social hierarchy. The leaders of large corporations 
are among those who wield a disproportionate amount of public influence, through their 
oversight of vast amounts of resources, financial capital, and hundreds of thousands of 
employees as well as engagement in national policy decisions pertaining to business.  
This study suggests higher education does play a role in the acquisition of power and also 
indicates a number of directions for further inquiry into the complex tasks of parsing out 
















































































Sample Rank Company Major SIC 
*  1 Wal-Mart Stores Retail Trade 
* * 2 Exxon Mobil Manufacturing 
*  3 Chevron Manufacturing 
  * 4 General Electric Nonclassifiable Establishments 
*  5 Bank of America Corp. Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
* * 6 ConocoPhillips Manufacturing 
* * 7 AT&T Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
* * 8 Ford Motor Manufacturing 
* * 9 J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  10 Hewlett-Packard Manufacturing 
   11 Berkshire Hathaway Nonclassifiable Establishments 
* * 12 Citigroup Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  13 Verizon Communications Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  14 McKesson Wholesale Trade 
* * 15 General Motors Manufacturing 
*  16 American International Group Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  17 Cardinal Health Wholesale Trade 
*  18 CVS Caremark Retail Trade 
* * 19 Wells Fargo Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
* * 20 International Business Machines Service Industries 
*  21 UnitedHealth Group Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
* * 22 Procter & Gamble Manufacturing 
*  23 Kroger Retail Trade 
*  24 AmerisourceBergen Wholesale Trade 
*  25 Costco Wholesale Retail Trade 
*  26 Valero Energy Manufacturing 
*  27 Archer Daniels Midland Manufacturing 
* * 28 Boeing Manufacturing 
*  29 Home Depot Retail Trade 
*  30 Target Retail Trade 
*  31 WellPoint Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  32 Walgreen Retail Trade 
*  33 Johnson & Johnson Manufacturing 
*  34 State Farm Insurance Cos. Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  35 Medco Health Solutions Retail Trade 
*  36 Microsoft Service Industries 
* * 37 United Technologies Manufacturing 
*  38 Dell Manufacturing 
*  39 Goldman Sachs Group Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  40 Pfizer Manufacturing 
* * 41 Marathon Oil Manufacturing 
*  42 Lowe's Retail Trade 
* * 43 United Parcel Service Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  44 Lockheed Martin Manufacturing 




* * 46 Dow Chemical Manufacturing 
*  47 Supervalu Retail Trade 
* * 48 Sears Holdings Retail Trade 
*  49 International Assets Holding Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  50 PepsiCo Manufacturing 
*  51 MetLife Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
* * 52 Safeway Retail Trade 
* * 53 Kraft Foods Manufacturing 
*  54 Freddie Mac Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  55 Sysco Wholesale Trade 
*  56 Apple Manufacturing 
*  57 Walt Disney Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  58 Cisco Systems Manufacturing 
*  59 Comcast Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  60 FedEx Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  61 Northrop Grumman Manufacturing 
*  62 Intel Manufacturing 
* * 63 Aetna Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
* * 64 New York Life Insurance Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
* * 65 Prudential Financial Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
* * 66 Caterpillar Manufacturing 
*  67 Sprint Nextel Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  68 Allstate Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  69 General Dynamics Manufacturing 
*  70 Morgan Stanley Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  71 Liberty Mutual Insurance Group Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  72 Coca-Cola Manufacturing 
*  73 Humana Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  74 Honeywell International Manufacturing 
*  75 Abbott Laboratories Manufacturing 
*  76 News Corp. Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  77 HCA Service Industries 
*  78 Sunoco Manufacturing 
* * 79 Hess Manufacturing 
*  80 Ingram Micro Wholesale Trade 
*  81 Fannie Mae Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  82 Time Warner Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
* * 83 Johnson Controls Manufacturing 
*  84 Delta Air Lines Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  85 Merck Manufacturing 
* * 86 DuPont Manufacturing 
*  87 Tyson Foods Manufacturing 
* * 88 American Express Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  89 Rite Aid Retail Trade 
*  90 TIAA-CREF Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  91 CHS Wholesale Trade 
*  92 Enterprise GP Holdings Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
* * 93 Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 




*  95 Raytheon Manufacturing 
*  96 Express Scripts Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  97 Hartford Financial Services Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
* * 98 Travelers Cos. Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  99 Publix Super Markets Retail Trade 
   100 Amazon.com Retail Trade 
   101 Staples Retail Trade 
*  102 Google Service Industries 
   103 Macy's Retail Trade 
* * 104 International Paper Manufacturing 
*  105 Oracle Service Industries 
*  106 3M Manufacturing 
* * 107 Deere Manufacturing 
   108 McDonald's Retail Trade 
*  109 Tech Data Wholesale Trade 
*  110 Motorola Manufacturing 
   111 Fluor Construction 
*  112 Eli Lilly Manufacturing 
*  113 Coca-Cola Enterprises Manufacturing 
*  114 Bristol-Myers Squibb Manufacturing 
* * 115 Northwestern Mutual Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  116 DirecTV Group Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  117 Emerson Electric Manufacturing 
* * 118 Nationwide Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   119 TJX Retail Trade 
* * 120 AMR (American Airlines) Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
* * 121 U.S. Bancorp Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   122 GMAC Nonclassifiable Establishments 
* * 123 PNC Financial Services Group Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  124 Nike Manufacturing 
*  125 Murphy Oil Manufacturing 
*  126 Kimberly-Clark Manufacturing 
*  127 Alcoa Manufacturing 
*  128 Plains All American Pipeline Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   129 Cigna Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   130 AFLAC Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  131 Time Warner Cable Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   132 United Services Auto. Assn. Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
  * 133 J.C. Penney Retail Trade 
*  134 Exelon Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   135 Kohl's Retail Trade 
*  136 Whirlpool Manufacturing 
* * 137 Altria Group (Phillip Morris) Manufacturing 
*  138 Computer Sciences Service Industries 
*  139 Tesoro Manufacturing 
* * 140 UAL Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
* * 141 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Manufacturing 
*  142 Avnet Wholesale Trade 




   144 Capital One Financial Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
* * 145 Southern Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   146 Health Net Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  147 FPL Group Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  148 L-3 Communications Manufacturing 
*  149 Constellation Energy Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
  * 150 Occidental Petroleum Mining 
* * 151 Colgate-Palmolive Manufacturing 
* * 152 Xerox Manufacturing 
*  153 Dominion Resources Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   154 Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Mining 
*  155 General Mills Manufacturing 
*  156 AES Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  157 Arrow Electronics Wholesale Trade 
   158 Halliburton Mining 
*  159 Amgen Manufacturing 
*  160 Medtronic Manufacturing 
   161 Progressive Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   162 Gap Retail Trade 
*  163 Smithfield Foods Manufacturing 
* * 164 Union Pacific Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
  * 165 Loews Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  166 EMC Manufacturing 
~ * 167 Burlington Northern Santa Fe Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  168 Coventry Health Care Service Industries 
*  169 Illinois Tool Works Manufacturing 
*  170 Viacom Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   171 Toys "R" Us Retail Trade 
* * 172 American Electric Power Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
* * 173 PG&E Corp. Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  174 Pepsi Bottling Manufacturing 
*  175 Consolidated Edison Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   176 Chubb Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  177 CBS Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  178 ConAgra Foods Manufacturing 
*  179 FirstEnergy Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  180 Sara Lee Manufacturing 
   181 Duke Energy Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  182 National Oilwell Varco Manufacturing 
  * 183 Continental Airlines Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  184 Kellogg Manufacturing 
*  185 Baxter International Manufacturing 
   186 Public Service Enterprise Group Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   187 Edison International Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   188 Qwest Communications Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   189 Aramark Retail Trade 
*  190 PPG Industries Manufacturing 
*  191 Community Health Systems Service Industries 




   193 KBR Construction 
*  194 Eaton Manufacturing 
   195 Dollar General Retail Trade 
   196 Waste Management Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
  * 197 Monsanto Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 
*  198 Omnicom Group Service Industries 
*  199 Jabil Circuit Manufacturing 
   200 DISH Network Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  201 TRW Automotive Holdings Manufacturing 
*  202 Navistar International Manufacturing 
   203 Jacobs Engineering Group Construction 
~ * 204 Sun Microsystems Manufacturing 
*  205 World Fuel Services Wholesale Trade 
*  206 Nucor Manufacturing 
*  207 Danaher Manufacturing 
*  208 Dean Foods Manufacturing 
   209 Oneok Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   210 Liberty Global Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
* * 211 United States Steel Manufacturing 
   212 AutoNation Retail Trade 
   213 Marriott International Service Industries 
*  214 ITT Manufacturing 
   215 SAIC Service Industries 
   216 Yum Brands Retail Trade 
   217 BB&T Corp. Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  218 Cummins Manufacturing 
   219 Entergy Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  220 Textron Manufacturing 
   221 Marsh & McLennan Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   222 US Airways Group Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  223 Texas Instruments Manufacturing 
   224 SunTrust Banks Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  225 Qualcomm Manufacturing 
*  226 Land O'Lakes Manufacturing 
   227 Liberty Media Retail Trade 
*  228 Avon Products Manufacturing 
   229 Southwest Airlines Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  230 Parker Hannifin Manufacturing 
*  231 Mosaic Manufacturing 
*  232 BJ's Wholesale Club Retail Trade 
*  233 H.J. Heinz Manufacturing 
*  234 Thermo Fisher Scientific Manufacturing 
   235 Unum Group Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   236 Genuine Parts Wholesale Trade 
   237 Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   238 Peter Kiewit Sons' Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   239 Progress Energy Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  240 R.R. Donnelley & Sons Manufacturing 




*  242 Lear Manufacturing 
*  243 Baker Hughes Manufacturing 
   244 Xcel Energy Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  245 Penske Automotive Group Retail Trade 
   246 Energy Future Holdings Nonclassifiable Establishments 
* * 247 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Retail Trade 
   248 Fifth Third Bancorp Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   249 State Street Corp. Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   250 First Data Service Industries 
   251 Pepco Holdings Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   252 URS Service Industries 
   253 Tenet Healthcare Service Industries 
   254 Regions Financial Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  255 GameStop Retail Trade 
  * 256 Lincoln National Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   257 Genworth Financial Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   258 XTO Energy Mining 
   259 CSX Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   260 Anadarko Petroleum Mining 
   261 Devon Energy Mining 
*  262 Praxair Manufacturing 
   263 NRG Energy Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   264 Harrah's Entertainment Service Industries 
   265 Automatic Data Processing Service Industries 
   266 Principal Financial Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   267 eBay Service Industries 
   268 Assurant Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  269 Limited Brands Retail Trade 
*  270 Nordstrom Retail Trade 
   271 Apache Mining 
* * 272 Reynolds American Manufacturing 
*  273 Air Products & Chemicals Manufacturing 
* * 274 Bank of New York Mellon Corp. Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   275 CenterPoint Energy Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   276 Williams Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  277 Smith International Manufacturing 
*  278 Republic Services Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  279 Boston Scientific Manufacturing 
   280 Ashland Wholesale Trade 
*  280 Sempra Energy Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  282 Paccar Manufacturing 
   283 Owens & Minor Wholesale Trade 
*  284 Whole Foods Market Retail Trade 
*  285 DTE Energy Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  286 Discover Financial Services Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  287 Norfolk Southern Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  288 Ameriprise Financial Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  289 Crown Holdings Manufacturing 




*  291 Masco Manufacturing 
*  292 Cablevision Systems Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  293 Huntsman Manufacturing 
   294 Synnex Wholesale Trade 
   295 Newmont Mining Mining 
   296 Chesapeake Energy Mining 
* * 297 Eastman Kodak Manufacturing 
*  298 Aon Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
*  299 Campbell Soup Manufacturing 
*  300 PPL Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  301 C.H. Robinson Worldwide Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  302 Integrys Energy Group Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   303 Quest Diagnostics Service Industries 
*  304 Western Digital Manufacturing 
*  305 Family Dollar Stores Retail Trade 
*  306 Winn-Dixie Stores Retail Trade 
*  307 Ball Manufacturing 
*  308 Estée Lauder Manufacturing 
   309 Shaw Group Service Industries 
*  310 VF Manufacturing 
   311 Darden Restaurants Retail Trade 
   312 Becton Dickinson Manufacturing 
   313 OfficeMax Wholesale Trade 
   314 Bed Bath & Beyond Retail Trade 
*  315 Kinder Morgan Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   316 Ross Stores Retail Trade 
   317 Pilgrim's Pride Manufacturing 
   318 Hertz Global Holdings Service Industries 
   319 Sherwin-Williams Manufacturing 
*  320 Ameren Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  321 Reinsurance Group of America Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   322 Owens-Illinois Manufacturing 
   323 CarMax Retail Trade 
   324 Gilead Sciences Manufacturing 
   325 Precision Castparts Manufacturing 
   326 Visa Service Industries 
   327 Commercial Metals Manufacturing 
*  328 WellCare Health Plans Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   329 AutoZone Retail Trade 
   330 Western Refining Manufacturing 
   331 Dole Food Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 
   332 Charter Communications Nonclassifiable Establishments 
   333 Stryker Manufacturing 
   334 Goodrich Manufacturing 
   335 Visteon Manufacturing 
*  336 NiSource Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   337 AGCO Manufacturing 
*  338 Calpine Transportation, Communications & Utilities 




   340 Hormel Foods Manufacturing 
   341 Affiliated Computer Services Service Industries 
*  342 Thrivent Financial for Lutherans Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   343 Yahoo Service Industries 
*  344 American Family Insurance Group Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   345 Sonic Automotive Retail Trade 
  * 346 Peabody Energy Mining 
   347 Omnicare Retail Trade 
   348 Dillard's Retail Trade 
   349 W.W. Grainger Wholesale Trade 
*  350 CMS Energy Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   351 Fortune Brands Manufacturing 
   352 AECOM Technology Service Industries 
   353 Symantec Service Industries 
*  354 SLM Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   355 DaVita Service Industries 
*  356 KeyCorp Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   357 MeadWestvaco Manufacturing 
   358 Interpublic Group Service Industries 
*  359 Virgin Media Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   360 MGM Mirage Service Industries 
*  361 First American Corp. Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
  * 362 Avery Dennison Manufacturing 
   363 McGraw-Hill Manufacturing 
   364 Enbridge Energy Partners Mining 
   365 Ecolab Manufacturing 
*  366 Fidelity National Financial Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   367 Dover Manufacturing 
   368 Global Partners Wholesale Trade 
*  369 UGI Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   370 Gannett Manufacturing 
   371 Harris Manufacturing 
   372 Barnes & Noble Retail Trade 
   373 Newell Rubbermaid Manufacturing 
   374 Smurfit-Stone Container Manufacturing 
   375 Pitney Bowes Manufacturing 
*  376 CC Media Holdings Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   377 Emcor Group Construction 
   378 Dr Pepper Snapple Group Manufacturing 
   379 Weyerhaeuser Manufacturing 
   380 SunGard Data Systems Service Industries 
   381 CH2M Hill Service Industries 
   382 Pantry Retail Trade 
   383 Domtar Manufacturing 
   384 Clorox Manufacturing 
*  385 Northeast Utilities Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   386 Oshkosh Manufacturing 
  * 387 Mattel Manufacturing 




   389 Advance Auto Parts Retail Trade 
   390 Advanced Micro Devices Manufacturing 
   391 Corning Manufacturing 
   392 Mohawk Industries Manufacturing 
   393 PetSmart Retail Trade 
   394 Reliance Steel & Aluminum Wholesale Trade 
   395 Hershey Manufacturing 
*  396 YRC Worldwide Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   397 Dollar Tree Retail Trade 
   398 Dana Holding Manufacturing 
   399 Cameron International Manufacturing 
   400 Nash-Finch Wholesale Trade 
*  401 Pacific Life Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   402 Terex Manufacturing 
   403 Universal Health Services Service Industries 
*  404 Amerigroup Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   405 Sanmina-SCI Manufacturing 
   406 Jarden Manufacturing 
   407 Tutor Perini Construction 
*  408 Mutual of Omaha Insurance Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   409 Avis Budget Group Service Industries 
   410 Autoliv Manufacturing 
*  411 MasterCard Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   412 Mylan Manufacturing 
*  413 Western Union Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   414 Celanese Manufacturing 
   415 Eastman Chemical Manufacturing 
*  416 Telephone & Data Systems Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   417 Polo Ralph Lauren Manufacturing 
~  418 Auto-Owners Insurance Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   419 Core-Mark Holding Wholesale Trade 
* * 420 Western & Southern Financial Group Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   421 Applied Materials Manufacturing 
   422 Anixter International Wholesale Trade 
*  423 CenturyTel Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   424 Atmos Energy Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
*  425 Universal American Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   426 Ryder System Service Industries 
   427 SPX Manufacturing 
   428 Foot Locker Retail Trade 
   429 O'Reilly Automotive Retail Trade 
   430 Harley-Davidson Manufacturing 
   431 Holly Manufacturing 
   432 Owens Corning Manufacturing 
   432 Micron Technology Manufacturing 
   434 EOG Resources Mining 
   435 Black & Decker Manufacturing 
   436 Big Lots Retail Trade 




   438 Starwood Hotels & Resorts Service Industries 
   439 United Stationers Wholesale Trade 
   440 TravelCenters of America Retail Trade 
*  441 BlackRock Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   442 Laboratory Corp. of America Service Industries 
   443 Health Management Associates Service Industries 
   444 NYSE Euronext Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   445 St. Jude Medical Manufacturing 
  * 446 Tenneco Manufacturing 
   447 El Paso Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   448 Wesco International Wholesale Trade 
   449 Consol Energy Mining 
   450 ArvinMeritor Manufacturing 
   451 NCR Manufacturing 
   452 Unisys Service Industries 
   453 Lubrizol Manufacturing 
   454 Alliant Techsystems Manufacturing 
   455 Washington Post Service Industries 
   456 Las Vegas Sands Service Industries 
   457 Group 1 Automotive Retail Trade 
   458 Genzyme Manufacturing 
   459 Allergan Manufacturing 
   460 Broadcom Manufacturing 
   461 Agilent Technologies Manufacturing 
  * 462 Rockwell Collins Manufacturing 
   463 W.R. Berkley Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   464 PepsiAmericas Manufacturing 
   465 Charles Schwab Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   466 Dick's Sporting Goods Retail Trade 
   467 FMC Technologies Manufacturing 
   468 NII Holdings Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   469 General Cable Manufacturing 
   470 Graybar Electric Wholesale Trade 
   471 Biogen Idec Manufacturing 
   472 AbitibiBowater Manufacturing 
   473 Flowserve Manufacturing 
   474 Airgas Wholesale Trade 
   475 Conseco Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
  * 476 Rockwell Automation Manufacturing 
   477 Kindred Healthcare Service Industries 
   478 American Financial Group Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   479 Kelly Services Service Industries 
   480 Spectrum Group International Service Industries 
   481 RadioShack Retail Trade 
   482 CA Service Industries 
   483 Con-way Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   484 Erie Insurance Group Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   485 Casey's General Stores Retail Trade 




   487 Sealed Air Manufacturing 
   488 Frontier Oil Manufacturing 
   489 Scana Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   490 Live Nation Entertainment Service Industries 
   491 Fiserv Service Industries 
   492 Host Hotels & Resorts Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   493 H&R Block Service Industries 
   494 Electronic Arts Service Industries 
   495 Franklin Resources Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   496 Wisconsin Energy Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   497 Northern Trust Corp. Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   498 MDU Resources Group Transportation, Communications & Utilities 
   499 CB Richard Ellis Group Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
   500 Blockbuster Service Industries 
 
~ 1Sun Microsystems was acquired in early 2010 by Oracle. Since Oracle was already part of the sample, I 
replaced Sun with VF.  Burlington Northern Railroads was acquired in early 2010 by Berkshire Hathaway, 
which is characterized as a “Nonclassifiable Establishment.” I replaced Burlington Northern with 
CenturyTel.  Auto-Owners Insurance is ranked 418 but is a privately held company and I could not locate a 
list of executives or directors.  I replaced it with the next company in Finance, Insurance & Real Estate, 
















Appendix D: Additional Descriptive Statistics for Postsecondary Institutions 
 
Table D.1 
Additional descriptive statistics for characteristics of bachelor’s degree institutions 
 












 Pct N Pct N Pct N Pct N Pct N Pct N 
Location (Census 
Region)a 
            
  Northeast  37.9% 1,201 36.2% 102 34.3% 413 37.9% 272 42.2% 465 47.8% 150 
  Midwest 27.5% 872 30.1% 85 30.7% 369 26.9% 193 23.6% 260 22.9% 72 
  South 22.8% 723 22.3% 63 23.2% 279 23.7% 170 21.9% 242 19.4% 61 
  West  11.9% 376 11.3% 32 11.8% 142 11.4% 82 12.3% 136 9.9% 31 
Public  44.6% 1,412 48.2% 136 51.4% 619 37.1% 266 41.5% 459 36.6% 115 
Private not-for-
profit  
55.1% 1,749 51.4% 145 48.0% 578 62.8% 450 58.3% 643 63.4% 199 
Private for-profit  0.3% 10 0.4% 1 0.5% 6 0.1% 1 0.2% 2 0% 0 
US Service 
Academy 
1.9% 60 2.8% 8 1.0% 12 2.9% 21 1.9% 21 4.1% 13 
HBCUb 1.5% 56 0.4% 1 0.4% 8 4.2% 30 1.5% 17 2.2% 7 
Land grant  19.4% 615 21.3% 60 21.5% 259 15.9% 114 18.6% 205 15.6% 49 
Ivy League 13.6% 430 14.2% 40 8.9% 107 13.7% 98 18.0% 198 19.7% 62 
Carnegie 
Classification 
            
  Doctoral-
granting  
69.6% 2,206 75.2% 212 70.0% 843 64.1% 458 70.5% 777 69.4% 218 
  Master’s/ 
  comprehensive 
12.2% 388 10.0% 28 13.3% 159 12.2% 87 11.8% 130 8.3% 26 
  Liberal Arts 
colleges 
12.6% 398 8.9% 25 11.8% 142 16.1% 115 12.3% 135 14.0% 44 
  Other 5.7% 181 6.1% 17 4.2% 51 7.6% 55 5.5% 60 8.3% 26 
 
Note. In this table, the full sample N represents those who earned a bachelor’s degree – executives without bachelor’s 
degrees are not included in the total, which is 3,172 for all rows except the first. Three groups are not part of the 
statistics: 1) I could not confirm whether 165 had earned a bachelor’s degree or not, 2) 73 do not have a bachelor’s 
degree, and 3) 57 have a bachelor’s degree (because I was able to verify that they held a graduate degree) but I could 
not determine where that degree was from.  In addition, there are 322 who earned international baccalaureate degrees. 
They are only included in the first row.   
Full Sample: first row n=3,494, rest n=3,172;  
For CEOs: first row n=317, rest n=282; 
Senior Managers: first row n=1319, rest n=1203;  
Multiple Directors: first row n=755, rest n=717;  
Single Directors: first row n=1256, rest n=1103;  
Association: first row n=332, rest n=314. 
aThe states included in each geographic region are as follows: Northeast: CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT, NJ, NY and PA; 
Midwest: IN, IL, MI, OH, WI, IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD; South: DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV, AL, 
KY, MS, TN, ARK, LA, OK, TX; West: AZ, CO, ID, NM, MT, UT, NV, WY, AK, CA, HI, WA. 
bI examined statistics for Hispanic Serving Institutions as well as HBCUs, but the N was less than 1 percent of the 











Additional descriptive statistics for characteristics of MBA institutions 
 







N Pct N Pct N Pct N Pct N Pct N Pct 
International MBA 
program (located outside 
of U.S.) 
55 4.3% 8 5.9% 23 4.8% 6 2.0% 20 4.7% 6 4.9% 
Location (Census Region)a             
  Northeast  584 48.0% 54 42.2% 274 59.4% 153 51.2% 227 55.8% 66 56.4% 
  Midwest 320 26.3% 31 24.2% 147 31.9% 79 26.4% 84 20.6% 27 23.1% 
  South 148 12.2% 23 18.0% 73 15.8% 28 9.4% 37 9.1% 14 12.0% 
  West  165 13.6% 20 15.6% 54 11.7% 39 13.0% 59 14.5% 10 8.5% 
Public  298 24.5% 33 25.8% 133 28.9% 69 22.7% 82 20.1% 22 18.8% 
Private not-for-profit  916 75.3% 95 74.2% 325 70.5% 231 77.3% 325 79.9% 95 81.2% 
Private for-profit  3 0.2% 0 0% 3 0.7% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
HBCU 19 1.5% 0 0% 12 2.7% 4 1.3% 5 1.2% 2 1.8% 
Land grant  101 8.3% 9 7.0% 45 9.8% 24 8.0% 28 6.9% 10 8.5% 
 
Note. In this table, the full sample N represents those who earned an MBA degree – executives without MBAs are not 
included in the total. In addition, there are 55 who earned MBAs from international schools. They are only included in 
the first row but not in any of the other rows representing program characteristics.  So, the N for the first row is 1,272 
but it is 1,217 for all others.  
For CEOs: first row n=136, remaining rows n=128; 
Senior Managers: first row n=484, remaining rows n=461; 
Multiple Directors: first row n=305, remaining rows n=299; 
Single Directors: first row n=427, remaining rows n=407; 
Association: first row n=123, remaining rows n=117. 
aThe states included in each geographic region are as follows: 
Northeast: CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT, NJ, NY and PA 
Midwest: IN, IL, MI, OH, WI, IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD 
South: DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV, AL, KY, MS, TN, ARK, LA, OK, TX 







Additional descriptive statistics for characteristics of law schools 
 











 N Pct N Pct N Pct N Pct N Pct N Pct 
International program  16 2.6% 3 6.9% 1 0.4% 4 3.6% 10 4.8% 2 3.2% 
Locationa             
  Northeast  247 40.7% 17 42.5% 122 51.3% 48 44.4% 105 50.2% 34 54.0% 
  Midwest 122 20.1% 8 20.0% 37 15.5% 18 16.7% 33 15.8% 8 12.7% 
  South 185 30.5% 13 32.5% 58 24.4% 34 31.5% 51 24.4% 17 27.0% 
  West  53 8.7% 2 5.0% 21 8.8% 8 7.4% 20 9.6% 4 6.3% 
Public  192 31.6% 10 25.0% 71 29.8% 25 23.1% 65 31.1% 12 19.0% 
Private not-for-profit  415 68.4% 30 75.0% 167 70.2% 83 76.9% 144 68.9% 51 81.0% 
HBCU 14 2.3% 0 0% 6 2.5% 5 4.6% 5 2.4% 1 1.6% 
Land grant  76 12.5% 4 10.0% 30 12.6% 11 10.2% 26 12.4% 3 4.8% 
             
 
Note. In this table, the full sample N represents those who earned a JD – executives without JDs are not included in the 
total. In addition, there are 16 who earned law degrees from international schools. They are only included in the first 
row but not in any of the other rows representing program characteristics. Also, 10 additional individuals who hold JDs 
are not included – three earned their degrees from law schools not accredited by the American Bar Association (which 
do not receive federal funding and therefore are not required to report to IPEDS) and seven had biographical 
information indicating that they hold law degrees, but the specific source of these degrees could not be identified. So, 
the N for the first row is 633 but it is 607 for all others. 
For CEOs: first row n=43, remaining rows n=40; 
Senior Managers: first row n=239, remaining rows n=238; 
Multiple Directors: first row n=112, remaining rows n=108; 
Single Directors: first row n=219, remaining rows n=209; 
Association: first row n=65, remaining rows n=63. 
aThe states included in each geographic region are as follows: 
Northeast: CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT, NJ, NY and PA 
Midwest: IN, IL, MI, OH, WI, IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD 
South: DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV, AL, KY, MS, TN, ARK, LA, OK, TX 






Appendix E: Corporate Positions for Subsample Compared to Full Sample 
 
When identifying the subsample for this analysis, a key criterion was selecting 
universities that are well represented among multiple directors, CEOs, and association 
leaders.  As the table illustrates, proportionally more of these executives are in the 






N Percent N Percent 
Corporate Governance     
  Serves on no corporate boards 1,635 44.2% 115 34.2% 
  Serves on one corporate board  1,377 36.3% 134 39.9% 
  Serves on two or more corporate boards 777 20.5% 87 25.9% 
Top Management     
  Senior managera 1,459 38.5% 111 33.0% 
  Chief executive officer 334 8.8% 29 8.6% 
Business Representatives     
 Not leader of an association  3,455 91.2% 294 87.5% 
 Leader of at least one association 334 8.8% 42 12.5% 
   Committee for Economic Development 33 0.9% 8 2.4% 
   Business Roundtable 102 2.7% 9 2.7% 
   Council on Foreign Relations 93 2.5% 28 8.3% 
   Business Council 182 4.8% 5 1.5% 
 












Appendix G: Study Extension: Full Independent Sample T-Test Results 
Table G.1  
Study extension: Independent sample t-test comparing CEOs & senior managers only  
 










Academic Achievements        
Phi Beta Kappa .125 128 .900 .005 .041 -.076 .086 
Rhodes/Marshall Scholar .760 128 .449 .020 .026 -.032 .071 
Campus academic award -.147 107 .883 -.018 .123 -.262 .226 
Major        
  Business .343 122 .732 .030 .087 -.142 .202 
  Engineering -.442 122 .659 -.037 .084 -.204 .129 
  Liberal arts -.986 122 .326 -.088 .089 -.264 .088 
  Bio./phys. sciences .352 122 .725 .016 .046 -.076 .108 
  Government -.387 122 .699 -.019 .050 -.118 .080 
  Social Sciences .520 122 .604 .039 .074 -.109 .186 
  Economics .765 122 .446 .060 .078 -.095 .214 
Campus Involvement        
Varsity athleticsa -2.240 35.92 .031 -.328 .146 -.625 -.031 
Fraternity/sorority -.437 85 .663 -.056 .127 -.308 .197 
Campus media -2.738 107 .007 -.232 .085 -.401 -.064 
Student societya -1.188 23.32 .247 -.130 .109 -.356 .096 
Club -.158 107 .874 -.040 .256 -.547 .466 
Leadership -.346 107 .730 -.080 .230 -.535 .376 
 
Note. These are the full results summarized in Table 4.21, last column. 





Study extension: Independent sample t-test comparing CEOs & all other executives  
 











Academic Achievements        
Phi Beta Kappa .903 334 .367 .047 .052 -.055 .149 
Rhodes/Marshall Scholar .933 334 .351 .029 .031 -.032 .091 
Campus academic awarda 1.760 42.63 .086 .187 .106 -.027 .401 
Major        
  Business -.239 324 .811 -.017 .073 -.161 .126 
  Engineering .047 324 .963 .004 .082 -.157 .165 
  Liberal arts -1.097 324 .273 -.088 .080 -.245 .070 
  Bio./phys. sciences .699 324 .485 .035 .050 -.063 .133 
  Government -.087 324 .931 -.004 .050 -.102 .094 
  Social Sciences .162 324 .871 .010 .064 -.115 .135 
  Economics .830 324 .407 .061 .073 -.083 .204 
Campus Involvement        
Varsity athleticsa -2.108 28.84 .044 -.291 .138 -.574 -.009 
Fraternity/sorority -.126 254 .900 -.015 .119 -.249 .219 
Campus media -2.498 294 .013 -.184 .074 -.329 -.039 
Student societya -.776 232 .439 -.079 .101 -.279 .121 
Club .816 294 .415 .256 .314 -.362 .874 
Leadership .565 295 .572 .149 .264 -.370 .669 
 
Note. These are the full results summarized in Table 4.21, middle column. 





Study extension: Independent sample t-test comparing Multiple Directors & all other 
executives 
 










Academic Achievements        
Phi Beta Kappa -1.056 334 .292 -.035 .033 -.101 .030 
Rhodes/Marshall Scholara -1.572 103.92 .119 -.041 .026 -.094 .011 
Campus academic award -.831 293 .407 -.093 .112 -.313 .127 
Major        
  Businessa 2.398 204.98 .017 .096 .040 .017 .176 
  Engineeringa -1.993 133.94 .048 -.111 .055 -.220 -.001 
  Liberal arts -.037 324 .971 -.002 .051 -.102 .098 
  Bio./phys. sciences .434 324 .665 .014 .031 -.048 .076 
  Government .434 324 .665 .014 .031 -.048 .076 
  Social Sciences -.724 324 .470 -.029 .040 -.108 .050 
  Economics .387 324 .699 .018 .046 -.073 .109 
Campus Involvement        
Varsity athletics -.712 298 .477 -.050 .070 -.186 .087 
Fraternity/sororitya -1.798 120.91 .075 -.124 .069 -.261 .013 
Campus media 1.074 294 .284 .050 .047 -.042 .142 
Student society -1.766 232 .079 -.108 .061 -.229 .013 
Cluba -1.860 112.91 .065 -.415 .223 -.858 .027 
Leadership -1.191 295 .235 -.196 .165 -.521 .128 
 
Note. These are the full results summarized in Table 4.22, middle column. 







Study extension: Independent sample t-test comparing multiple directors & single 
directors only 
 










Academic Achievements        
Phi Beta Kappa -.343 219 .732 -.014 .041 -.094 .066 
Rhodes/Marshall Scholara -1.564 116.52 .121 -.043 .027 -.096 .011 
Campus academic award .252 198 .801 .035 .138 -.237 .306 
Major        
  Businessa 1.702 210.56 .090 .077 .045 -.012 .167 
  Engineering -1.675 215 .095 -.099 .059 -.215 .017 
  Liberal arts .149 215 .881 .008 .057 -.104 .121 
  Bio./phys. sciences .934 215 .352 .035 .037 -.039 .108 
  Government .747 215 .456 .027 .036 -.044 .099 
  Social Sciences -1.681 215 .094 -.069 .041 -.149 .012 
  Economics .387 215 .699 .020 .051 -.081 .121 
Campus Involvement        
Varsity athletics -.542 202 .589 -.041 .076 -.191 .109 
Fraternity/sorority -1.594 176 .113 -.119 .075 -.266 .028 
Campus mediaa 1.782 198.74 .076 .082 .046 -.009 .173 
Student societya -1.134 97.81 .259 -.088 .078 -.242 .066 
Club -1.109 199 .269 -.261 .236 -.726 .203 
Leadership -.234 200 .816 -.046 .197 -.434 .342 
 
Note. These are the full results summarized in Table 4.22, right column. 





Study extension: Independent sample t-test comparing association leaders & all other 
executives 
 










Academic Achievements        
Phi Beta Kappa -.462 334 .645 -.020 .044 -.107 .067 
Rhodes/Marshall Scholara -2.066 42.48 .045 -.105 .051 -.208 -.003 
Campus academic award -2.906 293 .004 -.411 .141 -.690 -.133 
Major        
  Businessa 1.431 59.85 .158 .074 .052 -.030 .178 
  Engineeringa 2.583 65.55 .012 .138 .053 .031 .244 
  Liberal arts -2.316 324 .021 -.155 .067 -.288 -.023 
  Bio./phys. sciences .509 324 .611 .021 .042 -.061 .104 
  Government -.819 324 .413 -.034 .042 -.117 .048 
  Social Sciencesa -.995 48.02 .325 -.062 .062 -.187 .063 
  Economics .300 324 .764 .019 .062 -.103 .140 
Campus Involvement        
Varsity athletics -1.128 298 .260 -.102 .090 -.280 .076 
Fraternity/sorority -.555 254 .579 -.048 .087 -.220 .123 
Campus media .270 294 .788 .016 .060 -.102 .134 
Student society -2.907 232 .004 -.225 .077 -.377 -.072 
Club -.872 294 .384 -.220 .253 -.718 .277 
Leadership -2.431 295 .016 -.512 .210 -.926 -.097 
 
Note. These are the full results summarized in Table 4.23. 
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